

# Royal Gazette

## AND NEW-BRUNSWICK ADVERTISER.

Vol. 6.

SAINT JOHN, MONDAY, JUNE 7, 1813.

No. 284.

Printed and Published by JACOB S. MOTT, Printer to the KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY, at the Sign of the BIBLE and CROWN, Prince William-Street; where Subscriptions, Advertisements, &c. will be thankfully received.

BOSTON, MAY 20.

### RUSSIAN NOTE.

The most important article in the late French papers, is the following Note of the Prussian Ambassador at the Court of France, which has been obligingly translated for our Gazette. It is an able and eloquent State Paper, and will prove highly gratifying to every lover of truth and national independence.

Copy of a letter from M. de Krusemarck.  
PARIS, 27th MARCH, 1813.

Monsieur le Duc—I have just received the order of the king, my sovereign, to communicate the following to your excellency. The propositions which I have heretofore had the honor to submit to your excellency, were of a nature to merit an answer equally prompt and decisive. The progress of the Russian armies into the heart of the monarchy, and the retreat of the French armies, render it impossible for Prussia to continue in her present state of uncertainty. On the one hand, the Emperor of Russia, connected with the king by the ties of personal friendship, offers Prussia, at this critical juncture, the support of his power and the advantages of his friendship; on the other, his Majesty the Emperor of the French, persists in repelling an ally, who has sacrificed himself for his cause, and even disdains all explanation as to the motives of his silence.

France had a long time since violated in all their points, the treaties, which united her to Prussia. This alone was enough to discharge Prussia from her engagements.—Not content with having dictated to her at Tilsit a peace as hard as it was humiliating; not even has she suffered her to enjoy the feeble advantages, which that treaty seemed to promise her.

She has made use of odious pretexts to shake to their foundations the fortune of the state and of individuals. Ever since that epoch Prussia has been treated as a conquered country, and has been made to bow under a yoke of iron. The French armies remained there contrary to the terms of the treaty, and lived at discretion during eighteen months: exorbitant and arbitrary contributions are imposed on her; her commerce was ruined by her being forced to adopt the continental system; French garrisons were placed in the three fortresses of the Oder, and the country was obliged to provide for the expenses of their appointment; in fine, by the treaty of Bayonne, the property of widows and orphans was disposed of, still in manifest contradiction to the stipulations of the treaty of peace.

Every thing declared that no sort of terms would be kept with an unhappy and oppressed state. In this state of things, the benefit of the peace became illusory. The

king groaned with the enormous weight which burdened his subjects. He flattered himself that he could conquer by condescension and sacrifices, an animosity, the effects of which he knew while he was ignorant of its cause. He abandoned himself to the hope of sparing his people still greater misfortunes, by fulfilling scrupulously his engagements with France, and carefully avoiding whatever might give her offence. By extraordinary and unheard of efforts, Prussia was able to discharge two thirds of the contribution, she was preparing to pay the remainder, when the difficulties arose between Russia and France, and the immense preparations of the two powers left no room to doubt that war was about to burst forth in the North. The king, faithful to his principle of saving at every hazard the national existence, judging of the future by the past, perceived that he had every thing to fear from France. He made a sacrifice of his affections, and concluded a treaty of alliance with her. At the epoch of the conclusion of the treaty, before the news of it could reach Berlin, the French troops advanced into Pomerania and the March Electoral. The king saw with pain that no account was made of his frank and loyal intentions. Force was employed to obtain what it appeared impossible to obtain by negotiation. The Agents of Prussia, terrified by the menacing attitude of France, had signed at Paris separate conventions, containing conditions extremely onerous, relative to the provisioning and the wants of the grand army. The French government, aware of the smallness of our resources, foresaw a refusal, and prepared itself to wrest by forcible means, the consent of the king. It was deceived. His Majesty ratified those conventions, although he saw the difficulty of fulfilling them; he relied on the devotedness of the Prussians, and hoped that by setting bounds to our sacrifices, he might preserve his people from arbitrary requisitions, and their fatal consequences.—Experience has not justified this hope.—While Prussia exhausted all her means to pour into the magazines the stipulated supplies; the French army subsisted at the charge of individuals. France demanded at once the accomplishment of the treaty, and the daily maintenance of the troops. The property of the inhabitants was seized by main force, and without any account, and Prussia lost by these acts of violence more than seventy thousand horses and twenty thousand carriages.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding all these embarrassments, the king faithful to his system, fulfilled with religious fidelity all the engagements he had entered into. The supplies came in successfully; the stipulated contingent was in great progress; in short

nothing was omitted to demonstrate the loyalty of our conduct. But France answered this devotedness only by new pretensions, and believed that she might dispense with performing on her side those stipulations of the treaty, which fell to her charge. She constantly refused to verify her accountability for the supplies, although she had expressly undertaken that the accounts should be settled quarterly.

The military convention secured to the Emperor, until a new arrangement with Prussia, the possession of the fortresses of Glogau, Stettin and Custair; but the provisioning of the first of these was to be at the expence of France from the day of the signature of that convention, and as to the others, from the day when the king should have fulfilled his new engagements respecting the payment of the contribution. The king in agreeing to this article had already given France a great proof of his condescension, by renouncing the stipulations of 1808, by which Glogau was to be restored to Prussia as soon as the half of the contributions should have been paid. The new treaty was not better observed by France than that which preceded it. The provisioning of Glogau and that of the other fortresses, notwithstanding the most pressing representations, justified by the convention and the payment of the contributions already realized in the month of May of the last year, has continued at the charge of Prussia until this day. The convention stipulated nothing concerning the fortresses of Pillau and Spardau; they ought consequently to have remained in the occupation of the Prussian troops; nevertheless the French troops entered into them by a sort of military surprize and held possession.—While the expenses of Prussia were continually and indefinitely increased; while she proved, that after having discharged her contribution, her advances amounted already to enormous sums, still France persisted in refusing her any assistance; all her remonstrances were answered with a contemptuous silence, and incessantly requiring new sacrifices, France seemed to count for nothing the inconceivable efforts of an overburdened nation.

At the end of the preceding year the advances of Prussia amounted to ninety-four millions of francs. The accounts were as regular as it was possible to make them, considering the constant refusal of the French authorities to verify them according to the treaty. His Majesty had never ceased to represent by his agents the urgent necessity of doing justice to his claims; that his exhausted dominions could no longer support the maintenance of the French armies. The king confined himself at first to demanding a liquidation of those advances, and freely