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"OUR QUEEN AND CONSTITUTION."

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THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR IDOL-GOD.—We read of many kings and kaisars who have repaired to the theatre of war, to go through the form of receiving the submission of towns, fortresses, or armies; that had been previously reduced to extremities by their generals. But Alexander II. is the first sovereign on record who travelled so far to witness, with his own eyes, the dexterity with which his soldiers can destroy and evacuate their own defences. The Roman emperor who went from Rome to the Belgian coast to witness a sham embarkation for the conquest of Britain has hitherto been thought the most sublime ninyo on record; his laurels must fade in comparison with the Russian Emperor, who has travelled from St. Petersburg to Odessa to witness an unresisted irruption into his own dominions.—How the news of his passive exploits may be received at St. Petersburg it is not easy to conjecture.—When the inhabitants of that capital learned that their Black Sea fleet had been sunk by the orders of Prince Menschikoff, and that their forts around south Sebastopol had been blown up by the orders of Prince Gortschakoff, they could console themselves by the reflection that these misadventures could only happen in the absence of their Emperor—their God upon earth. But their Emperor has gone to the scene of action, and matters go on in his presence exactly as they did in his absence. May not this shake the confidence in his miraculous power to protect them? And may not the consequent want of faith in him prepare an indifferent reception for his imperial majesty on his return? The reverence with which the Russian regard their sovereign borders on idolatry; but old chronicles tell us how the worshippers of idols ere now, when tired with praying to their wooden gods without effect, tried whether they could not beat them into better behaviour. If the Russians have ever read the story of the man who, tired out with fruitless prayers to his idol, threw it rudely down from its pedestal, and was rewarded by a stream of gold coin which, having been deposited in a cavity of the image, they may be tempted to repeat the experiment upon their own flesh-and-blood divinity.—*London News.*

ON WHAT CAN THE CZAR RELY.—In persevering with this onerous, which has ruined the moral ascendancy of Russia, east and west, on what can the czar rely? We had an earnest at Bomarsund; we have reaped more solid fruits, with less parade, at Kinburn. From the Baltic to the Black sea, from Moldavia, to the Caucasus, from Sebastopol to Kars, from Swaborg to Otschakoff and Kinburn—not one success for the enemy in three years, but innumerable and heavy disasters. Perseverance under such circumstances, may be weakness and criminality. This is not our affair in a moral point of view; but it is very interesting to us in a political respect. We would, therefore, once more ask, in what can the czar confide? His father confided in the impossibility of a union between such old enemies as France and England. Because they had often boxed each other when they were young and naughty boys, they could not shake hands, and be friends, as men. He lived to see that union. He saw and yet would not believe. But it was argued by our ill wishers that such an alliance could not be sincere or lasting, as if brave men could not respect and love brave men! The alliance has lasted, has been real, and has been sincere. It has disappointed the calculations of the malignant, has surpassed the hopes of the good, and will outlive the illusions of the intriguing foe with whom we are at war. On what, then, can our enemy rely. To what part of Europe (for in Europe alone must he look for help) can he turn with the least prospect of success? Austria declared to side with

him on the appeal of gratitude—so bad was his cause. She merely confined herself to not siding against him. Prussia would be glad of alliance elsewhere, familiar to those which have influenced her government to befriend Russia, even against the wishes of her people. Perseverance is one of the conditional virtues. If the cause be hopeless, perseverance is an increase of folly; if the cause be bad, perseverance is an aggravation of guilt.—*London Post.*

THE RUSSIAN BEAR'S MONKEY.—If it is true that the veteran courtier Nesselrode has become an object of suspicion in his latter days to his sovereign and to the heads of both of the great parties in Russia, it is really no matter of surprise. Apart from the moral truism that men who spend their lives in trying to keep well with everybody end by being out of favour with all, there are circumstances in the career of Nesselrode which account for any jealousy and mistrust on the part of his late and present master. It must be remembered (and Nicholas never forgot it) how very long the career of this aged politician has been. He was in the vigour of his years and his faculties—just above thirty—when the century opened on the rising grandeur of Napoleon. He calculated his fortunes and laid out his career on the supposition of an eternal friendship between Russia and France. As far as he has since had any political ideas of his own, they have always been in accordance with that early and vivid conception which his conduct at the time was a sort of pledge to carry out; and it was no wonder now, when things are going wrong for Russia, that the disconcerted and irritated court, made suspicious by disappointment and mortification, should charge the minister with maintaining his old predilections in favour of France. Such is now the opinion of more parties than one in Russia; and no doubt the old courtier is chewing the bitter end of human ingratitude in his present painful position. He is thinking no doubt, how hard it is that after nearly sixty years of laborious and what he thinks, faithful service, after all his toils, all his sacrifices of his own feelings and convictions, and character for sincerity and consistency, he is now blamed by the German party for the war, and by the Muscovite party for his supposed good will to the allies. One conjecture what the real case has been. On the whole, it seems most probable that he was opposed to war but that his habit of obedience to the will of Nicholas prevailed as usual; and that now he sees the consequence without much surprise. As for his witnessing them with anything but pain, the allegation seems to us pure nonsense, such as nothing short of exasperation and fear could excuse or account for. The clearest thing about the whole matter is, that Nesselrode must indeed be a very ordinary sort of man if he is really surprised at the sort of reward his life of service is receiving. A youth of caution and self-seeking; a manhood of slavery and tergiversation, and hard repression of conscience and every other inconvenient faculty; and an old age of complicity in political crimes—these are not the antecedents of an honoured and peaceful retirement from life. If he chose to play the monkey to the Russian bear, he has no right to complain of being whipped into a corner in his old age, when his keepers suppose, rightly or wrongly, that his tricks have become productive of more plague than profit. The charge may not be true in detail; but he subjected himself to it when he put on his livery and sprang to his post of honour on Bruin's back.

MOVEMENTS IN THE CRIMEA.—The Monitor publishes the subjoined telegraphic despatch from Marshal Pelissier to the Minister of War:—*Sebastopol, Nov. 2.*—On the 27th October Gen. D'Allonville, with 24 battalions, 38 squadrons, and

50 pieces of artillery, advanced on the road from Eupatoria to Simpheropol as far as the ravine of Tchobatar. He found the Russians firmly established on the opposite side of this ravine, where they have thrown up an entrenchment, defended by 36 guns, all 32-pounders; some shots, fired from them at long range, reached our ranks, and struck down several men and horses.

Every attempt made to draw the enemy out of their strong position and bring them to an engagement proved unsuccessful. Ten Russian squadrons fell back before four Turkish squadrons which Gen. D'Allonville sent forward against them.

On the following day the same manoeuvres were repeated with no great result. The scarcity of water, after passing Saki, and the difficulty in supplying the troops with forage, determined the general to return on the 29th to Eupatoria.

The environs of Eupatoria, for a considerable distance, have been totally abandoned by the Russians.

A letter from Balaklava in the *Opinion* states—“The troops are exercised firing at the target when not on active duty. The French have erected targets in the plain adjoining the Tchernaya within the range of the Russian batteries, in order, they say, to accustom their conscripts to fire steadily under the enemy's guns. The general belief at the camp is that the Russians must eventually abandon the Crimea before the superior forces of the allies, but another victory is indispensable to compel them to retreat. The allies do not appear disposed to regard the Crimea merely as a battlefield; the works now being accomplished there show they intend retaining possession of it. The English are carrying on works at Balaklava on a gigantic scale. Thousands of Turks, coming chiefly from Constantinople and its environs, Tartars, Piedmontese, and others, are paid by England at the rate of 3s. a day besides soldiers' rations. These men are employed in landing in the bay an immense quantity of materials, which were conveyed from thence to the camps by beasts of burden. Whole regiments are meantime engaged in most important works.—Along the bay the English have built a quay, at which the largest ships can land the provisions of the army without the aid of small boats, such is the depth of the water. Immense magazines are being formed at Balaklava, which would supply the wants of an army numbering not 25,000 or 30,000, but even 100,000 men. Assuredly all these expenses would not be incurred if it were intended to evacuate the Crimea. We are now supplied with comfortable woollen garments, with which we can brave the rigours of winter.”

THE WAR IN ARIA.—The *Military Gazette* at Vienna pretends to have received from Trebizonde the news that in his report of September 30, the Turkish commander of Kars, Vassif Pacha, declared that he could not hold out more than three weeks unless he received reinforcements and supplies.—Upon this Omar Pacha immediately gave orders to send to Kars 12,000 horses with Provisions. It remains to be seen whether this re-victualling corps succeeded in reaching Kars. According to the same correspondence, Prince Bebutoff had arrived before the place with 14,000 horses, and a fresh assault was thought imminent.

A letter from Souchen Kaleh gives a rather more encouraging description of the state of affairs at Kars than some of the previous accounts. Colonel Simmons arrived at the above place on the 11th of October from Balaklava in the Great Britain, with 1800 Turkish troops. He there met Omar Pacha, who had sent forward the advanced guard of his army with the intention of following with the main body on the 12th. Dol. Simmons, it appears, had been present at a council of Circassian chiefs, the

result of which had been a combination of plans by them and Omer Pacha, the exact object of which is not mentioned. Regret is expressed at the small force at Omer Pacha's disposal, but the letter adds that it is daily being augmented by draughts from the Crimea and elsewhere. The letter further alludes to the continued investment of Kars, and the great risk there existed of its reduction with its garrison of 16,000 men and 192 pieces of artillery, and imputes to the commanders of the allies considerable remissness in neglecting so important a place. In conclusion, the writer of the letter expresses an opinion that the recent expedition to Kinburn and also Eupatoria are not likely to be attended with any important result at this season of the year.

THE RUMORS OF PEACE.—The rumors of peace first circulated by some of the German journals, not being sustained by further intelligence, are rapidly falling in credit. The few journals which speak in the name of Russia deny that any new proposition has been sent from St. Petersburg, and allege that it is the Emperor of France who is sending round the olive branch. The new *Prussian Gazette* even affirms that Napoleon III. has caused it to be notified at Vienna, that he is ready at this moment, to negotiate on the basis of the Four Points. The *Independence*, which very sensibly discredits this news, however states its belief, that at no time, before or since the fall of Sebastopol, have the Western belligerent powers declared themselves disengaged from the “Four Points.”

The *Constitutional*, remarking on the simultaneous presence of the Saxon and Bavarian Ministers in Paris, says that the general tendency of the secondary German States is now to rally round France. The *Daily News* correspondent thinks, however, that German diplomacy is going to work for the winter for the purpose of depriving us of the legitimate fruits of our expected triumph.

RUSSIAN APPEAL TO TURKEY.—The Russians have caused a number of copies of a proclamation to be struck off in the Turkish language, and distributed in the neighborhood of Eupatoria. Russia laments in this document the circumstance that the Porte has thrown herself into the hands of the allies, especially as the Czar was always prompted by the most honourable intentions towards the Turkish Empire. The allies, it is said, will never again leave the city of Constantinople, whose only hope of independence consists in the re-establishment of the friendly relations formerly subsisting between Russia and the Turkish Empire. This proclamation was first put into the hands of Rifaat Pacha, who carried, as will be remembered, the congratulations of the Sultan to the generals of the allied armies.

OUR MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE CRIMEA.—The *Globe* vouches for the substantial accuracy of the following statements, which are probably put forth to correct the general impression which Mr. Cobden's letter is calculated to create. On the 16th October the strength of the whole British army in the Crimea was in round numbers, 56,000 men of all ranks, of whom the number of ineffectives was about 4500. It was composed of 14 regiments of Cavalry, numbering nearly 5000; of 62 battalions of Infantry, comprising something over 33,000 in the aggregate; 14 batteries and some troops of Artillery, and 9 companies of Sappers, not far short of 2000 men in all. The remaining 10,000 are made up of Commissariat, Land Transport Army Works, Medical Staff and other Artillery Corps.—Of the 45,000 ineffectives somewhat more than one-third were wounded, and the rest very nearly 3000 were suffering from sickness. Summing up the above we have now in the Crimea 56,000 men, of