UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 9. IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS:

COMMUNICATED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

From General ARMSTRONG to Mr. MADISON.

"Since my arrival at this place [in Bourbonnais, about one third of the way between Paris and Bayonne] I have been honored by the receipt of your dispatch of the 21st ult, and would immediately return to Paris to revew my discussions with M. Champagny either personally, as you suggest, or by writing, had I not the most solemn conviction that any new experiment made at the present moment in either form and of official character, would certainly be use-less and prebably injurious,"

From Mr. PINCKNEY to Mr. CANNING. Great Cumberland Place, Aug. 23d, 1808.

Sir-I have had the honor, in consequence of the orders of the President, to recal your attention, in the course of several recent interviews, to the British Orders in Council of the 7th of January, and 1th of November, 1807, and to the various orders sounded upon or in execution of them; and I now take the liberty to renew, in the mode which I have understood to be indispensable, my instances on that subject.

I need scarcely to remind you, Sir, that the government of the United States has never ceased to consider these orders as violating its rights, and effecting most destructively its interests, upon grounds wholly inadmissable both in prin-

The letters of Mr. Madison to Mr. Erskine, of the 20th and 29th of March, 1807, produced by the official communication of that Minister of the order of the 7th January, and the answer of Mr. Madison of the 25th March, 1808, to a like communication of the orders of the 11th November, contained the most direct remonstrances against the system which these orders introduce and execute, and expressed

That expectation has not yet been fulfilled, but it has, not withflanding, not been relinquished. The President is still persuaded that its accomplishment will result from a careful review by his Majesty's government, made in the spirit of moderation and equity, of the facts and considerati-

the confident expectation of the President that it would not

It is not my purpose to recapitulate in this note the statements and reasonings contained in the above-mentioned letters of Mr. Madison, in support of the claim of the government of the United States, that the British orders be revoked. I content myself with referring to those letters for proofs which it is not necessary to repeat, and for argu-

But there are explanations which those letters do not contain, and which it is proper for me now to make.—Even, these, however, may be very briefly given, since you have already been made acquainted in our late conversations with

These explanations go to shew, that while every motive of justice, conspires to produce a disposition that all the orders of which my government complains, it is become apparent that even their professed object will be best attained by their revocation.

I had the honor to flate to you, Sir, that it was the intention of the President, in case Great-Britain repealed her orders, as regarded the United States, to exercise the power vested in him by an act of the last Session of Congress [Here the title of the act is recited] by suspending the embargo law and its supplements, as it regards Great-Britain.

I am authorised to give you this assurance in the most formal manner; and I trust that upon impartial inquiry it will be found to have no inducement to perseverance in the British orders, while it creates the most powerful inducements of equity and policy to abandon them.

On the score of justice it does not seem possible to mistake the footing upon which this overture places the subject; and I venture to believe that in any other view, there is as little room for doubt.

If, as I propose, your orders should be rescinded as to the United States, and our embargo rescinded as to Great-Britain, the effect of these concurrent acts will be that the commercial intercourse of the two countries will be immediately resumed; while, if France should adhere to maxims and conduct derogatory to the neutral rights of the United States, the embargo continuing, as to her, will take the place of your orders, and had with an efficacy, not merely equal to theirs, but probably much greater, to all the consequences that ought to result from them.

On the other hand, if France should concur in respecting those rigors, and commerce should thus regain its fair
immunities, and the law of nations its just dominion, all the
alledged purposes of the British orders will have been at
once fulfilled.

If I forbear to pursue these ideas through all the illustrations of which they are susceptible, it is because the personal conferences to which I have before alluded, as well as the obvious nature of the ideas themselves, render it unnecessary.

I cannot conclude this note without expressing my sincere with that what I have now suggested, in conformity with the liberal sentiments and enlightened views of the President, may contribute not only to remove the more immediate obstacles to the ordinary intercourse of trade between your country and mine, in a manner consistent with the honor of both, but to prepare the way for a satisfactory adjustment of every question important to their future friendship.

I have the honor to be,

With the highest consideration, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
(Signed) WM. PINCKNEY.

Here follows an extract of a letter from Mr. P. to Mr. M. covering the following copy of Mr. Canning's answer to the above.]

From Mr. CANNING to Mr. PINCKNEY. Foreign Office, September 231, 1808.

The underlighted his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for foreign affairs, had the honor to receive the official letter addressed to him by Mr. Pinckney, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States respecting the orders in council issued by his Majesty on the 7th January and 11th November 1807.

He has laid that letter before the King, and he is commanded to affure Mr. Pinckney that the answer to the proposal which Mr. Pinckney was instructed to bring forward, has been deferred only in the hope that the renewed application which was understood to have been recently made by the government of the United States to that of France, might, in the new flate of things which has arisen in Europe, have met with such a reception in France, as would have rendered the compliance of his Majesty with that proposal consistent as much with his Majesty's own dignity and with the interests of his people, as it would have been with his Majesty's disposition towards the United States. Unhappily there is now no longer any reason to believe that such a hope is likely to be realized; and the underfigned is therefore commanded to communicate to Mr. Pinckney the decision which under the circumstances as they fland, his Majelly feels himself compelled, however, unwillingly, to adopt.

The mitigated measure of retaliation, announced by his Majesty in the orders in council of the 7th January, and the further extension of that measure (an extension in operation but not in principle) by the orders in council of November, were founded (as has been already repeatedly avowed by his Majesty) on the "unquestionable right of his Majesty to retort upon the enemy the evils of his own injustice"—and upon the consideration that "if third parties incidently suffered by these retaliatory measures, they were to seek their redress from the power by whose original aggression that retaliation was occasioned."

His Majesty sees nothing in the Embargo laid on by the President of the United States of America, which varies this original and simple state of the question.

If confidered as a measure of impartial hostility against both belligerents, the Embargo appears to his Majesty to have been manifestly unjust, as, according to every principle of justice, that redress ought to have been first sought from the party originating the wrong. And his Majesty cannot consent to buy off that hostility which America ought not to have extended to him, at the expence of a concession made not to America but to France.

If as it has more generally been represented by the government of the United States, the Embargo is only to be confidered as an innocent municipal regulation which affects none but the U. S. themselves, and with which no foreign slate has any concern; viewed in this light, his Majesly does not conceive that he has the right or the pretention to make any complaint of it, and he has made none. But in this light there appears not only no reciprocity, but no assignable relation, between the repeal by the United States of a measure of voluntary self-restriction, and the surrender by his Majesly of his right of retaliation against his enemies.

The government of the United States is not now to be informed that the Berlin decree of Nov. 21, 1806, was the practical commencement of an attempt not merely to check or impair the prosperity of Great-Britain, but utterly to annihilate her political existence, through the ruin of her commercial prosperity; that in this attempt almost all the Powers of the European continent have been compelled more or less to co-operate; and that the American Embargo, though most affuredly not intended to that end (for America can have no political interells in the subversion of the British power and her rulers are too enlightened to act from any impulse against the real interests of their country) but by some unfortunate concurrence of circumstances, without any hostile intention, the American Embargo did come in aid of " the blockade of the European continent" precisely at the very moment when, if that blockade could have forceeded at all, this interpolition of the American government would most effectually have contributed to its success.

To this universal combination, his Majesty has opposed a temperate but a determined retaliation upon the enemy; trusting that a firm resistance would defeat this project, but knowing that the smallest concession would infallibly encourage a perseverance in it.

The flruggle has been viewed by other powers not without an apprehension that it might be fatal to this country. The British government has not disguised from itself that the trial of such an experiment might be arduous and long; though it has never doubted of the final iffice. But if that issue, such as the British government considently anticipated, has providentially arrived much sooner than could have been hoped; if " the blockade of the continent," as it has been triumphantly fivled by the enemy, is raifed even before it had been well ellablished, and if that system, of which extent and continuity were the vital principles, is broken up into fragments utterly harmless and contemptible; it is nevertheless important in the highest degree to the reputation of this country (a reputation which constitutes great part of her power) that this disappointment of the hopes of her enemies should not have been purchased by any concellion; that not a doubt should remain to distant times of her determination and of her ability to have continued her resissance; and that no slep which could even mistakenly be construed into concession should be taken on her part, while the smallest link of the confederacy remains undiffolved; or while it can be a question whether the plan devised for her destruction has or has not either completely failed or been unequivocatly abandoned.

These considerations compel his Majesty to adhere to the principles on which the orders in council of the 7th January and the 11th November are founded, so long as France adheres to that system by which his Majesty's retuliatory measures were occasioned and justified.

It is not improbable, indeed, that some alterations may be made in the orders in council, as they are at present framed; alterations calculated not to abate their spirit, or impair their principle, but to adapt them more exactly to the different state of things which has fortunately grown up in

Europe, and to combine all practicable relief to neutrals,

with a more severe pressure upon the enemy.

But of alterations to be made with this, view only, it would be uncanded to take any advantage in the present discussion; however it might be hoped, in their practical effect, they might prove beneficial to America, provided the operation of the embargo were not to prevent her from reaping that benefit.

It remains for the underlighted, to take notice of the last paragraph of Mr. Pinckney's letter. There cannot exist on the part of Mr. Pinckney, a stronger wish than there does on that in the underlighted, and of the British government for the adjustment of all the differences subsisting between the two countries.

His Majesty has no other disposition than to cultivate the most friendly intercourse with the United States.

The underlighed is perfuaded that Mr. Pinckney would be one of the last to imagine, what is often idly afferted, that the deprellion of any other country is necessary, or serviceable to the prosperity of this. The prosperity of America is effentially the prosperity of Great-Britain, and the strength and power of Great-Britain are not for herself only, but for the world. When these adjustments shall take place, to which, though unfortunately not practicable at this moment, nor under the conditions prescribed by Mr. Pinckney, the underfigned, nevertheless, confidently looks forward; it will perhaps be no insecure pledge, for the continuance of the good understanding between the two countries, that they will have learnt duly to appreciate each others friendsbip; and that it will not hereafter be imputed to Great Britain, either on the one hand that the envies American industry as prejudicial to British commerce, or, on the other hand that the is compelled to court an intercourfe with America, as absolutely necessary to her own exillence.

His Majesty would not hesitate to contribute, in any manner in his power, to restore to the commerce of the United States its wonted activity; and if it were possible to make any sacrifice for the repeal of the embargo, without appearing to deprecate it as a measure of hossility, he would gladly have facilitated its removal as a measure of incovement restriction upon the American people.

The underlighted is commanded, in conclusion to observe, that nothing is said in Mr. Pinckney's letter, of any intention to repeal the proclamation, by which the ships of war of Great-Britain are interdicted from all those rights of hospitality in the ports of the United States, which are freely

The continuance of an interdiction which, under such circumstances amounts to nearly direct hostility, after the willingness professed, and the attempt made by his Majesty to remove the cause on which that measure had been originally founded, would afford but an inauspicious omen for the commencement of a system of mutual conciliation, and the omission of any notice of that measure in the proposal which Mr. Pinckney has been instructed to bring forward, would have been of itself a material defect in the overture of the President.

But the underlighted is commanded no further to dwell upon this subject than for the purpose of assuring Mr. Pinckney, that on this and every other point in discussion between the two governments, his Majesty earnestly desires the rellocation of a perfect good understanding, and that his Majesty would decline no measure for the attainment of that object, which should be compatible with his own honor and just rights, and with the interests of his people.

The underfigued requells Mr. Pinckney will accept the assurances of his high consideration.

GEORGE CANNING.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

(Signed)

Mr. Chittenden (of Vermont) after a brief delineation of the evils suffered by his constituents from the operation of the EMBARGO LAWS, moved. That they immediately be repealed.—Negatived 88 to 9. Mr. Chittenden then moved, that the motion be referred to a committee of the whole; which after some passionate debate, was carried.

LONDON, SEPTEMBER 20.

SITUATION OF BONAPARTE. At a moment, when, according to all appearances, the flames of war are about to rage, with augmented fury, from one extremity of Europe to the other; and when the contell may, by the avowal of its author and mover, be fairly faid to be, whether the family of Bonaparte shall, or shall not, supplant the ancient Royal dynasties? It is an object of the most natural and rational curiofity, to consider the pofition of Bonaparte himself at this time, as compared with that in which he flood only five or fix months ago. In April last he attained to a point of elevation, prosperity, and even of apparent durability, of which no adequate conception can be formed by any example taken from modern history. To talk of Louis XIV. or of Philip II. is altogether nugatory; nor is Charlemagne more an inflance in point. The Roman Cæfars, before the division of the Eastern and Weitern Empires, present the only analagous model of this Corfican Cæsar. But neither in Theodofius, not in Constantine, nor perhaps in any Roman Emperor, except in Julius, were concentered such awful talents and energies as meet in Napoleon. In April last, he might be said to reign, in person, or by delegation, over Europe, though under different nominal designations; and in some countries or states, with more supreme despotism than in others,-But, if we except Sweden, the polition of which kingdom rendered it in some measure inaccessible, no Sovereign or Cabinet could be denominated independent .- The Emperors of Austria and of Russia recalled their Ambastadors, interdicted their commerce, closed their ports; and affirmed either hostile or pacific attitudes, just as the Supreme Ruler distated. All the other States was occupied by his armies, pillaged, oppressed, and reduced to a degree of political annihilation. His arms had been invincible. If Danizie refilled, it did not the less fall; and if, at Eylan, the victory was at all problematical, the battle of Friedland at once extinguilh all coalitions or opposition. Alexander and Fre-