

FROM THE BOSTON CENTINEL, DEC. 4.
THE ROAD TO RUIN.

The absurd and preposterous imitation of French policy by our officers in the Land service, and by our Government in suppressing accurate accounts of movements and exploits, and in giving the most absurd, bombastic and colored representations of them;—the habit of grossly misrepresenting the force and conduct of the enemy—renders it very difficult, even in this free country, to form a correct judgment of military events. In England they have a perfect and competent mode of remedying such an evil, should it occur, by a Parliamentary Inquiry.—But in our free country, even this remedy is out of our power. The majority in Congress enter into the views and passions of the Executive; and every attempt to promote inquiry, is stifled and suppressed.

In a late session, Mr. BRADLEY, of Vermont, though a decided democrat and advocate of the War, made an attempt to inquire into the causes of the failure of our arms;—but he was as little successful as if he had borne the fatal reputation of a *Federalist*, or *Lover of Peace*.

In examining, then, the progress, retrograde or advancing, of our arms, we have no other remedy than to take the meagre accounts furnished by interested officers; and to apply to them, as we do to French Bulletins, reasonable rules of addition or subtraction, derived from our general knowledge of events, and from the official returns of an enemy, who cannot, by the rules and regulations of his own Government, successfully deceive.

We shall consider the War operations according to the divisions which our own Government and that of Great-Britain have made, into the armies of the *West*, the *Centre*, and the *North*.

The former embraces the operations at the West end of Lake Erie;—The second those about Lake Ontario, at Fort George and Kingston;—and the last those directed against Lower Canada.

As to the former, it is well known that Gen. HULL was provided with an army of 2500 men, and began his march many months before Congress declared War;—a pretty sample of the respect which the Executive entertains for Congress, in whom alone is vested the power of declaring War!

At that time Gen. BROCK commanded in Upper Canada, and possessed only two or three battalions of the 41st and 49th regiments, with which he had to garrison Kingston, Fort George, York and Malden.—With this handful of men, he prepared to meet this unexpected irruption of the "white savages" of the West. He drew together seven hundred white troops, and about as many Indians, and with this force he not only compelled Gen. HULL to quit the British territory, but soon after to yield up his whole army, and the Michigan forts and territory.

I do not attribute blame to Gen. HULL. The subsequent conduct of his successors is the best defence of that General. Let prejudiced men rail at him as much as they please; *Heroic HARRISON*, as he is called, with infinitely better means, achieved nothing for more than twelve months after this disaster. HULL was without provisions or proper ammunition with his intercourse cut off by the Indians.—Lake Erie was in possession of the British; and if the command of that Lake had not been obtained, HARRISON would not have taken Malden in twenty years.

HULL's expedition terminated in the loss of 2500 men, and of the whole Michigan territory; to say nothing of Michillimackinac, and some other places, which yet remain in the hands of the British.

Gen. HARRISON succeeded to the command. He promised soon to revenge the loss, and to retrieve the fortune of our arms. All the Western States poured forth their myriads—their armies of Governors and Generals, and Heroes, as thick "as the autumnal leaves which strew the ground in Valumbrosa."

Under his command the United States sustained greater losses than under HULL, and, if possible, more disgrace.

The death of Gen. BROCK was a severe blow to our enemy. The command devolved on Col. PROCTOR.—He had to contend with almost as many Governors and Generals as he had troops. Instead of regaining Detroit, as he promised, the great HARRISON shut himself up in a stockaded fort, fifty miles from Detroit. One of his Generals advanced to the river Raisin with a thousand men. His whole corps was cut to pieces of taken prisoners by a British Colonel, at the head of seven hundred white troops. Still HARRISON does not move. The British advanced—attacked him in his fort—He attempted to repulse them; and CLAY, fol-

lowing the fate of WINCHESTER, is cut up with the loss of seven hundred men.

Thus in twelve months after the War was declared, we lost in the *Western* army alone 4200 men, by sword and by capture, besides probably 1000 more by disease.—All this was effected by a regular British force of 700 or 800 men, aided by an Indian force.

At last, the gallantry of Com. PERRY having deprived the British of all means of subsistence, relief or retreat, and HARRISON having under his command 3500 men, besides 1000 in the ships of war, aided too by the presence, countenance, counsel and courage of the Yankee Hero PERRY, succeeded in beating two small detachments of British troops, who, for more than a year, had triumphed over the whole forces of the Western States.

Besides the troops that crossed over with HARRISON it is stated that an equal number remained at Sandusky.

Thus with the expense of enlisting and maintaining at least 12,000 troops, we have succeeded in getting possession of the most remote settlement of Great-Britain, where we can hunt the wolves and bears in security, but where scarcely a civilized footstep can be traced.

Col. WASHINGTON at the head of 600 rangers did as much again fifty years ago.

I know not what other people think of this part of the War; but I think it shews us to be in the *High Road to Ruin*. We shall see, by and by, whether we have done much better in other quarters.

At this rate it would take twenty years, and 100,000 men, to conquer the other parts of Canada, where there are some human beings, and where the military force is more than twenty times as great.

Let us now consider the achievements of the army of the *Centre*. The utmost British force at Fort George, Queenstown, Chippewa, Fort Erie and Little York, did not in the first campaign exceed 1500 men. We had at Sackett's Harbor about 1500, and 3500 along the posts of Niagara, at a half mile's distance from the British garrisons. No attempt was made to dislodge these feeble garrisons of the British until the unfortunate expedition of Col. VAN RENSALAER. This, though the most gallant effort of our arms on land, since the War, (as the men did fight and were killed and wounded to the number of 5 or 600,) was still not honorable. Gen. BROCK had at first only about 250 men, with whom, and about 500 Indians, he defended Queenstown, until reinforced from a distance of eight miles, when the British captured our whole body.—Sixteen hundred men were lost in this action. The campaign ended with the blustering Gen. SMYTH, and his consequent disgrace.—In the Spring, the Commander in Chief, with 1800 men and a powerful superior fleet attacked and carried Little York, which was defended by only 313 troops.—The chief trophy on this occasion was one *Human Scalp*. Our loss was little less than the whole British number.

Soon after this place (which might have been held) was evacuated. Had it been held, the British must have evacuated all the country above.

Gen. DEARBORN, reinforced by all the army on the Niagara, took Fort George. His forces amounted to 4000 troops besides the Navy.—The British force to 1500. They abandoned their works, after a small battle. The British army was pursued to Burlington Heights—when, in their turn, they became assailants, and *incredible visus et turpe dictus!* the two superior Generals and their Aids, and 180 men, were taken in their own camp. The army retreated shamefully to Fort George, with the loss of much baggage, and it is said, 1000 men.—There they have remained, cooped up to this day; exhibiting, as Gov. PREVOST says in his intercepted letter, the *unheard of military spectacle* of a small insignificant army, blockading one of three times its force. Why HARRISON published this letter, unless to disgrace Gens. DEARBORN, LEWIS and BOYD, no man can tell.

The unsupported detachment of Colonel BOERSTLER having yielded to a contemptible British force, Government was obliged to sacrifice the Commander in Chief, by giving him leave of absence against his will. Thus ended Gen. DEARBORN's exploits. I omit the invasion of Canada last fall and the burning of one poor man's hut by our troops, with (as it was said) two Indians in it. This fact is settled as to be worthy of the historian's attention. The General has since exhibited the strange spectacle, known only to us, of a Commander in Chief *without troops*. Not trusted, yet not brought to trial—superceded by younger officers, yet not too proud to hold on to his profitable office. He has, however, consoled himself by entering into the service

of *Venus*.—He may now say with *Horace*,
Intermissa diu, Venus,
Parce, precor, precor,

Still I think DEARBORN rises every day by the same means that HULL did, by his successors' disgraces and blunders. As we charged 5200 men to the account of loss of the *Western* army, we must add 3500 for the loss of the army of the *Centre*—the DEARBORN army.

Free Trade, and Sailors' Rights.

A few weeks since, we made a few remarks on the above motto, which, in our opinion, at least, tend to shew, that if the Jeffersonians should succeed in bringing Great-Britain to agree to their maxim that *merchant ships shall protect, the persons and property of all that sail under the flag*, it would be highly pernicious to the interest of our own seamen, because that very fact would draw all manner of persons to our shores, for the purpose of taking the benefit of such an arrangement, and in that way, our own seamen would be either thrown out of employment, or obliged to work for half price. This effect is so obvious, and necessary, that no paper of the party, that we have seen, has pretended to deny it. In this particular, then, the professed object of the war, if attained, would be very injurious to this country.

But there are other objects of this war. Great-Britain does not now, nor never did, claim, a right to impress our seamen. She claims a right to impress her own subjects, and to take up her deserters. The war, then, is not waged for the protection of our own seamen, because Great-Britain, not claiming any right to take them, can never do more than promise by treaty not to take them. This would be only exacting a promise from her not to do that which she claims no right to do, which would be something like an absurdity. But, it seems, there is another class of beings who call themselves our seamen, about whose welfare our government are very solicitous—that is FOREIGNERS. *We are bound to protect them*, says every vagabond in this country and the government, anxious to secure the support of vagabonds, joins the cry, and the nation is enduring the horrible evils of this war, in a great degree for this purpose. It is not however, a matter of surprize, that Duane, and Richie, and Gales, and Binus, and a multitude of other English and Irish vagrants, who have been nurtured, and cherished by our miserable and despicable Administration, until they have become men of great importance, in their own opinion, should be zealously engaged to draw the United States into a perpetual war for their own personal security and emolument. So long as such men are appointed to places of honor and profit by our Presidents and Governors, and the natives of this country are contented to load themselves with taxes, and burthens of every kind—so long as they are willing that their sons shall sacrifice not only their ease and comfort, but their lives, in the high places of the field, for the benefit of vagabonds, we need never wonder at the impudence and clamours of those very vagabonds. We should think, however, when the period of services expires, and the surviving troops return to their families and friends, that those who then realize the awful breaches made in their domestic circles, will begin to feel that *security for vagrants is purchasing at a pretty dear rate*.

We have often stated this to be a prime object of the war. That our notions on this subject are well founded, we trust will be admitted by our readers, when they have perused the following sentiments from the National Intelligencer of the 11th of Nov. inst. in an article headed in large capitals—*"NATURAL ALLEGIANCE."* the editor says—*"This question has now become a vital point in our controversy with the enemy"*—the British government makes question of the right of expatriation. But it is no question with the mass of the people. IT CANNOT AND NEVER WILL BE, A QUESTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT." Here, then, we have the whole ground. Great-Britain claims perpetual allegiance from her subjects—such of her subjects as leave that country and take refuge in this, claims the right of turning their arms against their parent nation—our government regardless of the highest interests of their own native citizens, wage a destructive war on the Quixotic pretence of forcing Great Britain to abandon this great fundamental principle of her constitution—this is now avowed to be, what the opposers of the war have always considered it to be—a *vital point in the controversy*—and we are told, for our comfort, that the government will never abandon it.

It now becomes a serious enquiry for the native citizens of the United States—the owners of the soil, descendants of those who

settled the wilderness, and achieved the national independence, whether they intend to prosecute this war for untold years to come, for this avowed object? In answering this enquiry, and they must first or last answer it, it will be expedient for them to consider coolly and deliberately the whole subject. By attending to the experience of only 18 months, they may form some estimate of what they may be called to endure in five years, and in this way, they may make a replication satisfactory to themselves.

There is no reason to doubt, that the expenses of the war already amount to nearly fifty millions of dollars. Probably the next year will call for at least that sum.—We must depend on loans almost entirely. The system of internal revenue which is to commence its operation this winter, will raise but a dust in the balance of the sums necessary. The direct tax on lands, houses, &c. is calculated to raise in the whole United States the sum of 3,000,000 dollars.—Of this sum the proportion of Connecticut is 118,000 dollars. According to the same rule of computation, the proportion of the fifty millions which would belong to this state to pay, would be a little short of two millions, and the other states in proportion: If the war should last five years, and the expenses accumulate in the manner they have thus far, the probability is, that the amount will not be less than two hundred and fifty, or three hundred millions of dollars. This debt must be paid, and the owners of the soil will find their estates pledged for it to the twentieth generation. What is there in this *vital point*, which, if really gained, will reward us for this extravagant expense?

But this is not all. The prices of all the necessities of life, are already inordinately high, and the prospect is, they will continue to increase.—The tax which the owner of a house pays for it, will be the lightest one he is called upon for.—Flour at 14 dollars a barrel, butter at 25 cents a pound, sugar at 25 dollars a hundred, tea at double its old price, molasses at a dollar and 25 cents a gallon, salt at 1 dollar 25 a bushel, merchandize of all sorts raised cent per cent above peace prices, and these are some of the taxes which we are paying for the war. And when the whole trade of a country becomes a business of speculation, and speculations extend to a monopoly of all the necessities of life, what the inhabitants can expect but to be taxed, and that at a most immoderate rate. And let it be remembered, that this year, the crops of our country have been very abundant. What may not the poor, and the laboring classes of the community look for, if there should come a scarce season?

By adverting to a proclamation from the governor of Canada, in our paper of to day, it will be seen, that if our administration persist in their ridiculous and blood thirsty scheme of retaliation our towns upon the sea coast are threatened with promiscuous and indiscriminate bombardment. A great many of them may be destroyed in spite of all the force we can find to protect them.—This the government declared, in effect, when they gave their answer last summer to the states bordering upon the Chesapeake bay. The retaliation threatened by our government, is to punish subjects of Great-Britain, in our hands, if she punishes her own subjects taken in arms, and fighting against their own country. This system, once begun, there will be no end to it.—Great-Britain has taken many more prisoners than we have.—If we hang and shoot, they will hang and shoot. If the natives of this country are disposed to be butchered like cattle, merely for the sake of protecting British and Irish traitors, let them have their heart's desire. We shall not, however, believe that such is their desire, until we see it.

[Con. Mirror.]

BOSTON, DECEMBER 6.

Arrived, sch. Dake, Lunt, of Newbury, from New-York. On Monday afternoon, Capt. L. saw a sch. lying at anchor in Buzzard's Bay—on his heaving in sight, she made sail and flood for him, when he hove about, and came through a narrow channel to the Westward.—The last he saw of her was lying too far carried a top-sail and top-gallant-sail, and was apparently upwards of 100 tons burthen. He thinks she was a privateer. On Tuesday evening, several leagues to the northward of Cape Cod Light, saw the Lights of a ship of war, which appeared to be standing the same course with him. Same time, he saw a small suspicious looking sch. which flood for him, but he soon left her.

A Swedish sch. from Halifax, with dry goods, &c. arrived at Salem Friday morning, prize to the privateer sch. Washington, of Portland.

The beautiful corvet built ship Jacob Jones, 554 tons burthen and pierced for 20 guns, from Wilcasser, to Bryant and Storgis. We understand, that on her passage from Wilcass-