

English News.

WHO HAS GAINED, THUS FAR?

As the war in the Crimea has lately assumed a position of increasing interest, and apparently a crisis in the progress of hostilities is about being reached, it may help us to a clear view of the present posture of affairs, to look back to the commencement, and see what each party has thus far gained or lost. This will be much safer, as well as much more just, than to yield to the influence of a few weeks only, of vigorous exertion or unexpected reverses.

At the time when war was declared, Russia was in undisputed possession of the Danubian Principalities. She also, soon after, crossed the Danube and occupied the Dobrujscha, investing Silistria with a force of 60,000 to 80,000 men, and threatening to take it, penetrate the Balkans, and capture Constantinople before the Allies could come to the rescue. Repeatedly beaten in the field, and finally driven back defeated from the walls of Silistria, Russia has been compelled to abandon every foot of ground she had thus occupied. Not a Russian soldier is now to be found west of the Pruth or on the southern bank of the Danube.

Nor is it only in what she had thus unlawfully seized, that war has visited upon her a just retribution. Both by land and sea she has lost a large portion of that which a past century she had laboriously gained. At the beginning of the war she was mistress of the Black Sea. It was a Russian lake; and the bloody day of Sinope well nigh annihilated the Turkish fleet. Now, not a Russian vessel dares to thrust its prow beyond the protection of the batteries of Sebastopol. The Allied fleets command all their coasts, and every town is at their mercy. The Sea of Azoff is penetrated, its skirting towns have been scoured, its commerce destroyed, its roads and communications broken up. And in the Baltic the powerful Russian fleet are as hermetically sealed up within her granite harbors, as in the Euxine. The only way in which the Russians have been able to use their ships, has been by sinking them, to block up the entrance to their harbors. A few ships sunk are found to stop the enemy far more effectually than whole fleets afloat.

On land, they have lost the long chain of fortresses on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, which had for years fettered the independence of Circassia. Anapa—the strongest, the nearest to the rest of Russia, and the last to be abandoned—is at length evacuated by the troops of the Czar, and occupied by the Circassians. There yet remains, indeed, a Russian army in Asia, of which there is little to be said, except that it is not quite so bad, in any respect, as the miserable mob of Mohammedan tatterdemalions, which is all that remains of the "Turkish Army" in the same quarter of the world. But the prestige of the Russian power is humbled in Asia; and if Sebastopol should fall, that prestige will disappear for centuries.

Great boasts were made, at first, of the co-operation of Greece. A King and a Queen became conspirators in aid of the Czar; and the champion of legitimacy against revolution stirred up a rebellion. But it was with the utmost ease crushed at once. Greece is now of no farther use to Russia, except as furnishing its ablest spies.

But their most serious loss by land is the occupation of a portion of the Crimea by the Allies, who have so fortified themselves in their position, that it is very evident the whole military power of Russia cannot drive them out. If peace should be made on the simple basis that each party retain what it has gained during the war, it will be found that Russia gains nothing; loses her naval supremacy in the Black Sea altogether; abandons her costly conquests in Asia; leaving the Allies in quiet possession of the Gibraltar they have built for themselves on the heights above Sebastopol, and in full control of all the southern commerce of the Russian empire, except upon the Caspian Sea.

Nor has Russia gained in military glory what she has lost by land and sea, while her wondrous skill in purchasing all the science that England, France and Germany could sell is freely admitted, and while the illimitable endurance of Russian troops has called forth the astonishment of Europe, and inflicted grievous loss upon her assailants; still, in not one single great battle from the beginning of the war, have the Russians been victorious over Turks, or Christians, or both. Sinope has, in reality, been their only great success, besides the prolongation of the defence of Sebastopol. And in admiring the marvellous strength and skill of the defence of the latter fortress, it must never be forgotten that English and French engineers planned the works which now give so much trouble to their own countrymen to capture.

Not only has Russia thus lost ground in reality, but, notwithstanding all her proud boasts, she has been forced to confess it before the world. One after another of the haughty claims she made at the beginning, she has since testified her willingness to renounce, after loudly protesting that such renunciation would be incompatible with her honor. The difficulties in regard to the Holy Places she herself acknowledged to be settled before the outbreak of the war; and they have ever since vanished from view. The wording of these existing treaties with Turkey, she insisted on and refused to give up; she has now consented to their revision. The Protectorate of the Greek subjects of the Porte she claimed, and would not consent to part with her monopoly of that powerful interest; this, too, she has offered to resign. Her sole proprietorship of the Danubian Principalities she would not part with; but she has now consented to share it, as well as the other Protectorship, with the other powers of Europe. The Four Points which, on their first appearance, were declared by Nesselrode to be utterly incompatible with the honor of Russia, were a few months after not only accepted, but were accepted also with the interpretation put upon them by the Allies themselves. And if their late success in the Sea of Azof, and in the capture of the Place d'Armes and the Mamelon before Sebastopol, had taken place before the closing of the Conference, instead of afterwards, the Russian acceptance of those Four Points might have proved to be a reality, instead of only a ruse.

With the Allies all this has been the reverse.—Commencing with the greatest caution and the most moderate demands, they have been compelled to recede from no position which they have as yet formally assumed. Excepting the abandonment of Bomarsund and the Asian campaign of the Turks, the Allies have lost no territory, nor have the Russians obtained anywhere any foothold upon Allied soil. In spite of their trials, troubles and losses, they have never met with anything more than a temporary check. Even in the siege of Sebastopol, where they seem to have succeeded least, the real steps of advance have all been on their side. Every attempt to dislodge them from a position once taken and fortified by them, has been signally defeated.—N. Y. Church Journal.

The following is the speech delivered by the Emperor in the Legislative Assembly, at its opening on the second of July:—

Messieurs SENATORS AND DEPUTIES.—The diplomatic negotiations commenced during the course of our last session had already made such progress that I should be obliged to call you together when they came to a termination. Unhappily, the Conferences of Vienna have failed in procuring peace, and I come again to appeal to the patriotism of the country, and to your own judgment. Were we wanting in moderation in settling the conditions. I do not fear to examine the questions before you. One year already had passed since the commencement of the war, and already France and England had saved Turkey, gained two battles, forced Russia to evacuate the Principalities, and to exhaust her force in the defence of the Crimea. We had, moreover, in our favor the adhesion of Austria, and the moral approbation of the rest of Europe. In that situation, the Cabinet of Vienna asked us if we would consent to treat upon bases vaguely formed.

Before our successes, a refusal on our part seemed natural. Was it not to be supposed, forsooth, that the demands of France and England would increase in proportion to the greatness of the struggle, and of the sacrifice already made? Well, France and England did not turn their advantages to account, or even make the most of the rights given to them by previous treaties, so much had they at heart to facilitate peace, and to give an unchangeable proof of their moderation; we restricting ourselves to ask, in the interest of Germany, the free navigation of the Danube, and a breakwater against the Russian flood, which continually obstructed the mouths of that great river. Well, all these propositions, which I may call magnanimous disinterestedness, and which were approved in principle by Austria, by Prussia, and by Russia herself, have evaporated in the Conference. We demand in the interests of humanity and of justice the same guarantees for the Christians of every confession under the exclusive protection of the Sultan; in the interests of the Porte as well as in those of Europe. We demanded that Russia should limit to a reasonable degree, sufficient to shield her against any attack, the number of her ships in the Black Sea, and thus reduce a number which she could only maintain with aggressive objects. We demanded in the interests of Austria, and of Germany, a better Constitution for the Danubian Principalities, that they might serve as a barrier against the repeated invasions of the North.

Russia, who had consented in theory to put an end to her preponderance in the Black Sea, has refused every limitation of her naval forces, and we have still to wait for Austria to fulfil her engagements, which consisted in rendering our treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, if negotiations failed. Austria, it is true, proposed to secure by treaty the independence of Turkey, and to consider for the future as a *caus belli* an increase of the Russian ships of war to a number exceeding that before the commencement of hostilities. To accept such a proposition was impossible, for it had in no manner bound Russia, and, on the contrary, we should have apparently sanctioned her preponderance in the Black Sea. The war had to follow its course. I had resolved to go and place myself in the midst of that valiant army, where the presence of the sovereign could not have failed to produce a happy influence, and a witness of the heroic efforts of our soldiers. I should have been proud to lead them, but serious questions, agitated abroad, always remained pending, and the nature of the circumstances demanded at home new and important measures. It is therefore with regret that I abandoned the idea.

My Government will propose to you to vote the annual Recruitment bill. There will be no extraordinary levy, and the bill will take the usual course necessary for the regulation of the administration of a Recruitment bill.

In conclusion, gentlemen, let us not be discouraged by the sacrifices which are necessary, for as you are aware, a nation must either abdicate every political character, or if it possesses the instinct and the will to act conformably to its generous nature, to its historical traditions, to its providential missions, it must learn to support at times the trials which alone can bring to mind and restore to it the rank to which it is entitled.

The following extract from a private letter, received by the last English mail via New York, giving an account of the successful expedition to the sea of Azoff, which will interest some of our readers:—*Church Witness*.

"Agamemnon," before Kertch, June 11, 1855. Long before the receipt of this your heart will have been gladdened by the brilliant proof that English enterprise is not yet quite a thing forgotten contained in the whole conduct and result of this Kertch expedition. I have just arrived on board after a fortnight's hard campaigning, and have consequently only now been able to give you the information of my whereabouts and safety, which I have now doubt you have been anxiously looking for.

So many things have been crowded into the space of this one small fortnight, that I feel quite bewildered what to commence with, or how to condense them so as to bring all within the compass of one small sheet: this can only be done by commencing at the first faint symptom of a move and bringing events slowly along, until we come to the present perfect fruition of our most sanguine hopes.

I have been doing duty on shore at Karatch, guarding with a few men the numerous Government factories already established there. It was a pleasant change from the confinement of the ship, and the days passed so quietly, that it was almost necessary to collect my thoughts to account for the occasional sounds of heavy cannonading from the direction of Sebastopol. Thus then the time passed, until one morning the Admiral came on shore at a very early hour, and for the first time since the recall of the first expedition looked pleased and animated; he was about to attend a council of war (also the first since his recall) at which General Pelissier was to attend as commander-in-chief of the French army. He returned the same evening, and then we heard that this second expedition was at once to be despatched. What was to be done? I was on guard on shore, and by all previous rules must be left unless by great interest relieved. I immediately wrote to my very good friend the Secretary, and made a direct application to the Admiral through Sir T. Pasley. It was fortunately successful; Sir T. told me, when I got on board an hour or two before starting that the Admiral would only have granted it to an old shipmate; the best proof of that being that an officer from Admiral Stewart's ship had been left on the first occasion.

The fourth morning after the first order was given saw the expedition within sight of the landing place. In that short time four English regiments (Highlanders,) 7,000 French, and 5,000 Turks, with artillery and a few cavalry, had been embarked and transported all that distance; so much for the facilities of making war in 1855.—To those who could look quietly on, our landing must have been a magnificent spectacle. The large ships were obliged to anchor at some distance

from the land, but the men from each were at once got into boats, and by previous arrangement taken in tow by gun-boats, gaining the shore as soon as possible. Then it was that all engaged must have experienced to the full those feelings to which an almost certainty of immediate action gives rise, according to their several distinctions of character. We had been told that in all probability they would dispute our landing, or at all events receive us on the hill above. On our way we could hear in all directions the sound of heavy guns, as the gun-boats dashing along the coast brought the batteries to action. We landed, formed, and I found myself Captain of No. 3 company in a battalion which mustered 800 men—such men, too as it was a real pride to lead. A short delay followed, the Generals having gone to reconnoitre; then came the order to stand to our arms and move on. We marched across a plain thick with grass to a hill on which were prettily situated some houses; from this a few minutes before an enemy's column in some force had been seen in full retreat beyond a distant hill, leaving only a few Cossacks to watch our motion from the Tumuli every where scattered about the table-land. Thus then for the night ended our hopes of making the expedition a glorious as well as a profitable one. We marched on, numbers of French remaining behind to destroy what they could not take away from the houses which I spoke of. About two hours brought us to the limit of the table land looking down towards Kertch here we were halted, and all preparations made for a bivouac, guards and picquets thrown out, and parties sent for water. The night passed quietly, and the men somewhat fatigued by their march slept as soundly as in their barracks. I, too, got my cloak about 12 o'clock, and until 3 was perfectly oblivious to all earthly cares. Some delay occurred in the morning by the great distance to water, but we got away by 6, and then commenced a march which for great interest, extreme heat and consequent fatigue, has no parallel in my wanderings. It had been quite evident the night before that our mere presence had been sufficient to put down every attempt at resistance. Shortly after our landing, all the batteries up to Kertch, before so formidable, were blown up and abandoned, while in the city itself many of the principal government works were burned, with all the vessels in the harbor which could not escape to the Sea of Azoff. Reaching the crest looking up the Bosphorus and towards Kertch, we could just see in the far distance the Arrow (gun-boat) engaged with the batteries at Yenakala: this afforded the hope that as the castle there was strong we would be able to bring them to bay, and we were consequently forced on under the dreadfully hot sun to the utmost extent of our marching capabilities.—It was a strangely magnificent sight, this long column of waving plumes and bright bayonets, preceded by the artillery and close by the marines in their bright clean uniforms and white cap covers, looking altogether, as it really was, invincible.

Our march through Kertch was affecting in the extreme; a conquered town, a people desirous only of conciliating their strange unbidden visitors miserable in their degradation, they throng along the street to meet us, servile in their manner, deprecating our wrath; priests old men, women, children, all bowing down to the dominant power. And well would it have been for them had England alone furnished her quota for the conquest, for we at least can ensure respect and protection to those who ask for it. The Turks and French are quite different, and Kertch as it now is, has only to thank our unruly and unworthy allies for a sack almost as complete as that of Badajos. From the city to Yenikali our route led through long lanes of houses intercepting every breath of air, and roads which for dust and heat would vie with any in Europe. The men, French, Highlanders, and marines, fell out by dozens, utterly unable to bear up against the mere physical difficulty. We had however, an object in view, and to accomplish this every nerve was strained; the enemy were supposed to be before us, who would then stop who could help it? The march was finished the duty done, but they had slipped from our grasp, leaving guns, horses, everything. We lay down that night, after finishing our defensive position, as if nothing could rouse us but the "alarm." Midnight, however, brought with it the order for myself and company to proceed immediately to Yenikali, to put out a fire which the French in a drunken riot had lit up.

We did not get back to camp until 8 A. M.—From the next day we commenced the work in defence of the place, intending to leave the Turks in charge, while the rest of the force went elsewhere. A fortnight's hard work with 15,000 men