

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE.
AMERICAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS
Of the Second Invasion of Lower Canada.

From the Albany Argus Extra of Nov. 27.

From Gen. WILKINSON to the Secretary of War.

H. Q. French Mills, adjoining the Province of Lower Canada, Nov. 16.

SIR—I beg leave to refer you to the journal which accompanies this letter for the particulars of the movements of the corps under my command, down the St. Lawrence, and will endeavor to exert my enfeebled mind to detail to you the more striking and important incidents which have ensued since my departure from Grenadier island, at the foot of Lake Ontario, on the 3d inst.

The corps of the enemy from Kingston, which followed me, hung on my rear, and in concert with a heavy galley and a few gun boats, seemed determined to retard my progress. I was tempted to halt, turn about and put an end to his teasing; but alas! I was confined to my bed; Maj. Gen. Lewis was too ill for any active exertion; and above all, I did not dare suffer myself to be diverted a single day from the prosecution of the views of government. I had written Major Gen. Hampton on the 6th inst. by his Adj. Gen. Col. King, and had ordered him to form a junction with me on the St. Lawrence, which I expected would take place on the 9th or 10th. It would have been unpardonable, had I lost sight of this object a moment, as I deemed it of vital importance to the issue of the campaign.

The enemy deserve credit for their zeal and intelligence, which the active universal hostility of the male inhabitants of the country enabled them to employ to the greatest advantage. Thus, while menaced by a respectable force in rear, the coast was lined by musquetry in front, at every critical pass of the river, which obliged me to march a detachment, and this impeded my progress.

On the evening of the 9th inst. the army halted a few miles from the head of the Longue Sant. In the morning of the 10th, the inclosed order was issued. General Brown marched agreeably to order, and about noon we were apprized, by the report of his artillery that he was engaged some distance below us. At the same time the enemy were observed in our rear, and their galley and gun boats approached our flotilla, and opened a fire upon us, which obliged me to order a battery of 18-pounders to be planted, and a shot from it compelled the vessels of the enemy to retire, together with their troops, after some firing between the advanced parties. But by this time, in consequence of disembarking and re-embarking the heavy guns, the day was so far spent that our pilots did not dare enter the Sant, (eight miles a contigued rapid,) and therefore we fell down about two miles and came to for the night. Early the next morning every thing was in readiness for motion; but having received no intelligence from Gen. Brown, I was still delayed, as sound caution prescribed. I should learn the result of his affair, before I committed the flotilla to the Sant.

At half past ten o'clock, A. M. an officer of dragoons arrived with a letter, in which the General informed me he had forced the enemy, and would reach the foot of the Sant early in the day. Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to sail, at which instant the enemy's gun boats appeared, and began to throw shot among us. Information was brought me at the same time, from Brig. Gen. Boyd, that the enemy's troops were advancing in column. I immediately sent orders to him to attack them; this report was soon contradicted. Their gun boats however continued to scratch us, and a variety of reports of their movements and countermovements were brought to me in succession; which convinced me of their determination to hazard an attack, when it could be done to the greatest advantage—and therefore resolved to anticipate them. Directions were accordingly sent, by that distinguished officer Col. Swift of the engineers, to Brig. Gen. Boyd, to throw the detachments of his command, assigned to him in the order of the preceding day, and composed of men of his own, Covington's and Swartwout's brigades, into three columns, to march upon the enemy, outflank them if possible, and take their artillery. The action soon after commenced with the advanced body of the enemy, and became extremely sharp and galling, and with occasional pauses sustained with great vivacity, in open space and fair combat, for upwards of two and a half hours—the adverse lines alternately yielding and advancing. It is impossible to say with accuracy what was our number on the field, because it consisted

of indefinite detachments taken from the boats to render safe the passage of the Sant. Gens. Covington and Swartwout voluntarily took part in the action, at the head of detachments from their respective brigades, and exhibited the same courage that was displayed by Brig. Gen. Boyd, who happened to be the senior officer on the ground. Our force engaged might have reached sixteen or seventeen hundred men, but actually did not exceed eighteen hundred;—that of the enemy was estimated from twelve hundred to two thousand, but did not probably amount to more than fifteen or sixteen hundred—consisting, as I am informed, of detachments from the 49th, 84th, and 104th regiments of the line—with three companies of the Voltigeur and Glenary corps of the militia of the country, who are not included in the estimate.

It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to give you a detailed account of this affair, which certainly reflects high honor of the valor on the American soldier, as no examples can be produced of undisciplined men, with inexperienced officers, braving a fire of two hours and a half, without quitting the field or yielding to their antagonist. But, Sir, the information I now give you, is derived from officers of my confidence, who took active parts in this conflict; for though I was enabled to order the attack, it was my hard fortune not to be able to lead the troops I commanded. The disease with which I was assailed on the 2d of September, on my journey to fort George, having, with a few short intervals of convalescence, preyed on me ever since, and at the moment of this action, I was confined to my bed, and emaciated almost to a skeleton, unable to set on my horse, or to move ten paces without assistance.

I must, however, be pardoned for trespassing on your time a few remarks in relation to the affair.—The objects of the British and American commanders were precisely opposed—the last being bound by the instructions of his government and the most solemn obligations of duty, to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means—because this being effected, one of the greatest difficulties opposed to the American Arms would be surmounted; and the first, by duties equally imperious, to retard and if possible, prevent such descent. He is to be accounted victorious who effected his purpose! The British commander, having failed to gain either of his objects can lay no claim to the honors of the day. The battle fluctuated and triumph seemed, at different times, inclined to the contending corps. The front of the enemy were at first forced back more than a mile, and though they never regained the ground they lost, their stand was permanent and their charges resolute. Amidst these charges and near the close of the contest we lost a field piece by the fall of the officer who was serving it with the same coolness as if he had been at a parade of review. This was Lt. Smith, of the Light Artillery, who in point of merit, stood at the head of his grade. The enemy having halted and our troops being again formed in battalion front to front, and the firing having ceased on both sides, we resumed our position on the bank of the river, and the infantry being much fatigued the whole were re-embarked and proceeded down the river without further annoyance from the enemy or their gun boats, while the dragoons with five pieces of light artillery, marched down the Canada shore without molestation.

It is due to his rank, to his worth and his services, that I should make particular mention of Brig. Gen. Covington, who received a mortal wound directly through the body, while animating his men and leading them to the charge—He fell, where he fought, at the head of his men, and survived but two days.

The next morning the flotilla passed through the Sant and joined that excellent officer Brig. Gen. Brown, at Barnhart's, near Cornwall, where he had been instructed to take post and wait my arrival, and where I confidently expected to hear of Major Gen. Hampton's arrival on the opposite shore. But immediately after I halted Col. Atkinson, the Inspector General of the division under Maj. Gen. Hampton, waited on me with a letter from that officer in which to my unspeakable mortification and surprize, he declined the junction offered, and informed me he was marching towards Lake Champlain by way of co-operating in the proposed attack on Montreal. This letter, together with a copy of that to which it is an answer, were immediately submitted to a council of war, composed of general officers and the Col. commanding the Elite, the chief engineer and the adjutant general, who unanimously gave it as their opinion, that "the attack on Montreal should be abandoned for the present season, and the army near Cornwall

should be immediately crossed to the American shore for taking up winter quarters, and that this place afforded an eligible position for such quarters."

I acquiesced in these opinions, not from the shortness of the stock of provisions, (which had been reduced by the acts of God) because that of our meat had been increased five days, and our bread had been reduced only to two days, and because we could in case of extremity, have lived on the enemy—but because the loss of the division under Major-Gen. Hampton, weakened my force too sensibly to justify the attempt.—In all my measures and movements of moment, I have taken the opinions of my general officers which have been in accord with my own.

I remained on the Canada shore until the next day, without seeing or hearing from the "powerful force" of the enemy in our neighborhood, and the same day reached this position with the artillery and infantry. The dragoons have been ordered to Utica and its vicinity, and I expect are 50 or 60 miles on the march.

You have under cover a summary abstract of the killed and wounded in the affair of the 11th inst. which shall soon be followed by a particular return, in which a just regard will be paid to individual merits. The dead rest in honor, and the wounded bled for their country and deserve its gratitude.

With perfect respect, I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant.
Signed JAMES WILKINSON.

Extract of a letter of the 15th November, from Gen. WILKINSON.

"It is a fact, for which I am authorized to pledge myself on the most confidential authority, that on the 4th of the present month, the British garrison of Montreal, consisted solely of 400 marines and 200 sailors, which had been sent up from Quebec. We have, with the provisions here and that left at Chateaugay, about forty days subsistence, to which I shall add thirty more."
"Hon. Gen. Armstrong, Sec. of War."

General WILKINSON to Gen. ARMSTRONG.
H. Q. French Mills, Nov. 18, 1813.

SIR—I beg this may be considered as an appendage to my official communication respecting the action of the 11th instant. I last evening received the enclosed information, the result of the examination of sundry prisoners, taken on the field, which justifies the opinion of the surviving general officers who were in the engagement. This goes to prove, that although the imperious obligations of duty did not allow sufficient time to route the enemy, they were beaten—the accidental loss of one field piece notwithstanding, after it had been discharged fifteen or twenty times. I have also learned, from what is considered good authority, but I will not vouch for the correctness of it, that the enemy's loss exceeded five hundred killed and wounded. The enclosed report will correct an error in my former communication,—as it appears it was the 89th, and not the 84th British regiment which was engaged on the 11th. I beg leave to mention, relative to the action of the 11th, what from my extreme indisposition I have omitted. Having received information late in the day, that the contest had become somewhat dubious, I ordered up a reserve of six hundred men, whom I had directed to stand by their arms under Lieut. Col. UPHAM, who gallantly led them into the action, which terminated a few minutes after their arrival on the ground. With much consideration and respect, I have the honor to be, Sir, your ob't humble servant,
JAMES WILKINSON.

Hon. J. Armstrong, Sec. at War.

[Here follows a Return of the Killed and Wounded of the Army of U. S. descending the St. Lawrence river, under the command of Major General James Wilkinson, in action fought on the 11th November, 1813, amounting to 3 subalterns, 7 sergeants, 8 corporals, 1 musician, 83 privates—total 102 killed—1 Brigadier General, (Covington) mortally, (since dead,) 1 Assist. Adj. General, 1 Aide-de-Camp, 1 Colonel, 1 Major, 5 Captains, 6 Subalterns, 9 sergeants, 13 corporals, 1 musician, 198 privates—total 237 wounded.]

ORDERS

From Gen. Wilkinson to Gen. Hampton.

H. Q. of the army, 7 miles above Ogdensburg, Nov. 6, 1813.

SIR—I address you at the special instance of the Secretary of War, who by bad roads, worse weather, and ill health, was diverted from meeting me near this place, and determined to tread back his steps to Washington from Antwerp, on the 29th ult. I am destined to, and determined on the attack of Montreal, if not prevented by some

act of God; and to give security to the enterprise, the division under your command must co-operate with the corps under my immediate orders. The point of rendezvous is a circumstance of the greatest interest to the issue of this operation, and the distance which separates us, and my ignorance of the practicability of the direct or devious roads or routs by which you must march, make it necessary that your own judgment should determine the point. To assist you in making the soundest determination, and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation, in some respects of the first importance. I shall pass Prescott to night, because the stage of the season will not allow me three days to take it; shall cross the cavalry at Hamilton, which will not require a day. I shall thence press forward and break down every obstruction to [the junction of] this river with Grand river, there to cross the Isle Perrot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foothold on Montreal Island at about 20 miles from the city; after which our artillery, bayonets and swords must secure our triumph or provide us honorable graves.

Inclosed you have a memorandum of field and battering train, pretty well found in fixed ammunition, which may enable you to dismiss your own. But we are deficient in loose powder and musket cartridges, and therefore hope you may be abundantly found.

On the subject of provisions, I wish I could give a favorable information. Our stock of bread may be computed at about 15 days, and our meat at twenty. In speaking on this subject, to the Secretary of War, he informed me ample magazines were laid up on Lake Champlain, and therefore I must request of you to order forward two or three months supply by the safest route, in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of our provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should not prevent the progress of the expedition. And they also agree in opinion, that if you are not in force to face the enemy, you should meet us at St. Regis or its vicinity.

I shall expect to hear from if not see you on the 9th—and have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient humble servant,
Signed J. WILKINSON.

Major Gen. Hampton.

From Gen. Hampton to Gen. Wilkinson.

H. Q. Four Corners Nov. 8th, 1813.

SIR—I had the honor to receive, at a late hour last evening, by Col. King, your communication of the 6th, and was deeply impressed with the sense of responsibility it imposed of deciding upon the means of our co-operation. The idea suggested as the opinion of your officers, of effecting the junction at St. Regis, was most pleasing, as being most immediate; until I came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provisions. Col. Atkinson will explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible for me to have brought more than each man could have carried on his back; and when I reflected that on throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in your most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that by throwing myself back on my main depot, when all the means of transportation had gone and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburgh to Cognawaga or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success than by the junction at St. Regis. The way is in many places blockaded and abated, and the road impracticable for wheel carriages during winter—but by the employment of pack horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving. I have ascertained and witnessed that the plan of the enemy is to burn and consume every thing in our advance. My troops and other means will be described you by Col. Atkinson. Besides the rawness and sickness, they have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign, in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off; but upon this subject I must refer you to Col. Atkinson.

With these means—what can be accomplished by human exertion, I will attempt—with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, Sir, your most obedient servant.

Signed W. HAMPTON.

Major Gen. J. Wilkinson.

BOSTON, NOVEMBER 27.

The Mediation up.

It will be remembered that we have all along