

Orders in Council was the cause of this war—"No, said he, it was upon far different things—it was upon high and mighty interests of the British Empire, interests which we could not move without throwing the trident of the Ocean into the hands of America. America, said he, was not to be soothed and fondled into Peace—the heads of that government had long been influenced by a deadly hatred to this country, and (unusual as the epithet was) by a deadly love to France. Our policy was plain—our wisest, nay our most pacific measure would be, to show ourselves ready for the emergency—to present in front of America a force, which would make her feel her danger, and feel the importance of purchasing her safety by Peace—What had we done? Nothing—nothing to intimidate—nothing to punish—nothing to interest her weakness or her wisdom. If there was any hope of putting a speedy end to the war, it was to be accomplished by boldness and decision, by making the effort while it was still in our power, and by turning upon that war some part of the grand and superabundant strength of our country."

Lord Liverpool followed—He coincided with the noble Lord, as to the hostile dispositions of the American government—but denied that their hostilities had been inadequately met. This, however, said he, would form a topic for future discussion.

Lord Grenville rose—on the subject of America said, "As to America, he could not express his astonishment, his indignation, at the language of those who professed to say, that the abandonment of the Orders in Council would necessarily lead to a restoration of Peace. There was a time indeed, when such a concession on our part would not only have achieved peace, but alliance between the two countries—but it was the blind opinion of the noble Earl, and of a Statesman of his stamp, that concession never came too late—and this, notwithstanding the historical experience of our first fatal contest with America, where every year concessions were made in vain, which, if duly timed, would have been received with gratitude. He thought the House was indecently called upon in the Address to pledge themselves to the prosecution of this war, though not a document was produced to prove the justice of such a measure—On this subject he must say, that though he wished for peace, he would not consent to sacrifice one maritime right of the country—but this view only aggravated the guilt of those men who had unnecessarily plunged us into such a state of things."

The Address was agreed to without a division. In the House of Commons an Address to the Prince was moved by Lord Clive. He said, "Every person must regret the war with America, and rejoice at the Declaration of the Prince Regent, that the earliest opportunity would be taken to restore amity between the two countries."

Mr. Hart Davis seconded the motion, and when the question was putting, Mr. Canning rose, and of America he said,

"It was his sincere and anxious wish, that two nations so related to each other, by consanguinity, by one common language, and by mutual interests, as G. Britain and America, should not only be in alliance—but, when disputes ran to so great an extent, when once the die was cast, and hostilities had commenced, it became this country to be more prompt, and by every vigorous effort, to bring the struggles of war to a speedy conclusion—He would go to the extremest verge of forbearance to keep peace, but he would not dilute his war measures into a weak and sickly regimen, unfit for the vigour of the occasion.—He would not convert the acute distemper of war, into a chronic distemper, and incorporate it with the system. The present dispute was got up with petty profits and small gains, till at last actual war was fixed upon us. Two years ago, to have prophesied that after six months open war between America and England, America should boast the only naval trophy, and that we could only say that she had not been conquered! An Englishman would have resented such a prophecy as an insult. He could not consider our military success in America as matter of great triumph—He never supposed we should be conquered by America. He never could have thought that the mighty navy of England would have slept while her commerce was swept from the seas, and that, at the end of six months we should be found proclaiming a speech from the throne, that the time was at length come to be active and energetic, and to shew England and the world that England is what England was. Never, that we should send our Ambassador with our ships to our own North American towns and attack the American ports with our flags of truce. There might, however, remain circumstances yet to be disclosed, to account for all this; but he would say, that on the face of appearance, and on the declaration of war, there was evidently a studied determination to postpone the period of all accommodation. As for the desire of America to get possession of Canada, it was a project which he thought not likely to be frowned upon severely, even by those parties in America which were considered friendly to us." [He notices the departure of Barlow for Moscow, to sign a treaty.] "He thought it unfair to speak of the sentiments of an English party in America. When we spoke of an English party, we should think of them as good Americans merely who prefer an English to a French alliance. He concluded by observing that every effort should be used to extend the scale of warfare, and make it decisive."

Lord Castlereagh followed, and denied, that Ministers had conducted the war with America upon any principle of forbearance. He said "it had been conducted with all the means, both naval and military, which the country could have spared from other objects," &c. "He wished as much as any man that peace could be maintained with America, but if she was determined to throw off all those ties, which this country held dear, and which the common interests required, he must deplore that determination, but it was not

in the power of His Majesty's Ministers to prevent it."

Mr. Whitbread, after speaking of the wars of Russia and Spain said, "The war with America, he could not help thinking as most fatal and calamitous to the interests of Great-Britain, and most likely to cut the sinews of her force and energies which would otherwise be more happily employed. He wished the noble Lord were on his way with Joel Barlow for the purpose of entering into negotiations of peace"—and concluded, (after noticing the tardy measures taken to prevent the war with America) by "entreatng the House not to suffer the present moment to pass without converting it into the happy instrument of the re-establishment of Peace, observing "that no dishonorable object could be imputed to G. Britain, Russia or France, by overtures for the general pacification of Europe."

RUSSIAN VICTORIES.

Extract of a Letter from Count Rosen, dated Stockholm, 19th November, 1812.

"Two messengers arrived to night from Russia.—Wittgenstein has totally destroyed Victor and St. Cyr's armies, one is now near Smolensk. When Bonaparte left Moscow, he ordered Murat to attack General Benningsen but he was driven back. Bonaparte then attacked Kutusow in person with great desperation; near Maloyaroslavitz, and was again repulsed. He then intended to fight a general battle, and if he was conqueror, to march by way of Kaluga to Poland, and there remain in winter quarters, as near Galicia as possible; he had, therefore, nothing left but to concentrate his whole force, and return by way of Smolensk, which is entirely laid waste; the bad roads and the dreadful wants the French are in, gave Kutusow time to come up with them near Viasma, when he gave them battle and defeated them. Before the battle, Bonaparte gave the command to Murat, and went himself with six thousand men to Smolensk, on his way home; but he was met by General Oertel's detachment, which obliged him to return; he then tried to retreat by the road which goes from Smolensk towards the sea; there he was met by Wittgenstein's advanced guard, was beaten, and was obliged to fall back on the grand army.

"He has now in front of him Tormasow's, Tchichagoff's and Wittgensteins, and in his rear Prince Kutusow, with 150,000 men.

"The Russians take daily 3 or 4000 prisoners; Wittgenstein made in one day 6000, and took 23 pieces of cannon; Platow 30 pieces of cannon and 3700 prisoners.

Bonaparte himself quitted Moscow on the 19th Oct. the day after Murat was defeated with such loss by Kutusoff. Of that action the Bulletin furnishes no details. A horde of Cossacks annoyed the French cavalry, nay, even took them so by surprise, that they were in the French camp before the enemy could mount their horses—a tolerably strong tribute to the activity and enterprize of this most valuable force. Sebastiani lost 100 baggage waggons, a heavy loss indeed in the present state of affairs. But Murat is brought in, as if, instead of being beaten, he had retrieved the fortune of the day, by charging, breaking, and cutting to pieces four battalions of light infantry, sent to support the Cossacks. No mention is made of the death of Poniatowski, nor of Generals Joinville, Moncey and Daru being made prisoners.

The Duke of Treviso is said to have been left in Moscow with a garrison; but he remained there only two days, and, as our readers are informed, was compelled by Gen. Winzingerode to evacuate it in such haste, that the hospitals were taken possession of by the Russians. Yet the Bulletin pretends that all the sick were sent off four days before Bonaparte himself quitted Moscow.

The weather is still fine, says the Bulletin, a little warmer than it is in France in October! It has been fine, if we may believe the enemy, ever since they got to Moscow. "We do not perceive we are in the North," says the 23d Bulletin—only ten days before they are obliged to move southward with all possible rapidity. All these Bulletins have, of course, appeared in our paper; but we have thought it would not be unacceptable to our readers to re-publish them, (from Bonaparte's entrance into, till his departure from Moscow) in order that they may see how completely the hopes and projects of the enemy have been frustrated. He finds in Moscow, burnt as it was, "considerable resources of every kind." "The army is recovering from its fatigues; has, in short, provisions of all sort." "We every day discover cellars full of wine and brandy." "We are supplied with ammunition for two campaigns." "Baker-houses and magazines are re-establishing;" and "such large magazines," said a letter annexed to the 22d Bulletin, "of meal have been found, that our subsistence is ensured for a long time." Nay, Bonaparte had appointed Intendants of the Province of Moscow, organized a municipality, and adopted every measure and made every calculation with a view to a long residence at Moscow. But he did not take into his calculation the determined resistance of the Russian troops and people—he did not calculate upon the firmness of the Emperor—he did not calculate upon that constancy and courage which resolve to risk every thing rather than submit to the invader.

But now "Moscow is not a military position!" So says Bonaparte, now he can no longer hold it. But come forth thou profound Politician, almost as dull, but not quite so prolix as the old Wellesley Partisan, come forth thou author of the article in the Morning Chronicle, who told us that Moscow was the heart and soul, and life blood of the Russian Empire; that Petersburg was nothing, and that if it were sunk beneath the bog on which it was erected, it would be for the advantage of the Empire. Come forth and tell us why you led your "consummate General the Hero of the age" into such a trap. Why, you "kept the word of promise to his ear and broke it to his hope." You talked of Ciudad Rodrigo as a *trou de rat* to Lord Wellington, but what has Moscow been to Bonaparte?—However, you kept up his spirits as long as you could.—We were the "jolly Ministerialists" in ridicule, because we dared to hope that Moscow might be the grave of the French. On the very day Bonaparte was writing this Bulletin—his last dying speech and confession before he was turned off from

Moscow, you ridiculed us and our hopes of good in the following pleasant and witty strain:—"The battle of the jolly ministerialists, who cover the retreat of the Russians in such a handsome style, is now beginning to slacken a little. Having despaired of opposing Bonaparte in his van, they now hang on the rear; his communications are to be cut off; and Moscow was set for him as a trap! it is really disgusting to follow men of such never ending complacency, through their zig zag dance of pleasure; men who caper for joy if the gigantic enemy stand still; who are equally delighted if he moved forward; who see ruin encircling him at every event that can possibly happen; and who tinge with the complexion of victory the most horrible and disastrous defeats."

Whether the retreating enemy will direct his course we are unable to state. But he will not, it is obvious, stop till he has got quite out of the reach of those hordes of Cossacks, who steal into his camp before his troops can mount their horses. There is a hint in the Bulletin that would lead us to suspect he intended to favor his father-in-law, by quartering himself and his army upon him for the winter. Our readers remark in all his Bulletins his affected horror at Moscow's having been set fire to, to prevent its furnishing an asylum to his army. But what does he talk of doing? Blowing up the Kremlin, which he has mined, and burning all that yet remains of Moscow! a measure which we are happy to find his agent, Treviso, was unable to execute, probably on account of the unexpected rapidity with which Winzingerode pushed into the city. Annexed to this Bulletin is a famous commentary extracted from the *Journal de l'Empire*. It is much in the style of the Bulletin, with the addition of a previous piece of consolation, that the army may have to fight fresh battles, but that it cannot expect to reap from them either glory or benefit.

THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER

Has addressed very spirited Manifestos to his subjects on the events prior to and immediately after the possession and evacuation of Moscow by the French. The following is the substance:—

RUSSIANS—At length the enemy of our country—the foe of its independence and freedom—has experienced a portion of that terrible vengeance which his ambitious and unprincipled aggressions had aroused. From the period of his march from Wilna, his army, great in numbers, assured in valor and discipline, and elated at victories gained in other regions, threatened no less than the entire subjugation of the Russians. The system which we had thought fit to adopt strengthened that confidence. The sanguinary battles fought on his route, and which gave him temporary possession of Smolensk, flattered him with all the illusion of victory. He reached Moscow, and he believed himself invincible and invulnerable. He now exulted in the idea of reaping the fruits of his toils—of obtaining for his soldiers, comfortable winter quarters, and of sending out from thence, next spring, fresh forces to ravage and burn our cities—make captives of our countrymen—overthrow our laws and holy religion—and subject every thing to his lawless will. Vain, presumptuous hope!—insolent, degrading menace! A population of forty millions, attached to their King and Country, and devoted to their religion and laws—the least brave man of whom is superior to his unwilling confederates and victims, cannot be conquered by any heterogeneous force which he could muster, even of treble its late amount. Scarcely had he reached Moscow, and attempted to repose amidst its burning ruins, when he found himself encircled by the bayonets of our troops: he then too late discovered that the possessor of Moscow was not the conqueror of the kingdom—that his temerity has led him into a snare—and that he must choose between retreat or annihilation. He preferred the former; and he had the consequences.

[Here follow the accounts of the defeat of Murat by Marshal Kutusow; Gen. St. Cyr by Marshal Wittgenstein, and the storming of Polotsk; of the re-occupation of Moscow by Winzingerode's troops, &c.]

RUSSIANS!

THE Almighty has heard our wishes, and crowned your efforts with success. Every where the enemy is in motion; his disorderly movements betray his apprehensions; gladly would he compound for safety; but policy and justice alike demand the terrible infliction. The history of his daring must not be told without the terrible catastrophe by which it was attended. A hundred thousand men sacrificed to his frantic presumption attest your valour and devotion to your country; and must deter him from a repetition of his impracticable design. Much, however, yet remains to be done, and that is in your power. Let the lige of his retreat be rendered memorable by your honest indignation; destroy every thing which can be of service to him, and our commanders have orders to remunerate you. Render your bridges, your roads impassable. In fine, adopt and execute the suggestions of a brave, wise and patriotic heart, and show yourself deserving the thanks of your country and sovereign.

Should the remains of the enemy's force escape to our Imperial frontiers and attempt to winter there, they must prepare themselves to encounter all the rigours of the climate and season, and the valorous attacks of our troops: thus harried, exhausted and defeated, he shall forever be rendered incapable of renewing the presumptuous attempt.

ALEXANDER.

LONDON, November 24. The Romillies 74, Sir J. Hardy, the Elephant, 74, Captain Aulfin; the Victorious, Captain Talbot; the Rhin 44, and several other frigates have been ordered to reinforce the American stations. The crews of the 44's are to be augmented 40 hands, the 32's, 30, and the gun-brigs a proportionate number, to place them somewhat more on an equality with the large American frigates.

Two or three French squadrons are said to be ready for a start for America.

Arrivals from the North, state that the Russian fleet had arrived at Carlsham or Carlskrona, (adjacent ports in Sweden) where it was expected they would winter; and that war stores from England to Sweden, amounting to a million sterling had been landed at Gottenburg.