

ing of the 21st. He believed the resources of the country in that vicinity to be very few; he had not a particular knowledge of the state of defence in which Lisbon and the forts on the Tagus were, but considered the position about Lisbon to be very strong. He could not speak of the strength of the Castle, as he had never examined it. Was of opinion, that the French army, if forced back to Lisbon, could, in consequence of the assistance which it would derive from the crews of the Russian ships and boats, have crossed the Tagus, and effected its retreat by the garrison of Elvas. Situated as the French were in their position at Torres Vedras, he did not believe they would have consented to lay down their arms as prisoners of war. Did not believe they would have submitted to that necessity, even if forced back to Lisbon by the operations of the British army. If the case were reversed, and the British in a similar state to that in which the French were, he was sure they would have capitulated. Lisbon must have suffered both in the persons and properties of its inhabitants from the operations which the British army, jealous of its honor, must have carried into execution. The advantages of the Convention were, that it delivered Portugal of a French army—put an end to the ravages of war—allowed the fleets, which might not have been safe off the coast, to enter the river—and released four thousand Spanish troops. It allowed the British army to enter Spain, and sent the French force to a port of France remote from the Spanish frontier. The French were completely disheartened by the defeat of the 21st of August. The only artillery calibre were nine-pounders, not adequate to attack the garrisons or forts on the Tagus. He did not believe that the position of Santarem, occupied by the army under Sir John Moore, would have prevented the retreat of the enemy.

Major-General Spencer was next called, and was examined to the same points. He joined Sir Arthur Wellesley on the 5th of August, and was with him in the battle of the 21st. He knew that the positions about Lisbon and the forts of the Tagus, were both strong and defensible.—This Officer corroborated the statement of General Ackland as to his opinion of the compliance of the enemy to lay down their arms, and on the advantages of the Convention to the interest of Portugal, and the farther operations of the British army. He had no reason to suppose that the conduct of the French Commander and his army would not, with respect to Lisbon and its inhabitants, be influenced by the same considerations which have influenced other Commanders and armies, in similar situations. The artillery calibre were nine-pounders, and the nature of the country would not admit heavy ordnance to be brought up.—The Tagus being fordable a little above Santarem, he believed that the occupation of that position, by Sir John Moore's army, would have completely interrupted the retreat of the enemy by Elvas. He had served in the campaign in Egypt in 1801, and considered the Convention by which the French evacuated Alexandria and Cairo similar to the Convention of Cintra. In the former cases the French army did not possess the advantages which the French army in Portugal did, because, from the state of the garrisons of Alexandria and Cairo, they would not have been able to hold out for more than a short time.

Sir Arthur Wellesley.—Were you aware that it had been arranged with Capt. Malcolm, that the Alfred should attend the movements of the army along the coast, from Mondego, in the charge of the victuallers and store ships, and with the ammunition for the ordnance which was expected from England?

Major-General Spencer.—The Alfred, a 74-gun-ship, was ordered by Sir A. Wellesley for the express purpose of supplying the army with whatever heavy ordnance the Commander in Chief might require. The ordnance store-ships, loaded with ammunition, joined the Alfred a long time before they could have been required.

Lord Moira next asked Sir Arthur Wellesley. Had you any artillery or travelling carriages in the ordnance store-ships? A. There were mortars, but no heavy artillery.

Brigadier-General Nightingale was then called, and, without any material difference, corroborated the statement of the other General Officers who preceded him.

Captain Preval, of the engineers, stated that Lisbon was better defended by the strong positions than by its works; it was open on almost every side. There were new works constructed by the French, but they were directed against the town, or for the protection of the ships in the river.

The fort of St. Julien was strong against a regular siege, but he was of opinion that it was not difficult to make a breach. That might be effected in a week. There would be wanting 12 pieces of heavy artillery, two mortars, and two howitzers. The fort of Calcaes was less defensible by land. Of Peniche he had no accurate knowledge, but considered it very strong both by land and sea.

Sir A. Wellesley observed, that it was his wish to put some questions to Captain Preval, respecting some conversation he had with French officers, but as other officers had not arrived, he did not conceive the present the proper time.

Lord Moira. It is best to postpone any examination which could, even by implication, affect Sir H. Burrard. Captain Preval then withdrew.

Sir Hew Dalrymple stated, that had there been any artillery or travelling carriages landed at Mondego, they could not be brought far want of horses.

Earl Moira next put the following questions to Sir Arthur Wellesley:

Q. Had there been artillery with travelling carriages, could they have proceeded with the army from Mondego? A. No.

Q. Was the difficulty from the want of horses, or the badness of the roads? A. I will extend my answer: The roads throughout Portugal are very bad and very narrow. I should think that it would have been very difficult to bring forward heavy artillery, or travelling carriages, even by the employment of a large number of horses to draw them; but the Court must be aware from my narrative, and from the answers I have given to questions before, that there were horses with the army only in sufficient number to draw the field train.

Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens was examined by Sir A.

Wellesley, relative to his delivering to Sir Hew Dalrymple the copy of the Memorandum of Instructions, written by Sir A. Wellesley, and delivered to General Murray, for his conduct in concluding the Convention. It would be unnecessary to go into the evidence, as Sir Hew Dalrymple admitted the receipt of it on the last sitting.

Sir Hew Dalrymple asked Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, if he recollected when Brigadier-General Charles Stewart joined the army? He answered, on the evening of the 23d or 24th of August.

The President of the Board, Sir D. Dundas, then observed, that the Board was adjourned until the arrival of Sir Harry Burrard, who was expected daily, nay hourly, and when he did arrive it would be necessary that he should have some time to prepare his narrative.

The Court adjourned at a quarter past twelve o'clock. (To be continued.)

Latest European Intelligence.

LONDON, FEBRUARY 27.

A Telegraphic communication was made from Plymouth to the Admiralty late on Saturday afternoon, stating that a frigate had arrived there with information of the French fleet, consisting of nine sail of the line, having put to sea from Brest. Lord GAMBIE in the *Caledonia*, has failed in quest of the enemy.

In consequence of this information, directions were immediately sent to Portsmouth and Plymouth for all the line-of-battle ships to proceed to sea without a moments loss of time.

There has been no fresh arrival from the South of Spain. Notwithstanding this, rumours have been spread respecting negotiations between our Government and the Central Junta, concerning the occupation of Cadiz; and it has been intimated, that difficulties have arisen, as to the share we are to take in the further operations of the war. Mr. CANNING'S speech in the House of Commons on Friday night, induces us to believe, that Government by no means considers the affairs of the Peninsula as desperate, which others are so ready to imagine; and we trust, that the administrations of both countries are too sensible of the extreme importance of harmony and co-operation between them, to suffer an ill-founded jealousy to arise, and mar every prospect or expectation of a successful continuance of the conflict.

It has been recently announced, that "the Admiralty has already taken measures for blockading the ports of Ferrol and Corunna," four ships of the line have been ordered for that purpose. Excepting in the private information we have been enabled to communicate to the public, there has been very rarely indeed, in the daily prints, any allusion to the port or fleet of Ferrol. It is with no pleasure that we at length break the silence we have so long kept.

We certainly do not think that we shall convey information to Government by the detail we are about to give; but the public at large will learn, with inexpressible regret and surprise, that within a day's march of the British army on its retreat, and within two leagues of the British Squadron on its covering the passage of the transports home, there were NINE SAIL OF THE LINE, OF WHICH FOUR WERE THREE-DECKERS (besides two eighty gun ships on the stocks), FIVE FRIGATES, THREE CORVETTES, FOUR GUN-BRIGS, TWO ARMED SCHOONERS, AND FORTY GUN-BOATS; all under the authority of men, who to the last hour professed the closest alliance with England, and most determined hostility towards the common enemy.

The following statement has been transmitted to us; and we have, from the highly respectable source whence it is derived, entire confidence in its correctness.

THE NAVAL FORCE LYING AT FERROL.

THREE DECKERS.—Principe Asturias 120 guns; Mexicano, 120 guns; Conception, 120 guns; San Fernando, 100 guns.

SHIPS OF THE LINE.—Santelmo, 80; Atlante, 80; San Julian, 64; America, 64; Espana, 64 guns.

ON THE STOCKS.—El Tridente, 80; Emprededor, 80.

FRIGATES.—Magdalena, 40; Esmeralda, 40; Sabina, 40; Diana, 36; Pilar, 36 guns.

CORVETTES.—Indagadora, 26; Mosca, 20; Principe Asturias, 24 guns.

GUN-BRIGS.—Casilda, 18; ———, 16; Descubridor, 16; Cassador, 16 guns.

SCHOONERS.—Amistad, 6; ———, 6; and 48 Gun-Boats.

To this account of the actual naval force lying in the harbour, we add the following short minutes concerning the capacities of the place. Of the arsenal and dock-yards it is less necessary for us to speak, as there are those at home who have seen them near enough. They belong to the few public works which do honour to the former government of Spain, and are considered by professional men as among the most excellent structures of the kind in Europe. The Docks are so spacious that 40 ships of the line may be on the stocks at once; and as there are in the town between 5000 and 6000 working-shipwrights, the whole of those 40 vessels may be completed within the course of a single year.

It is no wonder, then, that Ferrol should, in the estimation of the politician, constitute the prime ornament of the glory of Galicia; and therefore when the determination of the British cabinet was known to make that kingdom the scene of their exertions, it was imagined that their acquaintance with Ferrol, as a naval depot, operated fully as much upon their minds, as the facilities afforded by the Province for a speedy co-operation with the Spanish armies; and we know that lately when it was announced at Corunna that the Commander in Chief had changed the point of his retreat to Corunna from Vigo, it was supposed that this was done with a view to the sending a detachment to Ferrol from Betanzos, in order to secure, if possible, the fleet, for the legitimate Sovereign of Spain, or at least to prevent its adding to the power of his oppressor.

These designs, however, if entertained, have sadly failed. Those who expected least from the resistance of Spain to the tyrant, calculated at all events upon such an accession to our naval resources, as would enable us, with a still fairer prof-

pect of success, to stand out alone against the conqueror and his slaves. The Patriots of Spain, it was thought, would, if vanquished, retire at last upon their fortified harbours.—The fleets of the country would bear away its rich men and their treasures, its wise men and their influence, to the new world, where a new empire, in close amity with the only part of the old world which retains a portion of its ancient constitution and independence, would preserve the continuity and connection of the two hemispheres, and commence a new period of intercourse and commerce.

We are grieved that in one instance these reasonable expectations are disappointed, and that the prospect is gloomy when we turn ourselves in other directions. But it is not our design to add reproach to our exhibition of the evil.—We are aware of all the difficulties which attended the attainment of the desired object. We know the delicacy requisite in the expression of our wishes and are sensible that great objects were in danger of being sacrificed to the acquisition of inferior ones. Yet these difficulties have been surmounted, in our opinion, by a timely and prudent use of those means which our influence with the Central Junta might have put into our hands.

We well know, that long before the immediate safety of Galicia appeared to be endangered, an offer was made to the Junta of that province to assist in putting the vessels at Ferrol in such a state that they might be at any time ready for sea; this was not excepted. We believe, too, what we have heard whispered, that, on the retreat through Galicia, Sir JOHN MOORE proposed garrisoning Ferrol, which was also declined. And we concede, that on no account would it have become us to seize by force, what we wanted address to gain by negotiation.

We are apprehensive that our error lay in making that a point of provincial arrangement which ought to have been settled with the Supreme National Body, as a concern of chief moment.

It is certain, that even at the last moment, the feeling of the populace remained honest and patriotic; and, however unwilling the inhabitants of any naval deposit might be, to part from the source of their affluence, yet there is no doubt that a mandate from the Central Junta to equip the Ferrol fleet, and transport it to Cadiz, would have been obeyed. To say that this point could not be obtained, is to confess that want of diplomatic skill in which, for ages, we have been thought deficient; to state, that the danger was not foreseen till it was too late to avert it, is to confess the fault, and give it a name.

There is but one suggestion that affords comfort, but it is doubtful whether we may be able to profit by this. Our abstinence, our forbearance, may be attributed to us for virtue: yet we think it would have been a higher and more genuine, and more animating display of our attachment to the cause of Spain, if we had borne away its fleet at Ferrol, in the name of its imprisoned Sovereign, into a safer harbor. We might have held out to the more high-minded and generous of the Spaniards, the means of transporting them to happier lands, should the too prosperous star of the Usurper once more be in the ascendant; and an example of virtue and generous sacrifice would have been set by those who accompanied the fleet. On the other hand, the loss of Ferrol, and of the fleet, is an event of ominous and evil tendency. We are now led to ask how the equally important ports of the South, Carthagen and Cadiz, may be affected by the example thus set them. And we look forward with emotions of concern, more sad in proportion to the importance of the consequences, to the conduct which will be pursued by the Spaniards in America.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

HOUSE OF LORDS, JANUARY 10.

The Lord CHANCELLOR delivered the following Speech from his MAJESTY.—

My Lords and Gentlemen,

We have it in command from his Majesty to state to you, that his Majesty has called you together, in perfect confidence, that you are prepared cordially to support his Majesty in the prosecution of a war which there is no hope of terminating safely and honorably, except through vigorous and persevering exertion.

We are to acquaint you, that his Majesty has directed to be laid before you, copies of the proposals for opening the negotiation which were transmitted to his Majesty from Erfurth; and of the correspondence which thereupon took place with the Governments of Russia and of France; together with the declaration issued by his Majesty's command on the termination of that correspondence.

HIS MAJESTY is persuaded, that you will participate in the feelings which were expressed by his Majesty, when it was requested that his Majesty, should consent to commence the negotiation by abandoning the cause of Spain, which he had so recently and solemnly espoused.

We are commanded to inform you, that his Majesty constitutes to receive from the Spanish Government, the strongest assurances of their determined perseverance in the cause of the legitimate Monarchy, and of the national independence of Spain; and to assure you, that so long as the people of Spain will remain true to themselves, his Majesty will continue to them his most strenuous assistance and support.

HIS MAJESTY has renewed to the Spanish nation, in the moment of its difficulties and reverses, the engagements which he voluntarily contracted at the outset of his struggle against the usurpation and tyranny of France; and we are commanded to acquaint you, that these engagements have been reduced into the form of a Treaty of Alliance; which Treaty, so soon as the ratifications shall have been exchanged, his Majesty will cause to be laid before you.

HIS MAJESTY commands us to state to you, that while his Majesty contemplated with the liveliest satisfaction, the achievements of his forces in the commencement of the campaign in Portugal; and the deliverance of his Ally from the presence and oppression of the French army, his Majesty, most deeply regretted the termination of that campaign, by an armistice and convention, of some of the articles of which his Majesty has felt himself obliged formally to declare his disapprobation.

We are to express to you his Majesty's reliance on your