

tion together of the British Colonies, and their Communication with each other. That Wedge of territory, which the United States are endeavouring to drive up between Canada and New-Brunswick, will most effectually separate the upper and lower Divisions of our possessions in America, and expose the Frontier of the former Province, no less, than it commands the occupation of the latter. A long and narrow strip of land, scarce thirteen miles in width, along the shore, at the entrance of the St. Lawrence, (which is all they would here leave us, in this quarter, on the right bank,) cannot be considered a very tenable possession. The navigation of the river becomes endangered, and the very passage of the Mails extremely circuitous, and extremely precarious. The situation of New-Brunswick renders it the centre of our Empire on that Continent, and the Territory in question is the very point of union; and as a prudent Commander would reserve his chief force and vigilance, for the protection of that position which secures the connexion and support of each extreme, no less anxiety should be shewn by a wary Government, along the Line of its dominions, more especially if so critical a part has already attracted the desires, and even the attempts, of our Adversary. In a commercial as well as political view, this Connexion has now become of consequence, and the course of future events may prove it far more important. For if the Union of all those Colonies under one General Government, as is sometimes suggested, should ever take place; or if, by any unforeseen exigency, the ties between them and the Mother Country should ever become less intimate, or less effectual, such a Communication and Connexion would become to them an important bond of Union, and would create and secure a community of Feeling and interest, and prevent their falling separately into the hands of that neighbouring Republic, whose power and commerce already threaten to rival Great Britain, and to whose increase, except in the present instance, we do not know what other opportunity will be ever found to prescribe a limit.

4th. But if these considerations appear of remoter interest, there are others more immediate, and perhaps more important. For it is not merely the communication between the Colonies themselves that is at stake, but the communication, between the Canadas and the Sea, between the Canadas and Great Britain. During eight months of the year, from the first of September to May, not even an answer from England to any intelligence from Quebec, can be there received, except through the United States, or through the Province of New-Brunswick. Supposing the latter communication interrupted, (as it will be most effectually, if any other Boundary is accepted, but that claimed by His Majesty's Commissioners,) it may easily be conceived what advantages an enemy in that country would possess, who should commence hostilities a little before that period, in the month of August or July, and thus have nearly a twelve month to overrun those Colonies, before they could receive the assistance of a single man, or a single musquet, from the Mother Country; whose armament, on arriving, the next June, might possibly find the enemy encamped on the Heights of Abram, or their very flag on the Walls of Quebec. Or if the Nations, with whom we have to contend, were such, as would probably overlook this advantage, still should any disaster occur in the course of the war, how injurious must be so long a delay, and how frequently must succour arrive too late. In short, is it possible for Great Britain to retain and defend a country, from which she would not only be so perfectly severed, by distance and climate,

but of the very occurrences in which she must remain in utter ignorance, during the greater part of the year.

It is not merely a Route to convey the Mails that is wanted, (which the Americans would very speciously offer, by a proposed exchange of territory, leaving us the left side of the Madawaska, for an equivalent on the right of the St. John's, and which even then would continue at their mercy,) but a Military Line of communication, the means of transporting Troops and stores, from St. John's, or Halifax, to Quebec, with convenience and security. The advantages of this Line have been already in some measure perceived. During the late War, regiments were marched through, and sailors transported, in the depth of winter, with perfect safety, to the Upper Provinces, where their arrival was very reasonable; and similar, and far more extensive, services, cannot fail to be received, or regretted, in case of future conflict. Such is the importance of preserving this communication, that the present question of Boundary can hardly be considered in any other light, than as involving the question of the expediency, of retaining, or relinquishing the whole of the British Colonies in North America.

It would really appear to be faintly perceived, or seldom considered, among us, how formidable a rival we must one day have to contend with in the United States, how rapidly that day is approaching, and how momentous must be the issue. At so great a distance, and comparatively of minor interest, little is here observed of the intriguing, ambitious, and imperious character, of a People and Government, who consider every thing they can claim and reach, as already their own, and every thing they cannot, as an injury to be borne only till they have acquired further strength. In the very terms of a previous concession they can find subject for fresh demands. With reciprocity for ever in their mouths, they can induce us to relax our system of Navigation, and yield them commercial advantages, which they then refuse or delay to return, and seem to think conduct, which in private life would be thought little consistent with good faith, to be the proof of policy on their part, or of weakness upon ours. Yet to whatever subtilty they may descend on some occasions, the boldness of their measures on others, bears no proportion to the imbecility of their present power, but seems to assume all the importance of their future expectations; and as if the vast Countries of the West were now too little for their increase, or were already but the means of acquiring more, we see them grasping, with one hand, the shores of the Gulph of Mexico, and reaching, with the other, at the Gulph of St. Lawrence; fortifying the mouth of the Columbia, on that side the Globe, intriguing and threatening for a Port in the Mediterranean, upon this; at one time, forbidding any Nation to colonize the coasts of the Pacific, and dictating, at another, to the new Republics of the South, not to touch the Havannah; and now, at last, publicly proclaiming, by the Message of their President, that their former submission to Belligerent rights can only be remembered with the resolution of never enduring it again. (What is this but to say, that if any Nation will go to war with Great Britain, they stand ready to join them?) Their attempt to seize, their unwillingness to relinquish, their very demand of, the Territory in question, is a striking indication of the present aims, and future measures, for why do they thus covet the possession of so angular and insulated a tract, as if they had not already more dependent than they can people for centuries? Why, but for the injury, and insult, it must inflict upon Great Britain? For surely the injury to the security

of the Empire will not be greater, than the insult upon its policy, if they have any argument, by which we can be persuaded, that the North-west Angle of Nova Scotia, which France once had at the source of the Kennebec, England at the Penobscot, and the Americans themselves, in 83, agreed was on the south of the St. John's, is, in point of fact, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. The secret is, that the United States have long found the British American Provinces to lie heavily on their flank and rear, and overhang and command their coast. To throw off so effectual a curb, and still more, by the acquisition of these possessions, to rid themselves of the superiority, or even of the presence, of the British fleets, in those waters; to get at their mines, to monopolize the fish and timber of America, force themselves into the West Indies, and force Great Britain out; these have been their constant objects, since their first struggle for independence, to the present hour. Their efforts have as yet been unavailing; nor have they for the future, by arms at least, any prospect of better success. In a few years, these Colonies will not contain less than two millions of inhabitants, who, in such a country as America, are not to be conquered; and in the mean time, experience has shewn, that with the protection of Great Britain, they may be defended; except indeed their natural Barriers are conceded by negotiation, and their connexion, and communication, with each other, separated, and lost.

The future destinies of the British Colonies in America, as far as from situation and circumstances can be probably conjectured, seem to promise a permanent continuance of their Connexion with the Mother Country. Or even if at any distant period that Connexion may be variously modified, according to the changes of time and events, yet, under the names of dependence, protection, or alliance, it can hardly fail to be almost equally intimate, and mutually advantageous. The commerce, the wants, the situation and fears, and above all, the moral feelings, of the Inhabitants, afford the surest earnest of this expectation. The liberal and parental policy of the Mother Country, particularly of late years, has added the ties of interest to those of affection, and left them nothing to gain, by any change that could be offered. Least of all can any desire, either exist at present, or arise hereafter, to exchange their dependence on Great Britain, for dependence on the American Congress, and submit their commerce to be taxed, and regulated, by the slave-holders of the South, or Planters beyond the Alleghanies, who have never seen the Sea. There does not exist among them, either in name or thought, such a thing as a Party, or even a feeling, in favour of the United States. The aversion of such a sentiment, or the suspicion of entertaining it, would immediately destroy a man's place and character in his attachment warm and frequent expressions of American principles, would surmount a Philosopher. We do not allude to the antipathy of the Canadas, or the fanaticism of the Loyalists, or the longing of the Emigrant for his native land; but to that rational preference of men of sense and education, who having a near and constant opportunity of comparing a mixed Government with a pure Democracy, see little reason to prefer the latter; and if the King's prerogative appear to be sometimes exercised with less justice or judgment, know how to distinguish between the principle and the abuse, and derive abundant consolation in finding the Democracy of their neighbours, more capricious in the favour she bestows, more servile in the homage she exacts, more unreasonable in her performance,

more oppressive in displeasure, and absolute in all. Nor should the disputes which sometimes arise with the Colonial Assemblies, be considered as at all involving the question of loyalty or disaffection, but as the natural results of a Legislature, composed of several orders, or of persons representing their powers, whose constitution has not yet become settled by precedent and usage, and to which the practice of the Mother Country is not always analogous, or the analogy not always conclusive. If however, in process of time hereafter, as they increase in wealth and population, the consciousness of importance should, as is wont, give rise to feelings of a more national description, Great Britain will probably see it for her interest, to anticipate and direct these, to a separate confederacy among themselves, rather than suffer them to swell the overgrown Empire of their neighbours. Of the present policy of friendly relations with the United States, there cannot exist a doubt, nor a wish for their interruption. But the best pledge for their continuance perhaps, is to hold in our hands the means of blockading and attacking their whole Coast, which is secured by the Ports of Nova Scotia and New-Brunswick, and an inroad into the heart of their Country, which is offered by Lake Champlain, and Lower Canada, and the annoyance of its rear, by the Upper Province, and Lakes. These Colonies, though they may have one of the secret objects, have never been the only causes, of war with the Americans, nor have they been ever even mentioned, among its avowed pretexis. If indeed, by the price of their relinquishment, perpetual amity could be purchased with the United States, the present question of Boundary might with more safety be neglected; but if the estimate of relative strength and security is often the real inducement to hostilities, and if commercial jealousies, which are not yet removed, and the old dispute of neutral rights, which may at any time revive, have already furnished the pretext; the question is never likely to arise, whether we shall go to war for the sake of these Colonies, but whether it is better to fight the Americans, with, if we must not say the assistance, yet at least with the opportunities and advantages, which these Provinces afford, or without them.

Of all the North American Colonies, the youngest, but the most fortunate in its advantages, and perhaps the most interesting, is New-Brunswick, and in the present question of Boundary, the most important. It is situated on the Gulf of Fundy on the one hand, and possesses a valuable fishery on her Newfoundland and Labrador. Its shores, and the whole country is intersected with large Rivers and Lakes, and numerous smaller Streams, to such a degree, that there is, it is said, no point in the Province eight miles distance from navigable water. In fertility of soil it yields to no part of America; the climate is severe but healthy; the face of the country level, and covered with apparently inexhaustible Forests of large and lofty timber; beneath, are Mines of coal, lime, gypsum, and others, the source of some present, and the promise of much future, advantage. Forty-three years ago this country was one vast wilderness; uninhabited, except by a few families of Acadian French, and the thin and wandering tribes of native Savages. At present, it contains and supports 80,000 inhabitants; its exports exceed the value of £600,000, which are almost all exchanged for British manufactures; and what is of far more importance, gives employment to above 200,000 tons of British shipping, and 10,000 seamen. Its progress so rapid,