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COURT OF INQUIRY.

(Continued from our last.)

Q. How many days would it have required to have taken both places? A. I never made up my mind on that subject, although some time must have been necessary; I do not believe that the army would have been sufficiently strong to have undertaken both sieges at the same time.

Q. Had not the French the power over the mules, horses, &c. in the Royal Palace, and in Lisbon and the neighbourhood? and would not these have assisted much in enabling them to go to Santern, or to any other place to which they might wish to retire? A. They certainly had within their power a great number of horses, mules, &c. which must have been of great use to them in this or any other expedition of the kind. Their cavalry would have tended to give greater celerity to their movements; and there were boats in the Tagus in sufficient number to pass the army to Cascaes at once.

Q. After the battle of the 17th, were you not nearer to Santern than Sir John Moore's corps was when at Mondego, and might you not have arrived there before his corps? A. After the action of the 17th, I was nearer to Santern than Sir John Moore's corps was when at Mondego, and certainly might have arrived there before Sir John Moore's corps could arrive in a state of equipment. I conceived that there were two distinct lines of operation in Portugal, and two modes of supporting them, one by Cascaes, dependent upon communications with the coast for supplies of all kinds: the other by Santern, depending for supplies on the communications with Mondego.

[He proceeded to state the superior advantages of the latter, there being in that line places under the controul of the Government of Portugal, which would have served as depots, and have kept up the communication, whereas on the other, the proper posts of communication, and also those places fit for depots, either were not in the possession of the government, or had been burnt.]

"Therefore" continued Sir Arthur Welleley, "I conceived, that, after the action of the 17th, it was not expedient that I should change my plan of operations with a view to those reasons only; and that it would be best that the corps should take their line to Santern, and should communicate with Mondego."

Q. Do you not think that the victuallers, which victualled Sir John Moore at Santern, could also have victualled you? A. If I had been at Santern, and all previous arrangements had been made for the supply of the corps under my command at that place, as detailed in my letters of the 8th, 10th, and 12th August, to Sir H. Burrard, I conceive the corps might have been victualled. In answer to a question as to the propriety of allowing General Anstruther's brigade to land where it did land, Sir A. Welleley said, "I was not informed of the arrival of General Anstruther's brigade till the night of the 18th of August. They were then off the Burlings to the southward of Cascaes, and could not have landed them nearer to Cascaes, than where they did land, without sending them back to the North against the wind, or altering my position again and falling back on Cascaes after the action of the 17th August, to facilitate the junction."

Q. Might not the rest of the force have landed at Maceira, and formed a depot there? A. I conceived the formation of a depot of provisions and stores on any part of the coast was very precarious, particularly so from the beginning of August to the end of September; it might have been effected by a long course of fair weather, but was a position not to be calculated on.

Q. If artillery horses had been landed, might not they have been given to the Commissariat? A. They might have been disposed of in this or any other manner; but they could have been of no use to the Commissariat, as there were no carts with the Commissariat, or in the country, which could have been driven by horses.

Q. If artillery horses had been landed, could not artillery waggons have been landed with them and made useful to the Commissariat? A. I conceive that there were not more artillery waggons with the army than would be sufficient for carrying stores for the artillery, but those artillery waggons might be employed in carrying provisions where the Commander in Chief should think proper.

Q. Was there no good ground at or near Mafra or Lisbon for cavalry to act on? A. In my opinion, cavalry could be used with advantage in nearly all parts of Portugal; not in large bodies any where, but every where in small bodies; and there was ground between Mafra and Lisbon, on which cavalry could act with advantage. He did not recollect to have ever heard at what time the light dragoons marched. He imagined that they went in company with Sir J. Moore's corps.

Sir H. Burrard interrogated by Lord Moira.
1st Question—Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Arthur Welleley have both stated that the French might have passed the Tagus with their whole force, and might have involved the British army in a long course of doubtful opera-

tions, at the very time the British army might have acted with effect. Are you of the same opinion? A. I certainly am.

2d Question—Could not General Junot have transported his forces across the Tagus immediately after the 22d August? A. I think he might.

3d Question—How is this conclusion to be refuted, that General Junot thought the conditions of the Convention more advantageous to the French interest, than the protracting, in the manner which has been represented to have been in his power? A. I conceive that General Junot had his own motives in not coming to action.

The Court were of opinion that these three questions should be put to the other two Officers. It being conceived that Sir Arthur had already, in some previous part of the proceedings, answered the first of them, the second question was put to him, to which his answer was—I think he might.

As to the third, Sir Arthur answered, "When I gave my opinion of the propriety of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal by sea, I took into my consideration British interests and British objects only. It was from a consideration of these interests; of the relative situations of the two armies in Portugal, and of the French army having been in possession of the country, that I came to be of opinion that they had a fair military right to withdraw by sea with their arms and baggage. I do not think it necessary for me to account for the motives of General Junot in preferring the evacuation by sea to another line of operations, which, without expressing any personal disrespect for him, might have been bad or unworthy of him, as well as prejudicial to his country. I mean, it is not for me to account for those motives, whatever they may have been."

The same questions were again put to Sir Harry Burrard; to the first of which he answered—"Certainly Junot might have transported his troops across the Tagus upon that occasion." To the second—"I did not much consider what were the motives which actuated the French General. I could not conceive what could induce him to do that which I thought was advantageous to his country."

Sir Hew Dalrymple examined by the Court.

The same question was put to Sir Hew.

Answer. I have already stated to the Court the reasons which induced me to think the Convention advantageous to us and our allies. It must also be recollected, that I had particular instructions to take care, in expelling the French from Lisbon, that they should be prevented from retreating through Spain. Without pretending to say how far it might have been the intention of the enemy to attempt their retreat through Spain, I must again state, that according to my opinion, and that of all my Officers, I had no other means of executing that part of my instructions for preventing their retreat through Spain (if such had been their intention), except by signing that Convention. I cannot be answerable for the motives which induced General Junot to agree to such a Convention. It was probable that that General saw some advantage to his country from it which he (Sir Hew) could not discern, exclusive of that great and obvious motive to spare an useless effusion of blood.

The question having been again put to him in a new form, he answered, that doubtless Junot must have had motives either for his own advantage or that of his country, but what these motives were he could not possibly say.

Q. Had you any doubt of Sir John Moore's division landing in time, if you had resolved on further operations? A. I supposed they would soon land, and their landing was completed on the 9th; at that time, however, I thought circumstances had changed, and that they did not permit the negotiation to be any longer protracted. Four Lieut. Generals, whom I consulted on the occasion, appeared to coincide with me in that opinion. These Generals were Sir Harry Burrard, Sir John Moore, Lieut. Gen. Hope, and Lieut. Gen. Mackenzie Fraser.—Lieut. Generals Sir Arthur Welleley and Lord Paget were then absent on a more distant service.

Q. At what time did the British army set out on its march to Spain? A. I cannot say when, in point of fact, the army marched for Spain. When I left Portugal, they waited for nothing but a notification from Madrid, that the necessary arrangements had been made in that country to forward the movements of troops.

Q. Was there not any arrangement previously existing? A. None that I know of.

Col. Torrens called, and examined by Sir A. Welleley.

Q. Were you present on board the Brazen, on the evening of the 20th of August, at a conversation between me and Sir Harry Burrard? A. I was.

Sir Arthur Welleley.—State that conversation.

Colonel Torrens.—I was present on board the Brazen when Sir A. Welleley made his report upon the evening of the 20th of August, when Sir Harry Burrard, who had then arrived in Maceira roads, Sir Arthur Welleley represented the state of the army under his command, the situation and strength of the enemy, and the principal objects he had in view. He gave an account of all his operations from the time of his landing at Mondego Bay, and further stated that he had issued orders

for the advance of the army on the ensuing morning. Sir Harry Burrard replied, that he did not conceive it advisable for the army to advance from that position until it should have been reinforced by the division under Sir John Moore. Sir Arthur observed, that it appeared to him that it was of the utmost importance to push forward by way of Mafra, with a view of turning the enemy's left flank, and endeavouring to break the French army. He wished to force them to a battle as near Lisbon as possible, in order that we might avail ourselves of the short distance from the Tagus, to follow up in such a manner the victory which he expected to gain as to prevent them crossing that river. He also added, that he wished the cattle to be in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, as he had a most accurate survey of all the surrounding country. Sir Arthur Welleley also objected to bringing down Sir John Moore to Maceira, as he conceived that Sir Harry Burrard would, by that measure, preclude himself from all the advantage which might otherwise be expected from marching that body to Santern, and cutting off the retreat of the French to the northward. Sir Harry Burrard, however, thought it advisable to bring down Sir John Moore's corps, in order to render certain those operations which would otherwise appear to him to be doubtful. Sir Arthur then asked him, whether he had received his letters of the 8th and 10th of August, recommending the march of these reinforcements upon Santern? Sir Harry Burrard acknowledged that he had received those letters, but made no observation or comment upon them.—Sir Harry Burrard then wrote a letter to Sir John Moore, ordering him to come down along the coast to Maceira.—This was, as well as he could recollect, the substance of the conversation.

Q. Does Colonel Torrens recollect my stating to Sir Harry Burrard the probability that if we did not move forward to attack the enemy, they would attack us? I do recollect that observation made by Sir Arthur Welleley; and also that he thought a favourable opportunity might be lost by waiting for Sir John Moore, who could not be expected for many days.

Q. Do you recollect my stating to Sir Harry Burrard the difficulty that there would be in supplying the army with provisions, when its number should be much increased, without any proportionate increase of means? A. I do perfectly recollect it.

Q. Do you recollect my also stating the probability that if the enemy should not attack us, they would take advantage of the delay of our army, by fortifying their position in such a manner, that, considering the difficulties of drawing cannon on such narrow roads, we should find it almost impossible to flank them? A. I do remember this; and that you not only mentioned the narrowness of the roads in that country, but the badness of them.

Q. Do you recollect my sending you to the divisions of General Fane and General Anstruther before the battle, or immediately on its commencement, with orders? A. Sir A. Welleley desired me to ride as fast as I could to Generals Anstruther and Fane, and convey his orders that they should not move from the position which they occupied in front of the village of Vimiera without further direction.—On my arrival at that position, I found that General Fane had advanced a little way in front, and was engaged with some of the enemy's light troops. I delivered the orders, and he consequently retired.

Q. Can you state the reason that I gave for those orders? A. I understand that those orders arose from the nature of the ground in front, which would render it ineligible to move further. He particularly observed that he saw a large body forming in a wood, preparing for a vigorous attack upon our centre.

Q. Do you remember my recommending to Sir Harry Burrard to continue the pursuit of the enemy? A. Yes, immediately after we had defeated the right column of the French army, which was retreating precipitately, Sir Arthur Welleley rode up to Sir H. Burrard, and said, "Sir Harry, now is your time to advance upon the enemy, they are completely broken, and we may be in Lisbon in three days; a large body of our troops have not been in the action; let us move them to the right, on the road to Torres Vedras, and I will follow the enemy with the left." Sir Harry replied, that he thought a great deal had been done, very much to the credit of the troops, that he did not think it advisable to do more, or quit the ground in pursuit of the enemy. Sir Arthur Welleley observed at the time, that the troops were perfectly ready to advance, having provisions ready cooked in their haversacks, according to the orders of the preceding day.

Q. Do you recollect my mentioning that there were twelve days bread for the army at Vimiera, and plenty of ammunition? A. I do not remember the mentioning twelve days, but I know you mentioned that there was plenty of provisions and ammunition.

Q. Were not orders given on the 20th for the march of the troops next day? A. They were.

Sir Arthur Welleley then read to the Court a written

(For the remainder, see last page.)