

BY THE HONORABLE
MARTIN HUNTER, Esquire,
 PRESIDENT of His MAJESTY'S Council, and
 (L. S.) Commander in Chief of the Province of New-
 Brunswick, &c. &c. &c.
MARTIN HUNTER,

A PROCLAMATION.
 WHEREAS a Public Fast and Humiliation has been lately appointed by the KING'S Command to be observed throughout England, Wales and the Town of Berwick upon Tweed; I have therefore thought fit, by and with the advice of His MAJESTY'S Council, hereby to order and direct that on WEDNESDAY the seventh day of MARCH next, a Public Fast and Humiliation be observed throughout this Province; that so we may humble ourselves before Almighty GOD, in order to obtain pardon for our Sins, and may, in the most devout and solemn manner, send up our Prayers and supplications for averting those heavy judgments which our manifold provocations have most justly deserved, and imploring the Divine Blessing and assistance on His MAJESTY'S Arms, and for restoring and perpetuating Peace, Safety and Prosperity, to himself and his Dominions.

And whereas a suitable Form of Prayer has been composed by the Right Reverend BISHOP of NOVA-SCOTIA, I do hereby authorize and appoint the same to be used, on this solemn occasion, in all Churches, Chapels, and Places of Public Worship, throughout this Province.

GIVEN under my Hand and Seal at Fredericton, the twenty-second day of January, in the Year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ten, and in the Fifth Year of His MAJESTY'S Reign.
 By the PRESIDENT'S Command,
JON. ODELL.

THE SUBSCRIBER

Is now opening for Sale,
 A CONSIGNMENT OF THE FOLLOWING
 ARTICLES, VIZ.

EXCELLENT Feather Beds and Bedsteads with Curtains, Mattresses, Bolsters, and Pillows; 10-4 11-4 and 12-4 fine merino Blankets—House Linen, viz. Towels, Sheets, Pillow Cases, Quilts, Table Cloths, and Napkins, Kidderminster Carpets, Hearth Rugs, Paper Hangings, &c. &c.—A complete Chest of Carpenters Farmers and Gardeners Tools and Implements.

N. B. As the above were manufactured for home consumption they will be found of a superior quality.

JAMES CODNER.

St. John, 29th January, 1810. 3w. 9

LIST OF LETTERS

In the Post-Office at Schoodic, (opposite St. Andrews,) January 1, 1810.

Names.	Residence.	Dls.	Cts.
Auldjo, Maitland & Co.	Quebec	25	
Adams, Amos	St. John	17	
Boyd, Mrs. E.	Halifax	25	
Bailey, Eliphaz	Montreal	17	
Brofson, Robert	Halifax	25	
Clarke, Michael	New-Brunswick	10	
Crosby, Rev. Michael	St. Augustins	17	
Croton, Joseph	Halifax	25	
Charker, G.	ditto	27	
Cushing, Mary	St. John	17	
Carman, Phineas & Co.	New-Brunswick	17	
Dougherty, Martin	St. John	25	
Digby, Mrs. Dilou	Nova-Scotia	25	
Davis, William	Halifax	25	
Deblois, Steph. Wm. & Co.	ditto	25	
Dechamps, Mrs. Ann	ditto	25	
Dexter, Andrew Junr.	Windfor	17	
Eastman, Robert	New-Brunswick	12	
Fisher, George	Halifax	50	
Fowler, Elijah	Horton	19	
Frazier, Daniel	Halifax	19	
Harford, Solomon	Kingston, N. S.	17	
Hena pere, Monsieur	Halifax	25	
Jack, Alexander	ditto	19	
Jones, Edward	Kingston, N. S.	25	
Johnson, Robert	St. John's, N. F.	19	
King, Hezekiah	Fort Cumberland	17	
Lawrance, George	Sackville, N. B.	17	
Lawson, John	Halifax	25	
Lovett, Phineas	New-Brunswick	27	
Mahoney, D. 41ft R. foot	Canada	25	
Martin, George	St. Andrews	13	
Maloney, Hugh	Sidney Island	25	
Milnes, James	Pictou, N. S.	25	
M'Donagh, Michael	St. John's, N. F.	27	
M'Fadin, John	Cumberland, N. S.	27	
M'Grath, John	Canada	25	
Nesmith, William	St. John	25	
Newton, Maucell	Halifax	27	
Pryor, Edward	ditto	17	
Pearl, Mrs. Cassandra	Manchester, N. S.	20	
Palmer, Daniel	Maugerville, N. B.	10	
Paint & Lemefurier	Newfoundland	27	
Scovil, Mrs. Amy	Kingston	25	
Smith, David	Halifax	25	
Schwind, John F. T. G.	ditto	22	
Smith, Peter	ditto	25	
Scaife, Robert	ditto	27	
Scott, Henry	ditto	17	
Spurr, Samuel	Magaguadavic	17	
Stetson, Gerlbom	St. John	17	
Stevens, Simon	Weymouth, N. S.	25	
Thurston, Jason	Sheffield, N. B.	17	
Taylor, Rufus G.	Halifax	27	
Wood, Francis 2 letters	Shelburne, N. S.	50	
Webbler, Andrew	Horton	17	
Young, George	St. John	25	
R. W. Grand Secretary of the G. L. of Nova-Scotia, Halifax,		1	75

JOHN BREWER, Post-Master.

From the BOSTON COLUMBIAN CENTINEL.
 The Diplomatic Policy of Mr. MADISON Unveiled.

No. V.

**THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS AND ISSUE OF
 MR. ERSKINE'S ARRANGEMENT.**

IT has been shewn that this arrangement originated in proposals transmitted by Mr. Erskine as from our own government:—That the instructions were formed upon a basis supposed to have been proposed by them:—That the convention itself affords no evidence of sincerity on the part of our administration, because it was concluded not only without a demand of Mr. Erskine's full powers, without a knowledge that such powers existed, but with the express knowledge that he violated what he had stated to be his Instructions. We have endeavored to shew a good reason why our Government should be willing to take such a hazardous step with the full conviction that the agreement would be rejected—that the tendency of it would be to widen the breach between the two countries, and therefore would be the most grateful offering which Mr. Madison could make to his own party, and that as such it has been received—received as a pledge of his devotion to their views, of his disposition to gratify the most favorite wishes of their hearts.

Mr. Madison had further motives sufficiently powerful to induce him to take this bold and artful step.

The Non-intercourse with Great-Britain, as a substitute to the Embargo, pleased no party in the United States.—It was an extorted compromise with the different parties in our country. To the southern states it afforded but an imperfect relief. The necessity of transshipment, of a circuitous voyage in order to bring their staple productions to their best market, Great-Britain, afforded them only a partial remedy. Whatever may be the pretences of Mr. Madison, that the United States have suffered an "irreparable injury" by Mr. Erskine's agreement, and that Great-Britain has gained an essential advantage, the people of the United States know and feel the contrary to be the fact.—The most popular act therefore Mr. Madison could have performed was the opening of the direct trade with Great-Britain.—This he well knew, and this the experience of the short interval of freedom abundantly proves.

Another consideration powerfully operated with Mr. Madison.—It had been contended by Mr. Madison and his party from the time of his famous resolutions 1795, that America held the destinies of Great-Britain in the hollow of her hand—that we had only to open our granaries and the enjoyed plenty—and to close them and she starved. The Embargo was the effect and the experiment of this policy.—Although it disappointed all the hopes of its friends, yet the folly of Mr. Erskine (to use the mildest term) seemed to offer them a hope of proving to their party, what experience had already convinced the leaders was not true, that their prophecies were correct. If the second nation in Europe could be compelled to relinquish her general policy, without a substitute, merely by our restrictive energies, the triumph of Mr. Madison was complete.

Although, therefore, he might have known, and as we have shewn did know, that Great-Britain never meant to recede from her system of retaliation, but with a substitute on our part, which would completely supersede it and occupy its place; yet when he found a feeble minister capable of being cajoled by general professions, and influenced by a desire of assisting the party to which his father and himself belonged in Great-Britain, who (always in opposition) had particularly opposed the British retaliating Orders: is it extraordinary that Mr. Madison should be willing to agree to an arrangement, though persuaded that it would be rejected, which would afford a temporary triumph to his principles? His game was a certain one he could not be a loser, and he might gain immortal glory.

If, said he, Great-Britain unwilling as I know her to be, to enter into a contest with us, shall ratify the unauthorized act of her minister, then we can justly boast that our policy, our restrictive, pacific, energetic policy, has brought to our feet the proud mistress of the ocean; my praise will be in all the cities; and France, grateful for my co-operation, will add new praises and new laurels to my brow.—But if Great-Britain, indignant at the conduct of her minister, shall refuse to ratify, we shall have created a new cause of complaint; I shall be fixed more firmly than ever in the affections of my party, and in the good will of France.

Though these considerations were sufficient to any reasonable calculating politician, yet Mr. Madison looked still deeper. "The passions of a populace (he must have said "to himself) are not so easily controuled. The leaders "must consult these passions, not attempt to direct them. "It is too Herculean a task to hope to render a state of "peace with Great-Britain popular. The federalists and "men of property will support me, to be sure, but an honest "peace with England will destroy the firmest admini- "stration. To avoid then this rock upon which even "Washington's administration had almost split, I will take "care (said Mr. Madison) so to conduct this negotiation "that it shall be impossible, absolutely impossible, for Great- "Britain to accede to the arrangement."

In examining Mr. Erskine's agreement we accordingly find a language adopted by our Cabinet which breathes the spirit of defiance, rather than of friendship; which resembles rather a manner of war than a friendly discussion leading to a permanent peace.

When parties suppose they are about to settle their differences; it is common and it is natural to adopt a language of conciliation. In this case we find no courtesy but a spirit of reproof. Great-Britain had contended, that it was our duty, to repel the aggressions of France, and she had manifested a disposition uniformly to withdraw her Orders in Council whenever we should take any effectual steps to vindicate our own rights against France, in the vindication of which she herself had a direct interest:—For her Orders in Council were nothing more than retaliating upon her enemy that injustice which neutrals (the only one of which remaining was America) permitted France to inflict upon her through their flags.

As soon then as Great-Britain found we were disposed

to resist the decrees of France, she was ready to withdraw her Orders in Council, inasmuch as our laws, if duly enforced, would supersede the necessity of her blockade.

Upon this basis Mr. Erskine's arrangement is professedly founded—but although this was the only ground upon which Great-Britain could with any honor as it respected her enemy withdraw her Orders in Council, yet our Ministers insisted in this pretended and affected pacific arrangement, a clause which took away from Great-Britain the only salvo to her pride—the only apology for her honor. They declared that the act prohibiting intercourse with France did not "proceed from any disposition to produce an equality "between the two nations but arose from separate and dis- "tinct considerations."—In other words, lest you should presume that we were actuated by a sense of justice to you or by your remonstrances on that subject, we declare we had no intention to do you justice, and your acknowledgment and repeal we choose to have considered as a pure concession to us and to our forcible and energetic measures.

A still more affrontive clause was added to the acceptance of satisfaction for the Chesapeake.

The Government of the United States did accept, as a full and complete satisfaction, the terms which Great-Britain offered. If peace had been the object it should have been received with good will, but in lieu of this, our Minister told Mr. Erskine, after agreeing to the terms, "that it "would have been more for the honor of his Britannic Ma- "jesty to have punished Admiral Berkeley."

Admit the fact thus offensively known alleged, if you choose:—Admit it was disreputable in his Britannic Majesty not to punish Admiral Berkeley:—Still we agreed to accept of a satisfaction without it—and if a good understanding had been wished or expected, we ought to have abstained from such offensive terms.

It cannot be necessary to men of sentiment to add, that to say that it would have been more to his Britannic Majesty's honor to have done a certain thing is tantamount to saying that to omit doing it is dishonorable.

Is this the administration which is so alive to the insults of Mr. Jackson, which no man can perceive and no man point out?

The fact is well known, that when these expressions were read in the British Parliament all the bitter distinctions of party were melted away, and dissipated in one common sense of indignation at an unmerited unprovoked, and deliberate insult at a moment of affected reconciliation.

Mr. Erskine has never found a defender in Parliament: No, nor even in the prostituted vehicles of the opposition.

Where then do we find the evidence of sincerity of our government? In making a treaty without demanding the powers of the Agent? In forming a convention with a man who stated that he was violating his instructions? Or in the unprecedented affrontive language made use of after a compromise had been agreed to?

In the present number I have only time to add one more proof to those I have already adduced of insincerity. It is a fact that although this arrangement was made with Great-Britain, all the democratic papers continued the same virulent abuse of that government which they had used when we were on the eve of a war.

But a more material fact is, that Mr. Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Seaver, democratic Member of Congress from Norfolk, on the 4th of July, at Dedham; and the Marshal of this District, are said, all of them before the disavowal of Great-Britain was known in this country, to have publicly declared that they feared the agreement would not be ratified, because Mr. Erskine had exceeded his powers.—How did these gentlemen divine this? If from our Cabinet the information was derived, what becomes of their sincerity, what of their honesty in clamoring against Great-Britain for an act which their own consciences had taught them to expect?

No. VI.

**THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS AND ISSUE OF
 MR. ERSKINE'S ARRANGEMENT.**

Another circumstance, the tendency of which is to prove the insincerity of our Cabinet, in the agreement with Mr. Erskine, is the appointment of Mr. Adams, as Minister to Russia. I have been astonished that so little consequence has been attached to this measure which, in any country of Europe, would have excited the most curious inquiry, and the most serious alarm. The time in which his nomination was first made, the knowledge that a serious coalition had been just then formed to destroy the commercial power of Great-Britain, the illegal and unauthorized appointment of Mr. Shortt, by Mr. Jefferson, at such a juncture—the nearly unanimous refusal to sanction that appointment—the solemn vote of the Senate on the motion of Mr. Lloyd, (one of the most intelligent merchants in either branch) "that any mission to Russia was inexpedient and unnecessary;" the conviction in the mind of every intelligent man, that this vote of the Senate was correct, are all of them proofs that this measure has some object beyond its first appearance. We have passed thirty years safely and prosperously without a Minister to Russia; our trade to that country inconsiderable, in itself, was perfectly well managed without an Consul and was certainly sufficiently secure with an able Consul-General. Russia is not an important naval power; and it is on the ocean alone that the theatre of American politics is erected.

When therefore Mr. Jefferson, at a moment of hostility with Great-Britain, nominated a Minister to Russia: when he selected for that purpose the man, the most completely pledged of any citizen in the United States—the man who had justified the Berlin decrees as merely retaliatory on the British rule of 1756, all prudent men stood appalled.—Even an obedient Senate, so complaisant in general to the Executive, could not discern the expediency of multiplying our foreign relations. A momentary compunction seemed to take possession of the party, which had for so many years opposed the extension of our diplomatic connections.

Mr. Jefferson was disgraced.—The Senate almost unanimously voted that any mission to Russia was inexpedient.—Without doubt many of them thought that to multiply and to draw closer our connections with the Allies of France