

From the London Courier, Nov. 12.

THE BATTLE OF NAVARIN.

In our preceding columns will be found the official details, as published in the Gazette Extraordinary, at a late hour on Saturday night, of the decided naval victory gained by the Allied Squadrons of England, France and Russia, over the Turco-Egyptian fleet, at anchor near the port of Navarin: we also communicate from the Paris Papers, the official account transmitted to the French Government by Admiral de Rigny.

The French account seems to imply that there were 20 of the smaller vessels afloat. Our private letter, as we stated on Saturday, estimates them at only eight. We suppose the French account must include some of that class of vessels, which our letter had included under the name of transports, &c.

Some of our contemporaries affect to be alarmed, lest the damage which the allied fleets have suffered should put our interests in the Levant in jeopardy; but they forget, that if our fleets have suffered, the fleets by which they could be opposed, are completely annihilated.

The narrative of Admiral Codrington is so simple and clear—it is such an unaffected and succinct detail of the events that occurred, unmixed with political reflections, and unperplexed by nautical phraseology, that we should only weaken the effect which that gallant officer's own despatch is so eminently calculated to produce, by any recapitulation of our own. Our feelings alone must predominate upon perusing these accounts, that barbarian perfidy and insult have received a signal and merited chastisement.—“When I found,” says Admiral Codrington, “that the boasted Ottoman word of honor was made a sacrifice to wanton, savage devastation, and that a base advantage was taken of our reliance upon Ibrahim's good faith, I own I felt a desire to punish the offenders. But it was my duty to refrain, and refrain I did; but I can assure his Royal Highness that I would still have avoided this disastrous extremity, if other means had been open to me.” There were obviously no other means. The only choice left the British Admiral, was, that of remaining a cajoled witness of fierce persecution, carried on by Ibrahim against the suffering Greeks, or avenging if not arresting, that persecution, by the destruction of his formidable naval armament. It was, not, however, till our pacific and honorable approaches were met by the hostile acts of the enemy....till, in fact, the work of slaughter had begun against us, that the allied squadron, no less in vindication of national honor, than from the dictates of self defence, taught them to understand the desperate game they were playing.

We are, as yet, uninformed with regard to all the circumstances under which this battle was thus precipitated: whether from the impetuous impulse of the moment, or in obedience to the positive commands of the Porte. The fact of the Armistice having been concluded with Ibrahim was known at Constantinople on the 7th ult.; and it has been stated, in accounts from the capital, that the instructions of the Sultan had been despatched to the Pacha. These he would receive before the battle of the 20th; but whether they imposed upon him the necessity of fighting that battle, is not known. Much, of course, in a political point of view, as regards what may be the ultimate issue of this defeat, will depend upon the nature of those instructions. If it should appear that the battle was the unexpected consequence of the entrance into

the Bay of Navarin, of the combined squadrons, the intelligence of the disastrous result may stagger the Ottoman Councils, and lower their tone of proud defiance. If, on the other hand, it was a prescribed course, possibly defeat may have entered into their calculation, and then its actual occurrence would only accelerate whatever other plans might be in contemplation. Our own impression certainly is, that the battle of Navarin is the commencement, not the termination of this business. The Sultan will hardly be a free agent in the affair. Popular resentment, when the fearful truth is known, will hurry him and the Divan to desperate, perhaps lamentable retaliation; if, too, as has been more than insinuated, the Porte has acted throughout from delusive assurances, that by assuming a determined attitude, the threatened consequences of the treaty of the 6th July would end in its menace, it may happen that the implied or positive obligations connected with its acquiescence in those assurances, will be exacted, and the question may suddenly assume a new and infinitely more complicated character.

In discussing the treaty of Intervention, we have never limited our arguments to the mere consideration of the points specifically set forth in that document. If we had done so, we should now be almost prepared to admit, that those specific points were accomplished....for the cause of Greece....so far as Greece only is concerned, has triumphed. That which the negotiation failed to obtain, victory has. A formidable fleet, destined to convey the means of renewed barbarities, is annihilated. Greece, therefore, is saved. But when we look to Turkey, and the great probability that what has occurred will be construed by the Ottoman Government into a personal cause of war....when we recollect what conflicting European interests may be brought into activity, should such be the case, and the possible extremity to which the infatuated policy of the Ottoman Government may lead....we cannot persuade ourselves but that we are only on the threshold of mighty events, which the future will disclose. The next advices from Constantinople, if they include the effect produced on the Sultan and his Ministers by the intelligence from Navarin, will be of the greatest interest.

The London New Times, in reply to some of its contemporaries, who question the right the combined squadrons had to enter Navarin and attack the Turkish and Egyptian fleet, says—

“Ibrahim had broken the Armistice by his attacks on the undefended Greeks on shore. The destruction of his fleet, and of his army, also, was no longer a question of right, but of expedience. If the object of the Allies could have been secured by a threat, a threat only would have been used; but the Turks despised threats as they had despised conventions, and their chastisement was thus no longer a matter of choice. It was evident the attack was anticipated by Ibrahim. He knew he had provoked it. His vessels were drawn up in battle array, and his centre and his flanks were defended with much skill. He lay, not in the position of a man who relies on the faith of treaties, but as one who had broken it, and who looks for the penalty of the infraction. As to the alarm lest Austria should be offended, because in the *melee* some of her transports suffered, it deserves no thought (if the Allies had no right to oppose Turkey, how came Austria to have a right to assist it? Was the gift of free agency limited only to the enemies of Christianity? But we ought to have declared war with Turkey. We are not at war with Turkey.

We have said to Turkey—“You must make peace with Greece; humanity is not to be any longer outraged by your quarrels.” When we said this we added our determination to act up to our declaration. If, in consequence of our doing so, Turkey see fit to go to war with us, we must meet her; If not, all we intend is merely to keep her from attacking Greece, while we equally keep Greece from attacking her. This is not war, and therefore needs no declaration.”

GREECE.

[We take the following extract from an article in Bell's Weekly Messenger of Sept. 30, on the FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE COUNTRY, AND DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN CABINETS.]—

With respect to the Greek war, it involves two points....Greece herself, and also Turkey. The Ottoman Empire, like some of those splendid fragments of ancient art, which exist on her deserted plain, seems to owe its integrity and duration to every other circumstance but its strength. Its position, the jealousy of neighbouring Powers, the difficulty of dividing her spoil,—all these are circumstances which keep alive this intolerable nuisance, and prevent its being overthrown. In a war with Russia, France, and England, Turkey is lost. We speak, of course, of serious hostility waged against the Porte by the combined strength of the Allies. Turkey, in such a case, has not the means of supporting one campaign. The capture of Rudstuck, on the Danube, would open the road to Constantinople, or this fortress might be masqued, as the military term is, that is, passed, and Constantinople be stormed. But it is impossible to doubt that such an event would most materially alter the state of the world, and would add too much substantial power, and too many valuable resources, to a nation already too formidable for her continental neighbours. It is impossible that the other Cabinets of Europe could see this state of things in Turkey with indifference. The Turks have resolved, we believe, to make no concessions; and the three Powers have resolved upon war and force, unless concessions are made.

Greece, likewise, is a further subject for some very important consideration. On the one hand, it is impossible to be indifferent to the cause of a Christian nation, and of a people of such a name and of such ancestors as the Greeks. On the other, the emancipation of the Greeks, and particularly at this period, may cause the ruin of Turkey. It is a matter, therefore, of much difficulty to conciliate these two contrary objects;—to emancipate the Greeks without so debilitating the Turkish Empire as to throw it open to the mercy of Russia.

One word further upon this subject. All the accounts of Greece are so exaggerated, and, in consequence, the public judgment is so unhxed, that we shall annex to these remarks a brief document in our hands, which at once points out the actual extent of Greece, and indicates what the Greeks may do, and how remote they are, in some parts, from the reach of their enemy at Constantinople.

The total population of Greece does not exceed two millions, that is, about the population of Scotland. These two millions are distributed according to the following table, which we subjoin as unquestionably entitled to the first degree of credit, and as showing the relative power and resources of the provinces:—

Macedonia, . . . . .	700,000
Thessaly, . . . . .	300,000
Etolia, Phocis, and Bœotia, . . . . .	300,000
The Morea, . . . . .	300,000
Epirus, . . . . .	400,000

Attica, . . . . .	20,000
Total of all Greece, . . . . .	2,020,000

Fighting men, 150,000.—Distance from Athens to Constantinople 700 miles.

But the question will not turn upon the belligerent powers of Greece, should the allies persist in their course of compelling Turkey to the proposed measures for recognizing the independence of these States. The menaces and warlike preparations of the Porte, and of its great feudatory the Pacha of Egypt, to subdue these provinces, will be worse than useless when the allies shall take any decisive step of a hostile character. There are English vessels enough at this moment to block up the Dardanelles, and one cheer of our British sailors would scatter the Turkish fleet without firing a gun. And with respect to the Pacha of Egypt, he will instantly drop his alliance upon the hint of the English Consul. He has already established so valuable a connexion, and so good a trade with England, that he will not be induced to hazard it from any subserviency to the actual or presumed interest of his Ottoman master.

RUSSIA AND PERSIA.

ST. PETERSBURGH, Oct. 27.—Gen. Paskewitch, being informed on the 2d Oct. that the Sardar of Erivan was passed with several detachments of infantry and cavalry 19 vers beyond the Araxes, despatched Colonel Rejewskji with a force to surprise and attack him; but on his arrival he found he had retired the night previous, towards the frontiers of Turkey. On the 4th Gen. Paskewitch quitted Eschmiadzine, proceeding without delay to the siege of Eviran. He concludes his report in announcing that Prince Erristow, on hearing that Abbas Mirza was in motion with all his troops to surprise Nachitschewan, put himself at the head of a strong force, and on the 17th September, the advance guard met the enemy, beat him and pursued him beyond Abbas Abad. Abbas Mirza crossed the Araxes with his infantry, 5000, but his cavalry, 10,000, remained on the right and fired on ours; they were however, soon put to flight. On the arrival of our troops at Masick, they saw, at eight vers distance the whole Persian army in order of battle, but before our infantry could be assembled, they retreated towards Choza.

Mahmed Giasfer, Chaw of Aram, has been placed under the protection of the Russian Government, on condition of his keeping the frontier free of the enemy, assembling a force to repel him when called on and of paying the same tribute to our government as he did to the Persian.

COLONIAL.

Halifax, January 4, 1828

A LIGHT HOUSE, has lately been erected on the Tower, at the West-end of Mauger's Beach, at the entrance of this harbour, which will be lighted on the first of April next.

As this light is intended for the express purpose of leading vessels up the harbour, the greater part of the eastern side will be darkened, viz. from N. E. by N. to S. half E.

The following directions should be attended to: Vessels coming from the Eastward must keep Sambro Light open to the southward of Chebucto head and until the light opens on Mauger's beach, which will then bear N half W,—they will then be to the westward of Thrum Cap Shoals, and may shape course up the har-