

NEW-YORK, JULY 23.

The letters of Mr. Erskine, which we this day copy from the National Intelligencer, will serve as documents to prove the facts that were stated in our *Historical Fragment*, published some few days since. They will also open the eyes of many people as to Erskine's arrangement. It seems these letters have been in the possession of our Government since the 21st of April last, if not longer; as Mr. Gallatin's exculpatory letter bears that date. It was these letters which caused the difference among the members of our Cabinet. They quarrelled about them before the adjournment of Congress; but it seems they had prudence and cunning enough to keep them from the members and from the public. It appears, however, that there was an intention to publish them much sooner, and Mr. Gallatin's piece "for the National Intelligencer" was written to accompany them. Whether Mr. Gallatin's apology will be satisfactory to the friends of Jefferson or not, time must determine;—We think the development of this affair will not be very satisfactory to the nation. We shall wait for the other letters promised by the Intelligencer, and after giving the whole, shall make a few remarks. In the mean time we would request our readers to give these letters an attentive perusal, and bear in mind that these conversations led to the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, a history of which transaction we shall give in some future paper.

From the National Intelligencer, July 19.

The correspondence between Mr. Canning and Mr. Erskine laid before the House of Lords of Great-Britain, and printed by their order, contains four letters from Mr. Erskine which do not appear to have been published in any English or American newspaper.—They are now published from a printed copy lately put into our hands, all the other papers contained in that collection having already appeared in the papers.

(No. 8.)

Dispatch from the Hon. David Erskine, to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated Washington, 31 December, 1808.

SIR,—The Government and Congress having been quite at a loss how to act in the present extraordinary and embarrassing situation of their public affairs, and they have not yet determined upon the measures which they mean to pursue; but I think I may venture to assure you, that the course of conduct recommended by the committee of the House of Representatives, to which was referred the documents mentioned in the President's message to Congress, will, in substance, at least, be adopted for the present, with certain amendments, so as to give some time previous to its going into operation.

It is not, however, denied by those even who have introduced this measure, that it is only of a temporary nature, and that the United States may be driven to adopt a more decided course of conduct against the belligerents before the present Congress closes, or at any rate soon after the meeting of the new Legislature, in consequence of the feelings and sentiments of the Eastern division of the United States, which has almost universally expressed a disapprobation of the continuance of the embargo, and has begun to shew symptoms of a determination not to endure it much longer.

The government and party in power unequivocally express their resolution not to remove the embargo, except by substituting war measures against both belligerents, unless either or both should relax their restrictions upon neutral commerce.

Upon this subject some important communications have been made to me by Mr. Madison, and several of the members of this government, which I will accordingly lay before you, as I confidently believe they were delivered from an unfeigned desire that they might produce the effect of leading if possible to some adjustment of their differences with Great-Britain, so as to enable the government and the nation to extricate themselves from the present very distressing dilemma in which they are involved.

Mr. Madison expressed his firm conviction that when the documents referred to in the President's Message should be seen by his Majesty's government, and the correspondences between their minister in France with the French minister respecting the decrees of Berlin and Milan, should be deliberately considered; particularly the strong remonstrance of Mr. Armstrong to the French Government of the 12th November, 1807, that it would be acknowledged that the United States had exerted all the efforts which remonstrances could have been supposed to be capable of producing, and that in failure of any effect from them in persuading the French government to withdraw their unjust restrictions upon neutral commerce, recourse might have been had by the United States to measures of more activity and decision against France; but that in the mean time Great-Britain had issued her Orders in Council, before it was known whether the United States would acquiesce in the aggressions of France, and thereby rendered it impossible to distinguish between the conduct of the two belligerents, who had equally committed aggressions against the United States.

He went also into all the arguments upon that subject which are detailed in his correspondences with the American ministers in London and Paris, as published in the documents referred to in the President's message, but which I do not now repeat, as my object is merely to inform you of the result of his observations, which was, that as the world must be convinced that America had in vain taken all the means in her power to obtain from Great-Britain and France a just attention to her rights as a neutral power, by representations and remonstrances, that she would be fully justified in having recourse to hostilities with either belligerent, and that she only hesitated to do so, from the difficulty of contending with both; but that she must be driven even to endeavour to maintain her rights against the two greatest powers in the world, unless either of them should relax their restrictions upon neutral commerce, in which case the United States would at once side with that power against the other which might continue its aggressions.

Mr. Madison observed to me that it must be evident that the United States would enter upon measures of hostility with great reluctance, as he acknowledged that they are not at all prepared for war, much less with a power so irresistibly strong as Great-Britain, and that nothing would be

thought to be too great a sacrifice to the preservation of peace, except their independence and their honor. He said that he did not believe that any Americans would be found willing to submit to (what he termed) the encroachments upon the liberty of the rights of the United States, by the belligerents, and therefore the alternatives were embargo or war. He confessed that the people of this country were beginning to think the former alternative too passive, and would perhaps soon prefer the latter as even less injurious to the interests and more congenial with the spirit of a free people.

He declared to me that every opinion on which he ascertained respecting the best interests of his country led him to wish that a good understanding should take place between Great-Britain and the United States, and that he thought that the obvious advantages which would thereby result to both countries were a sufficient pledge of the sincerity of his sentiments.

The reasons which induce me to believe that the views and determinations of this government, as described to me by Madison are their real sentiments, and that they will pursue the course of conduct which they have marked out, arise from a mature consideration of the actual state of the affairs of this country, the particular situation of the government and ruling party, and from certain private but important communications which have been made to me by some of the members of the administration, who are sincerely desirous of a conciliation with Great-Britain.

It is evident from every thing which has lately taken place in this country, that the people at large are desirous of having the embargo removed; but it is also to be recollected from the result of the elections throughout the United States, that the present ruling party have a decided majority of the people with them, and as they have pledged themselves not to repeal it, while the restrictions upon their neutral rights continue in force by both belligerents, without substituting war measures, and as they themselves acknowledge "that the ultimate and only effectual mode of resisting such warfare, if persisted in, is war," and "that a permanent suspension of commerce would not properly be resorted to, but submission;" I cannot therefore conceive that it would be possible for them to retract their declarations, and indeed, they would not have the power of continuing the embargo more than six months, and of course therefore they must substitute war measures when it should be withdrawn, unless they were to abandon all the principles they have laid down, and to change all the resolutions which they have so unequivocally expressed.

It is true that they might possibly do so, if they found themselves pressed by the number and strength of their opponents, or by a change in their opinions of their majority amongst the people; but it is plain from the decision in the House of Representatives in Congress, upon the resolutions proposed by the committee appointed to consider the subject of their foreign relations, which were carried by a majority of eighty-four to twenty-one, that they have not lost any ground in the present Congress, and the result of the elections for members of Congress, proves, that although they have lost some votes in the Eastern States, that they will have a great majority out of the whole number of the next Congress.

For these reasons I conclude that the government party could carry along with them the support of the people in the measures they might resolve to take, and I have already explained why I believe they will adopt the course of conduct which I have described in the foregoing part of this dispatch, arising out of the state of the country and their own particular situation, and I will therefore proceed to explain my private reasons for feeling confirmed in their opinions, and will have the honor of laying before you some important communications which were made to me by some of the members of this government, unofficially, but with a desire that they might produce a favorable effect towards a conciliation with Great-Britain, I beg leave to refer you to my next number, in which they are detailed.

I have the honor to be,

With the highest respect, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

D. M. ERSKINE.

(No. 9)

Dispatch from the Hon. David Erskine to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated Washington, 4th Dec. 1808.

SIR,—In the course of several private interviews which I had with Mr. Gallatin the Secretary of the Treasury, and with Mr. Smith the Secretary of the Navy, I have collected from them that their sentiments coincide with those of Mr. Madison, which I have detailed at some length in the preceding number of my dispatches, respecting the proper course of conduct which ought to be pursued by the United States, in their present situation, although they had differed as to the propriety of laying on the embargo, as a measure of defence, and had thought that it would have been better to have resorted to measures of a more decided nature at first, but that now they had no other means left, but to continue it for a short time longer, and then in the event of no change taking place in the conduct of the belligerents towards the United States, to endeavour to assert their rights against both powers; but that if either should relax in their aggressions, they said they would vote for taking part with that one against the other which should continue its aggressions.

Mr. Gallatin remarked to me, that the resolutions which were proposed by the committee of Foreign Relations in their report to the House of Representatives, and which had already passed in the committee of the whole House, and would perhaps soon pass into a law, seemed to him to remove two very important grounds of difference with Great-Britain, viz. the non-importation Act, as applicable to her alone, and the President's proclamation, whereby the ships of Great-Britain were excluded from the ports of the United States, while those of France were permitted to enter, but now, by the non-intercourse law both powers were placed on the same footing; he did not pretend to say that this measure had been taken from any motives of concession to Great-Britain; but as in fact those consequences followed, he conceived that they might be considered as removing the

two great obstacles to a conciliation. This he wished might be the case, as he intimated to me that such steps were about to be taken by Congress upon another very important subject of the differences between the two countries, as might have a further effect in leading to a favorable adjustment of them. He informed me, that a law was about to be proposed to Congress, and which he believed would pass, to interdict all American vessels from receiving on board any foreign seamen, under heavy penalties or forfeitures, and that already the ships of war of the United States had been ordered not to receive any, and to discharge such as were at that time on board. This subject is also alluded to by Mr. Giles, the Senator, in his speech, who is high in the confidence of the government, and, it is said, is to be Mr. Madison's Secretary of State. Mr. Gallatin also said, that he knew that it was intended by the United States to abandon the attempt to carry on a trade with the colonies of the belligerents in time of war which was not allowed in time of peace, and to trust to their being permitted by the French to carry on such trade in peace so as to enable them to a continuance of it in time of war.

In this manner he observed all the points of difference between Great-Britain and the United States might be smoothed away (was his expression) and that the United States would be willing to put the intercourse with Great-Britain upon a perfect footing of reciprocity, and would either consent to the arrangement that the ships of both nations should pay the same duties reciprocally, or place each other simply upon the footing of the most favored nation.

I have no doubt that these communications were made with a sincere desire that they might produce the effect of conciliation, because it is well known that Mr. Gallatin has long thought that the restrictive and jealous system of non-importation laws, extra duties, and other modes of checking a free trade with Great-Britain have been erroneous, and highly injurious to the interests of America; he informed me, distinctly, that he had always entertained that opinion, and that he had uniformly endeavoured to persuade the President to place the conduct of Great-Britain and France towards the United States in a fair light before the public. He seemed to check himself at the moment he was speaking upon that subject, and I could not get him to express himself more distinctly, but I could clearly collect from his manner, and from some slight insinuations, that he thought the President had acted with partiality towards France. For he turned the conversation immediately upon the character of Mr. Madison, and said that he could not be accused of having such a bias towards France; and remarked that Mr. Madison was known to be an admirer of the British constitution, to be generally well disposed towards the nation, and to be entirely free from any enmity to its general prosperity. He appealed to me, whether I had not observed that he frequently spoke with approbation of its institutions, its energy and spirit, and that he was thoroughly well versed in its history, literature and arts.

These observations he made at that time for the purpose of contrasting the sentiments of Mr. Madison with those of the President, as he knew that I must have observed that Mr. Jefferson never spoke with approbation of any thing that was British, and always took up French topics in his conversation, and always praised the people and country of France, and never lost an opportunity of shewing his dislike to Great-Britain.

At the close of my interview with Mr. Gallatin, he said in a familiar way; "You see, Sir, we could settle a treaty in my private room in two hours, which might perhaps be found to be as lasting as if it was bound up in all the formalities of a regular system; and might be found as reciprocally useful as a treaty consisting of twenty-four articles, in which the intricate points of intercourse might be in vain attempted to be reconciled to the opposite, and perhaps, jealous views of self-interest of the respective countries."

I have taken the liberty of detailing to you the substance of this unofficial conversation with Mr. Gallatin, in order to explain to you the grounds upon which I have formed my opinion that the members of the present government who it is expected will belong also to the next, would be desirous of settling the differences of the United States with Great-Britain, to enable them to extricate the country and themselves from the difficulties in which they are involved; for it is now, I believe, determined that Mr. Gallatin will accept his present office under Mr. Madison, which was at one time doubted. The character of Mr. Gallatin must be well known to you, to be held in the greatest respect in this country for his unrivalled talents as a financier and as a statesman. There cannot I think be any reasonable doubt entertained that he is heartily opposed to French aggrandizement, and to the usurpations of Bonaparte. He was an enthusiast in favor of the French revolution, in the early period of it, but has long since abandoned the favourable opinions he had entertained respecting it, and has viewed the progress of France towards universal dominion with jealousy and regret.

How far the good will of this government and country towards Great-Britain may be worth, in the estimation of his Majesty's government, the sacrifice of the Orders in Council and of the impression which they might be expected to make on France, it would be presumptuous in me to venture to calculate, but I am thoroughly persuaded that at THAT PRICE it might be obtained.

I have endeavoured, by the most strict and diligent enquiries into the views and strength of the federal party to ascertain to what extent they would be willing and able to resist the measures of the party in power, and how far they could carry the opinions of this country along with them in their attempts to remove the Embargo, without recurring to hostilities against both Great-Britain and France.

Upon a mature consideration of this subject I am persuaded that great as the desire is which generally prevails for the removal of the Embargo that the federalists would not venture to recommend that it should be withdrawn, without proposing some measures of greater energy as a substitute. Some have indeed hinted at the propriety of at once declaring war against France; but few, however, of those who have been most clamorous against the embargo, have yet offered their opinions as to what course ought to be pursued,