LIVERPOOL, APRIL 10.

SPAIN .- The conduct of La Pena in neglecting to support the British troops at the battle of Barrosa has justly excited the indignation of the public, and it has been also commented on with a becoming severity in the House of Commons. As, however, we have no control over the appointments of the Spanish Government, nor any right to dictate the degree of punishment it shall inflict upon such of its servants as misconduct themselves, the introduction of this subject into a British Parliament could only be for the the purpose of admomishing Ministers: of supporting an argument in favour of the abandonment of Spain, or of pointing out the danger of subjecting British troops to the command of Spanish Generals. In the last of these points we cordially unite with the opposition. It is scarcely possible from the circumstances in which Spain has been placed that she should possess experienced Generals, and though the gratification of personal or national vanity may in some cases be politic, it becomes a flagrant crime when it equally puts to hazard the lives of brave men, and the success of a great cause. But were even the skill of the Spanish Generals undoubted, can we reckon upon their honesty? In putting this question we do not speak or think illiberally. There are a few tried. Generals who are known, there are, we hope, many others, but we do not know them. Spain herself does not know them. Many have already deceived both them and us, and confidence is therefore not to be excited by any new commander. These are sufficient reasons why no British General should be second in command; to a Spanish officer it ought not to be permitted, and if the Spaniards will not submit to this, it will then be the policy of Great-Britain to withdraw her smaller bodies of troops from the coast and unite them to her main army where numbers alone will give priority of command. Enough has been done for glory; and it is high time that Ministers should exert themselves through their Ambassador at Cadiz to excite such a combination of effort in Spain as has been effected in Portugal, an effort which can only be produced by the activity of British counsels, and by assigning to British skill and valour its proper place. If indeed we were fighting for fame, the greater the hazards to which ignorant Spanish officers might expose our troops, the greater the honour which our soldiery would acquire in rescuing themselves. But the Spanish war has no such chivalrous character. It is a war for British interests as well as for those of Spain and Portugal. We are attacking the enemy in the most vulnerable quarter; we have two nations literally for our allies; the very geography of the country fights for us; we take off the pressure of his armies, and, consequently, of his power from the north of Europe; we impede his marine projects; we force him to drain his military strength and finances in a wide, interminable, and wasting contest. Success is therefore our only glory; our troops are there, not that we may admire their valour only, but that both we and our allies may reap the benefit of their actions. We have heard, it is true, of the project of forming a Spanish army of 30,000 men under British officers ; but this, like the other projects of the Cortes, is slow in execution. The circumstances of the battle of Barrosa ought then to be made use of to press the Spanish Government into the measure. If there be any delicacy in the case it will only apply to a few men swollen with hereditary pride, and as incompetent as proud. The body of the Spanish people have no such feeling. The British are now known : the experiment of training troops under them has been tried in Portugal, and its success is known. Besides this, the Spanish soldiers have little confidence in their officers. They have been so often betrayed or made the victims of incapacity, that even deserving officers, except a few very conspicuous characters, cannot command the reliance they merit; but the Spaniards know that British officers will never betray them. They are not ignoarnt of what must ever be a proud reflection to a Briton, and raise the character of the nation in the eyes of all Europe, that in the long contest we have had with France, not one of our commanders has ever been charged or suspected of being corrupted by the enemy. This lofty character, sustained by British officers, is a pledge to the Spaniards that they will never abandon them in the hour of danger; and under such leaders they would be both obedient and firm. No country presents a peasantry better fitted to compose a bold and a brave army than Spain. Their temperance, their endurance of fatigue, and their agility, eminently qualify them for soldiers. Discipline and commanders are all they want, and these the British only can furnish. If, however, we agree with the Opposition in exposing the folly of placing British Generals in subordinate commands, we shall not follow them in their abuse of the Spanish soldiers, nor in the argument by which they would urge Government to abandon Spain. How unfair it is to extend an indiscriminate censure to the whole of the Spanish troops employed in the late expedition is evident from this plain fact, that those of them that did engage behaved well; and the rest were kept at a distance from the field of battle by their commander. The blame then rests solely with him, and in justice can be extended no further. Equally absurd is it to recommend the desertion of Spain, because of the fault of a commander. Could it even be demonstrated that the French will ultimately conquer the peninsula, it would still be policy to continue the war. We encou. rage resistance to the enemy, we multiply his difficulties, we waste down his armies, with little risk to ourselves. In such a contest both the enemy and the countries he claims are unfeebled, and at the conclusion of the contest he would become less formidable himself, and find fewer resources in them to brandish against us. But the prospect brightens. Spain, even without regular

armies, keeps up a formidable warfare. She is still unsubjected. The most imposing army of the enemy is in a state of flight, and the grand military projects of the last year both against Portugal and the South of Spain are completely frustrated.

FRANCE.—It would have excited some curiosity to know in what manner Bonaparte would have apologized to the Hanse Towns for the seizure of their independence, had not his character been previously developed. It would not have surprised Europe had he disdained to offer any other reason than, "it is my will that you should be united to the French empire;" and this would have been less offensive than to attempt, as he has done, to justify his own tyranny by pleading the conduct of England. This is to insult the understand, ing of his victims, as the seizure itself outrages their interests. By the one act he brings to their minds the bitter reflection of their political weakness, and by the other he treats them as fools or lunatics:

He has, however, informed the Deputies from Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubeck; that the British Ofders in Council have obliged him to annex the towns they represent to his respective dominions, and the only consolation he offers them for this violation of their liberty and destruction of their commerce is the hope that England may be conquered when he shall have increased his navy to one hundred sail of the line; and that till this be effected he shall require their seamen to man his ships, and the materials they can furnish to build them. in the courage and prudence of Com. Rogers; and have no doubt if he falls in with the Guerriere he will obtain our impressed countryman by soft or hard means.—If he is compelled to use force, we are under no fears for the issue; and as we feel confident that Capt. Pechell in impressing John Diguo, acted without any orders from his government, we do not think it will bring on a war; while it will teach the British commanders more correct conduct:

FURTHER.

We are correctly informed, that a letter is in town from one of the Members of the Executive stating, that Commodore Rogers has positive orders to search for the British frigate, demand the impressed Americans she has on board, and if refused to take them by force: This may be relied upon.

It is reported, that a smart firing has been heard off the Capes.

The Whig says, a letter has been received from Bayonne, dated March 30th which states, "The French Imperial Guards are returning from Spain to France; and have marched through this town." If this be true, it is important. These guards had been in Spain more than a year, waiting for the Emperor. At our last Spanish dates, they were at Zamora, in Leon, under Marshal BESSIERES, Duke of Istria. The movement indicates that NAPOLEON does not mean to return to Spain; and that there will be use for them in another quarter:

Let us, however, refer to the reasoning of the imperrial logician-

"England acts upon the principle of seizing the enemy's merchandize, under whatever flag it might be. The empire has been compelled to admit the principle of seizing English merchandize, or proceeding from the commerce of England, in whatever territory it may be. England seizes in every sea the passengers, merchants, and carriers belonging to the nation she is at war with. France is compelled to seize the English travellers, merchants, and carriers, in whatever part of the continent they may be, and wherever she can, reach them; and if in this system there be any thing little consonant to the spirit of the age, it is the injustice of the new English laws which must be charged with it."

Now, in answer to this burlesque upon every thing, suppose one of the Deputies had possessed boldness sufficient to have addressed his Imperial Majesty in this manner :-- "You must excuse us, Sire, if we doubt the pertinancy of your explanations. Without arguing the question of destroying the independence of a neutral state because the possession of its means may enable you to carry on the war with your enemy with greater rigour, will it follow that because England may seize a vessel which has enemy's property on board, which yet is not done except in such cases as the old laws of nations sanction, you have no show of justice even upon the principle of reprisals, to seize a whole state, because English merchandize is found in a few ware-houses on its coast? If England takes your property at sea, does that warrant you in seizing the property not of English men, but of your allies, because that property was once English property, though now by a bona fide purchase it is become our property? And if England seizes at sea the merchants and carriers of France and other nations she is at war with, how does that justify you in seizing, imprisoning, and putting to death our merchants and carriers who happen to be employed in transmitting merchandize which once might have been the property of British subjects? We rather suspect that these are but pretexts for your exactions, and that in indulging your blind rage against England you trample upon the rights of every nation within the reach of your power, and that under pretence of obtaining the liber. ty of the seas for us, you are in reality urging the projects of your own boundless ambition. Even the general principle you have laid down is as false a ground for your proceedings as those we have already exposed. You say that you destroy our liberty, and annex us to your empire because Great-Britain has issued her Or. ders in Council. But you forget to say that your Decrees were issued first. You were precedent in the attack upon neutral rights, and if you be indeed a sincere champion for the freedom of commerce, you 'ought to be first in repentance and amendment. If you really wish the British to repeal their Orders there is a more effectual and honourable way to effect this than by destroying our trade, reducing us to slavery and taking away our seamen, the sinews of our industry-repeal your Decress, and England has told the world that she will rescind her Orders," Such a remonstrance would have sent the Deputies to one of the tyrant's newly-erected Bastiles; but its truth would have remained the same. A certain kind of consolation, however, remains. Bonaparte's measures against commerce have reached their acme. All letters to and from England are condemned to be burned, and every man detected in a commercial correspondence with this country is to be put to death.

BOSTON, MAY 25. BLOODY NEWS EXPECTED.

Various corroborant accounts now induce a belief that the President of the United States has ordered Commodore Rogers, in the President of 44 guns, to search after, and to demand of Capt. Pechell, of the British frigate Guerriere of 38 guns, the restoration of the American seamen which have been recently and wantonly impressed on board that ship, and in the event of refusal to use force to obtain them. The real port on this subject has heretofore been discredited on the ground that an order of the kind would be tanta: mount to an act of War, and as Congress alone are authorized by the Constitution to declare and make War, that the President would not take upon himself the high responsibility of such an unconstitutional act. But it appears the President has deemed it his duty to issue the order, and is willing to run the hazard of im. peachment. Should he have federal judges, we are confident they will acquit him, if his sole object shall appear to have been the liberation of American seamen: -And if his Judges are democratic, he will only have to put to the test the sincerity of those who have by words and deeds so often admitted, that their President can do no wrong. Their creed is

"To one sole monarch love commits the sway, "His are the laws, and HIM let all obey."

It is a fact Commodore Rogers has put to sea, and as it is supposed the Guerriere is now off the coast, there cannot be a doubt but the Commodore's vigilance and activity will find her; and that he, will execute his orders, whatever they may be with firmness and com. pleteness. "When Greek meets Greek then comes the tug of war." Both frigates are warm vessels. The President has the advantage in weight of metal. La Guerriere was captured from the French by the Blanche,

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BALTIMORE, MAY 20. VERY IMPORTANT.

It is currently stated, that Commodore Rogers, who

of 38 guns, in 1806. Capt. Pechell was made Post. Captain last year.

Letters from Baltimore, by yesterday's mails, stated the prevalence there of a report that the two frigates had met and had a combat. We think the report premature.

FROM PORTUGAL.

Additional accounts from Lisbon to the 1st April have been received at Norfolk. Prior to that period 4000 of the Prisoners taken from Prince Massena had arrived in Lisbon, and were to be embarked for England in the transports now no longer necessary to be stationed in the Tagus. The indignation of the Portuguese at the at ocious enormities perpetrated by the French in every part of the country they have prowled over, had arisen to such a pitch, that the exercise of all the energies of the British guards was necessary to prevent the assassination of the French prisoners in the streets, by the populace of Lisbon. Some of the men of war in the Tagus had been ordered to England to form part of the expedition destined to reduce the Danish Island of Zealand, and re-occupy Copenhagen.

The accounts from the vicinity of Badajoz are to the 31st March. —Marshal Beresford was then at Elvas making preparations to cross the Guadiana, on his way to Seville. In the retreat of the French from Campo Major to Badajoz they lost 24 pieces of cannon. The principal part of the Marshal's force is Portuguese.

HALIFAX, MAY 27.

Arrived, yesterday, His Majesty's Sloops of War, Little Belt, Capt. Bingham, from a cruise; Goree, Captain Byng; Rattler, Capt. Gordon; Indian, Captain Jane; and schooners Chub, Bream and Cuttle, from Bermuda; and Duke of Montrose, Packet, Capt. Bluett, from New-York.

This morning H. M. Brig Plumper, Lieut. Frissell,

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has sailed in the President frigate, of 44 guns, has orders to search after the Guerriere, British frigate, of 38 guns, commanded by Capt. S. J. Pechell, and to demand the immediate release of the American seaman impressed from the Portland coaster a short time since; and if the demand is refused, to scrve the Guerriere as the Leopard did the unfortunate Chesapeake. Per. haps there is not a word of truth in all this: But if there be, it looks as if the Government had some spunk left; though the orders are contrary to the doctrines advocated by Jefferson and his toadeaters when the Chesapeake affair took place. We have full confidence

from Bermuda; and schooner Speculator, Barss, from St. Croix.

The Little Belt has been cruising off the American coast—from conversations with several of her officers, we have derived the following interesting information: At eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 16th inst. when about 100 miles to the eastward of the Chesapeake, a sail was observed, and chace immediately given—at one, it was discovered to be a frigate, steering East, with a Commodore's blue pendant at the main, and the conclusion drawn that it was an American ship. The Little Belt then altered her course to the south.