

useless in her hands one of the finest outlets in the world. Should Germany acquire this immense boon for its commerce, it will owe it to the blood shed by France and England." Count Nesselrode affects to regret that, pending the reference to St. Petersburg on the third point, the Plenipotentiaries were not allowed to proceed with the discussion of the fourth. Count Walewski answers this reproach by remarking, that the object of the fourth guarantee was diametrically opposed to that of the Menschikoff mission; and that, if the Fourth Point had been entered upon, it would only have shown the difficulty of negotiation at this juncture to be still surmountable. He then comes to the question of the Black Sea; and after showing that no security would have been afforded by either of the two combinations recommended by Count Nesselrode, maintains, that "the demands of the Western Powers, in conformity to the wishes of the Porte, supported to the end by the Austrian Plenipotentiaries, as a complete and efficacious system, were, on the contrary, as moderate in form as they were legitimate in their nature."

"We asked nothing from Russia which would have caused her dignity, and still less her honor, to suffer. We invited her, moved solely by the general interest of Europe, to fix on a basis equitably calculated and accepted by the Porte, the number of vessels which she means to keep for the future in a sea in which she has to dread no attack, and in which her navy, reduced to reasonable proportions, amply sufficient for the regular services which she would have to provide, would in any case have been at least equal to the Ottoman navy. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg refused this accord, which would have restored peace to the world. It has declined the authority of the examples that were cited to it; has forgotten that in its last treaty of peace with Persia, it imposed on that Power the obligation of abstaining from navigating the Caspian Sea, and of exclusively reserving that sea to the flotillas of Russia; it has not consented to admit what France, England, the United States, and the Netherlands, under different forms, and at different epochs, have accepted either to terminate war, or to consolidate peace, or to suppress germs of rivalry or conflict between neighbouring states."

In concluding the *expose*, Count Walewski expresses his confidence, that it will leave upon all impartial minds the conviction that—

"The Western Powers cannot be responsible for the continuation of a war, the effects of which they have desired to stop with as much sincerity and zeal as they employed to prevent the breaking out of it. France and England do not entertain the sentiments ascribed to them; their hostility is not, as has been said, implacable. They have never desired to impose on Russia a peace derogatory to her honour and to her dignity; but necessity has invested them with a duty which, with the aid of Divine Providence, they well know how to fulfil; and Europe, consolidated on her bases, will be thankful to them for having restrained within just bounds an influence which everywhere endeavoured to outstep the limits of its legitimate action."

The *Dusseldorf Zeitung* states that Count Buol has informed the Russian ambassador that the delivery of the despatch of Count Nesselrode of the 18th of April to the several members of the German Confederation separately, was not only an act of violation of all diplomatic usages, but would be marked by the Cabinet of Austria by great displeasure. At the same time Count Buol seized the opportunity of informing Prince Gortschakoff that Austria was not content with Russia's concessions in regard to the two first points, but that she still demanded, and must continue to demand the acceptance of the whole four. He said further, that he trusted that none of the members of the confederation would bind themselves singly to Russia; as such an event would hasten on the crisis, which Austria would gladly set aside. It is generally reported that the same views have been presented by Count Buol to the several German courts.

PROSPECTS OF THE ALLIED ARMY.

[From the London Times.]

We hope that we have now arrived at the beginning of the end, and that we are in a fair way of bringing to a triumphant close the great contest in the Crimea, which has so long absorbed the attention of the civilized world. The news which has come to hand during the last few days relative to the seizure of Kertch, and the proceedings in the sea of Azoff, may be said to constitute the opening of the second act of that great drama, the first of which commenced on the 14th of Sep-

tember last with the landing of the British expedition at Old Fort. The interval between the arrival of the Allies in the Crimea and the present time has been one of great suspense and no inconsiderable suffering; but the success of the future, if continuous and brilliant, as it promises to be, will soon obliterate the memory of the past, and restore the confidence which has been shaken by the protracted events before Sebastopol. Perhaps a calm review of all the occurrences in the Crimea from the invasion to the removal of General Canrobert, would not impress the reader with a high opinion of the soldierly skill which has been brought into play; but while the severity of the critic, if tempered with justice, would compel him to censure much that has happened, allowances would be made for what seemed under the circumstances almost unavoidable,—the result, in a great measure, of the suddenness with which the war came upon us, and of that course of tactics, the adoption of which was necessitated by the very limited force with which we originally landed on the enemy's soil.

The article which the French Government published some five or six weeks ago in the official organ, in the justification of the original plan which had been determined upon between the two Governments when the Crimea was first invaded, and from which the allied commanders were compelled, owing to their want of numerical force, to depart, prepared the public for some such movement as the one which has now taken place at Kertch. Indeed, about three weeks back, an expedition actually sailed from Kamiesch for Kertch, but was recalled from causes which have never correctly transpired. This movement ought to have aroused the fears of the Russians for the safety of the spot from which they draw their supplies, and it was believed that the allies on their next visit would have found the enemy on the alert; but such was not the case; for the veteran, Sir G. Brown, who had the command of the expedition, writes to say that he took Kertch without a casualty, on her Majesty's birth-day, and that the enemy evacuated and destroyed the forts which guarded the Sea of Azoff on the approach of the expedition. Enormous quantities of provisions, intended for the garrison at Sebastopol, have thus fallen into our hands, and we have now possession of the principal key between the Sea of Azoff and the Euxine.

With the eastern end of the Crimea in our keeping, we can command all the great military roads leading to Simpheropol and Sebastopol, and while we thus extend our base of operations, we correspondingly cripple the enemy by cutting off the means of feeding his army, except under circumstances which border upon the impossible. The greatness of this exploit has caused it to be asked why it was not sooner undertaken; but answer is found in the numerical weakness to which we have referred. The allies have now more than 200,000 men in the Crimea; when they first landed the number was barely 50,000; so that they have at present strength enough to maintain their position before Sebastopol, to fight a battle in the open country,—should the Russians accept the challenge,—and to starve the garrison of the great fortress into submission. Nothing can show the feebleness of Russia so clearly as the easy fall of Kertch, and the neck of the Sea of Azoff, which receives the great streams of the Don and the Volga. It is now clear that she has long concentrated her strength at Sebastopol, and has been unable to protect other salient points of her empire against anything like a respectable force. Lord Panmure, writing from the war department, on the last day of the month, states that the enemy had destroyed four of their own war steamers and large quantities of corn,—that the allies had destroyed 100 Russian merchant vessels and a powder magazine at Arabat, and that only one Russian steamship remained on the Sea of Azoff. At Kertch, 100 guns were taken, and five vessels laden with corn, unconscious that the place had been captured, ran in and were seized. These events, it is needless to add, have revived the national spirit which had begun to droop, and if the intelligence had reached before the debate which preceded the Whitsuntide holidays, more loveliness would have been imparted to that gladiatorial exhibition. But these successes are not the only ones which have recently waited upon the arms of the allies. The Russians have been losing ground before Sebastopol, and a new system of warfare has been introduced there, which varies the monotony of the siege. The Russians, for some time past, have been successfully engaged in constructing works outside their general lines of defence, and the allied commanders, instead of making counter-approaches, are determined to seize and occupy those of the enemy. One of these earthen works, which flanked the left attack of

the French, was the scene of a sanguinary conflict on the night of the 22d of May, in which Prince Gortschakoff admits a loss of 2500 in killed and wounded. It was one of the most bloody encounters which has marked the progress of the siege, for the combatants fought hand to hand with the bayonet. The French carried one half of the work the first night, and became masters of the whole on the night following, when the attack was renewed, with a loss on the part of the enemy quite equal to the first battle. The Tchernaya, which runs between two precipitous chains of hills into the Black Sea, close to Sebastopol, has also been the scene of a desperate struggle.—Hitherto the allies were in possession of the heights on the left bank of this stream, the Russians those on the right; but the French have driven them from this position, and the allies are now masters of both sides of the river,—positions which will probably soon cover still more important operations.

THE SEA OF AZOFF.

(Correspondence of the London Daily News.)

May 29th.

The interest excited as to Russian supplies to the Crimea by way of Azoff, and the evidence before the Sebastopol Committee of official "ignorance of that route," may justify a notice of its actual use a century and more ago, when it contributed essentially to the Russian conquests of the Crimea.

At that time the Black Sea was in the possession of the Turks, the Tartars and Turks held the Perekop route, and Turkish vessels were in the Sea of Azoff, yet Russia conquered the Crimea from the then most daring and warlike people in Europe.

Field Marshal Count de Lacy (an Irish warrior) in his autobiography, in the possession of his kinsman Cornet Pierce, records, 1726, "The 31st of August I marched, conformably to the orders I had from His Majesty, from Azoff to Perekop, with 5,000 infantry, 500 dragoons, 600 Cossacks, and 2,000 Calmucks. I passed by Murtza Danza, Sapiana, the river Sa'iscl, Asalambek south side the river Mehus, where I found the Cossacks coming from Perekop with the news that Munich, wanting provision and forage, and the greatest part of his troops sick for want of regular supplies of bread and water, had retired from Perekop towards Russia. Munich passed the whole of the campaign of 1736 in taking and restoring the Crimea, (Perekop,) and in losing half of his army, which on first entering it amounted to 54,000 men; the amount of the killed did not exceed 2,000. He left me to winter in the Ukraine, in command of both armies, while he went to St Petersburg."

From Prince De Ligne's *Memoirs of Marshal Lacy* (as quoted in Mrs. Nash's "Crimea") we extract "in the next year 1737 it was necessary the campaign should be opened with éclat, an expedition to the Crimea being quite the fashion at court, this famous man (Lacy) was therefore fixed on to take the sole command. * * * His intrepid march, his passage across the arm of the sea near Arabat, partly by swimming, are well known and never will be forgotten. He was charged with the operations in the Crimea—the enemy in possession of all the surrounding points of strength and seas—yet he penetrated it without losing a man; and it ought to be recorded how. He had remarked that the excessive heats dried up a part of the Sea of Azoff, and that with the wind in the west the waves are so effectually driven back, that if advantage be taken of the instant, a passage may be effected dry footed." He did so with 10,000 men; he turned Perekop, which he took "in reverse;" blew up the "impregnable fortifications," leveled those famous lines, defeated the Tartars in a pitched battle; he took himself to winter quarters in the Ukraine as was usual. This was his second conquest of the Crimea without passing by Perekop.

General Manstein's *Memoirs*, too record that "Lacy, to the astonishment of all Europe, penetrated the Crimea, where victory always attended him; by which gallant exploit he saved an army which must have been sacrificed in attacking the impenetrable lines of Perekop, on the north side."

It is not for one whose relations served Russia for a century and a half, and have been denied service in their own country, to comment on facts.

I am, &c., DE LACY PIERIE.

ALMA AND INKERMAN.—A Paris correspondent of the Independent Belge says that a project has been started in London for erecting by popular subscription two towers on the opposite shores of England and France, for the purpose of perpetuating the alliance of the nations. One of them is to be called Alma and the other Inkerman.

LIFE IN A RIFLE PIT.

The following is an extract from a letter from the Crimea:

"Within the last week I have been twice in the trenches, both times in the advanced trench and the rifle pits in front of it, and for the first time I tried the new Enfield rifle (a smaller bore than the Minie). They carry beautifully while clean, for about twenty rounds, but then they begin to lead, and do not carry so well. When I first saw our men firing (last Saturday the 21st,) from the rifle pits they had no idea of range or distance. Two of them were firing at the same place one with his sight up for 400, the other for 900 yards. I told them it was too much, and with the sight up for 400 I put two shots in succession through the loophole that the Russians were firing at them from. As I sat, about a quarter of an hour afterwards, half asleep in the pit, they called to me and said three men were coming down from the batteries towards the town. I told them to elevate for 900 yards. They made them dodge from house to house. But when they got into the street they thought they were out of our range, and coolly walked arm-in-arm down the middle of the street. I could not quietly stand that; I took the best rifle, put up the sight for 900, and, calculating the distance to be about 1000 yards, I fired high.

The man on the right dropped like a stone, and the others rushed into a house. He lay there for some time. They afterwards managed to get him into a house. This shows what the rifles will do when properly laid on. Afterwards I saw too carts laden with powder-boxes going from the town to the batteries, at what I guessed to be 1100 yards. I took a rifle, and soon caused the drivers to stop for the batteries, and leave the carts to come as they could. Our men said I knocked over five or six but I only feel certain about one. I was sent out to the rifle pits again on Tuesday, (the 24th,) but the Russians were very shy that day, and gave very few chances. I had a regular duel with a Russian in the nearest rifle pit to us (250 yards.) In about half an hour he gave up firing, and, as I had put about four shots out of seven through his loophole I thought I must have hit him. I left a namesake of mine in my company to watch him. Very soon the Russian (who by the by, was a splendid shot) fired again, and put the ball right through Private ———'s cap, because he did not bob his head when he saw the smoke.

They began to fire 68-pounders at us in the rifle pits from a great gun in the Redan, 700 yards from the pit I was in, and with two men loading rifles for me, I bullied them so much that they were half an hour loading the gun, for I had a very sharp corporal watching the gunners with my telescope, and directly they appeared I fired into the embrasure. As soon as I saw the gun was loaded I made the men lie down close under the parapet till they fired.

The shot came close over our heads, but did no harm. The same thing went on again, but they only fired four shots at us altogether, and did no harm. We lost no men that day, but on Saturday I had three men killed and one wounded of my party by round shot. Two were only a few yards from me and were cut right in two by a 24-pound shot. I have told you a few incidents of my experience in the trenches, and now I take no notice of shot or shell, except to take the necessary precautions to get out of the way."

SEA OF AZOFF.—In 1851 no less than 1000 trading vessels passed the straits. Taganrog, Mariopol, Berdianski, and Kertch, all commercial towns, which it has been the policy of the Russian Government to protect and foster with the utmost care for the last seventy years, exist only by the freedom of trade between the sea of Azoff and the Euxine. The whole exports of the valley of the Don and its tributaries, and the communication between the Don and the Volga, which places the trade of that mighty stream in connection with the markets of Europe all depends on this neck of the Sea of Azoff; so that it is no exaggeration to assert that our occupation of Kertch will be felt in the interior of Russia, even to Casan and Nishni Novogord. On the Asiatic shore of the straits the Russians have also destroyed their fortifications, so that both sides may be occupied, and the allied forces will threaten or blockade Anapa, which is the key to the whole Circassian coast. Kertch itself is a flourishing town of about 18,000 inhabitants, built entirely of substantial stone houses.—The inhabitants are chiefly Greeks and Tartars, and for the first time since the commencement of these operations our troops will find themselves in contact with what may be termed, by comparison, a civilized community. The climate, though cold in winter, is healthy and genial in this season.—The surrounding country, which is termed by the Russians the district of Kertch-Enikelsk, is luxuriantly fertile wherever it is cultivated. It is separated from Kaffa by about sixty miles of undulating plain, lying between the Sea of Azoff and the Black Sea, and the isthmus dividing the Bay of Kaffa from that of Arabat is not more than twelve miles in breadth.