

subject. We may briefly observe, that in the middle ages land was assigned to individuals not in property, but to enable them to administer justice, to preserve order, and provide for military defence. By degrees succession was introduced; but still the land was held subject to these burdens. Gradually the services were commuted for sums which came at last to be merely nominal.

In ancient Greece and Rome the system was much the same as in the East. The land belonging to the community.

Were society to be reconstructed anew there can be no question that the rent of land would be a most desirable fund out of which to defray the public burdens. The soil of the country, however, having become the property of individuals, that, like every other descriptions of property, must be respected. But the cultivation of the soil and its ownership are quite distinct.

We would advise Mr. O'Connell to read the evidence given by the late James Mill before the committee on India affairs, before he speaks of the burdens of the people of Hindostan. The rent may be too high in some instances; but the state of things in his own country afford tolerable evidence that individuals exact occasionally a high rent as well as the public. The poor Paddy who, in order to pay his rent, must live on lumpers potatoes, might be no worse off were he, like the Riant in India, to pay rent to the government.

The attempt to convert Zemindaries (Government functionaries) into proprietors in some parts of British India, has not, we believe, ameliorated the condition of the actual cultivators.

There are, it is true, taxes in India as well as rent; and we believe, with Mr. O'Connell, that these taxes are not in all cases judiciously imposed. But this and other subjects connected with the improvement of India require more consideration than we can now devote to them. Mr. O'Connell, however, is unjust to the East India Company. The British legislature ought to bear the most of the blame, where blame is due. The able historian of British India observes that no government have done so much in the same time for the improvement of the people under them as the East India Company. Their endeavours have, it is true, not been always so successful as their intentions have been honest.

From the Morning Advertiser.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

The whole press of England have been unanimous for some weeks past in imputing the sudden warlike humour of our neighbours to a small and insignificant portion of the nation—such as the journalists of Paris, or the idlers of the coffee-houses. They have denied that the cry for war was the true voice of France. Every consideration founded on the condition of her population led us to believe the soundness of this conclusion, and that the social changes in French society since the termination of the wars of the empire, had totally altered the former character and conditions of the mass which had made those wars possible.

It was believed that the state of property in France, and the enormous proportion of the nation possessed of property, through virtue of the law of equal partition—that bulwark of the first revolution against Europe and the Bourbons—would have so far effected a change in the military disposition of the people, that no Frenchmen would have submitted to be dragged from the private and domestic pursuits for any government, or any motive whatever short of invasion. Through the general diffusion of property in France, it was argued, that the bulk of the nation must be the most pacific in Europe, since they had greater motives to be so—greater interests at stake. The despotic powers, and even England, it was imagined, might rise from their surplus population, men without any property, or prospect of possessing property, armies with which, as never-changing machines without will, and transportable to any quarter of the world, they could maintain a prolonged foreign war so long as their resources lasted. But the case of France was thought to resemble too much that of an immoveable militia to make foreign war popular with them, or, in fact, capable of being continued on a large scale beyond a very limited period of time.

To our great surprise, however, facts prove the very reverse of all this reasoning. The two or three millions of proprietors who own the soil of France, careless of the conscription, heedless of the domestic interest which bind them to their localities, clamour as loudly for a war with England, and detest her as cordially as the defeated military of the empire, or the covetous member of the shopkeeper Chamber of Deputies and their cabinet. It is a fact that the provincial journals of the country excel in furious hatred to England the most violent of the Parisian newspapers. It cannot be denied that, from the prime minister to the peasant, every man in France is eager for war.

What has England done to merit all this

odium? Is it signing the quadruple alliance to the exclusion of France? Not that alone.

To account for it, we have been told that M. Thiers is possessed with the idea that he is a great military genius, and not a civil one, and for this cause is resolved to plunge Europe into a war. But it seems a more likely reason that the detestation with which England is unquestionably regarded on the continent as a selfish and perfidious power, insatiable in the pursuit of riches, gained by interest alone, and exhausting and turning to her profit every country with which she comes into contact, has sprung up as the natural consequence of the exclusive commercial policy and despotic partialities which characterized the government of the Tories. The Tories have left to their country an inheritance of hatred which it would be too much to expect the Whigs to have removed in the short time during which they have held power.

Frenchmen cannot believe that these motives and prejudices have given way to a policy more generous and social under the administration of the Whigs. Unwisely, as we think, they have adopted the policy which we have laid aside, and rejecting the principles of free trade, and enthroning monopoly as the parent of national prosperity, they have determined upon the aggrandisement of France at all hazards. 'My friend,' wrote M. Thiers, not long ago, to a distinguished French politician, 'a grand futurity of money opens before us!' This, in a word, represents the general feeling of France, as well as the true feeling of M. Thiers. An extension of their ships, colonies and commerce, in all directions; in a word, a money making, instead of a military feeling, is the prevailing sentiment with the nation at the present day. It is not the revolutionary ardour of proselytism, or the enthusiasm of standing forth in the great arena of Europe once more as the invincible champion of the rights of man, that dictates the present commotion. But the ignoble greed of a shopkeeper democracy, equally ready in Spain as in the Levant, as the Isle of Bourbon as at La Plata, to exhibit by insults to the flag of England its rancorous envy of its commercial supremacy.

England, however, can afford to show forbearance, for she knows that experience will prove to France (as in the case of Algiers) the groundlessness of her hopes of wealth drawn from colonial empire, but Europe will not pardon France a general war, occasioned by a motive so selfish as gain; nor will the war have the halo of the principles of liberty to gild it, even though the possession of Egypt, and not shame and defeat should be to France the result.

FRENCH POLICY IN THE EAST.

London Morning Chronicle.

M de Lamartine, whose prophetic views of the fatal consequences of French policy with regard to Syria we lately published, as spoken by him in the Chamber of Deputies on the commencement of last session, has now come forward with another and full statement of his opinion, and it has the more importance, as Count Mole is known to share M. de Lamartine's views of the errors committed by the French government in this affair. The following are extracts from the new pamphlet of M. de Lamartine published by the Press:—

'The cause of Mehemet Ali is the cause of France, argues the present minister. Such an assertion make those shudder who know what Syria and what Mehemet Ali are. Our children could never cover the shame of their fathers with a veil thick enough, if we consent to be the supporters and instruments of Mehemet Ali in Syria. Syria is separated from Egypt by a desert of ten days' journey. It is a country completely European, Christians, civilised, industrious—in relations, fraternity, and ideas akin to us. It is the Morea in Asia, or the Caucasus organized and occidentalized after our manner. Their religious creed and their mountains secured to the inhabitants under the suzerainty of the Turks, who governed it with mildness and respect. It possessed liberty of religion, liberty of culture, liberty of commerce. Peopled with Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs, both pastors and husbandmen—with the Druses, these Asiatic Swiss—and the Maronites, this vigorous population could send forth 40,000 fighting men to render impregnable the fortresses of the Lebanon. Syria was just emancipating itself, and beheld the invasion of Mehemet Ali with horror. The first acts of the Pacha were to levy soldiers, even to the extinction of the population, to raise taxes to the extinction of culture, and to establish the monopoly of commerce. Three times the unfortunate Syrians rebelled, and were on the point of annihilating the armies of Ibrahim. Three times they fell back, deceived by Ibrahim's promises, and by the abandonment of Emir Beschir, their chief, too old not to purchase tranquility at any price. Such are the people that France struggles to place under the fangs of the merciless Pacha. It is as if the French aided the Turks to conquer the Morea, or helped the English

to reconquer Ireland, or the Russians to re-occupy Poland. But our ministers pretend there is deep policy in this. Now, suppose the war successful; suppose if possible, that France single handed against Europe, beats Europe, and sweeps hostile armies and hostile navies from earth and sea. She makes Egypt an empire. Yet what has she gained thereby? A bulletin, and nothing more. Will Egypt and Syria in the hands of the Pacha, give France a road to that Indian empire which she does not possess. Will it give a frontier against Russia, or a frontier against England, or a market for commerce, or a guarantee of peace? No; it brings none of these things. It brings merely an eternity of war—of war unprofitable, if successful; yet most ruinous if lost. Will the enthronement of the Pacha in Egypt take the Adriatic from Austria, or the provinces north of Adrinople from Russia? Will it save Constantinople from the menace of Sebastopol, or save the Red Sea from the English, already at Aden? Do you not see that even were the French masters of the Mediterranean, England through the Red Sea can reduce the Pacha. Egypt, will resist you think. But Buonaparte and Kleber with 40,000 veteran and enthusiastic French soldiers, could not keep Egypt. They capitulated. How can the French of the present day, or Mehemet, hope to defend it?

After showing how powerless France is to hold or defend herself in Egypt, M. Lamartine passes to her chances in a general war, and asks, is she capable of resisting Europe, and for none of these essential and sacred causes which give a nation super human energy?

'It is not one budget, nor one conscription, nor arsenals once filled that can suffice. But then there is the propagande, by which we can set fire to the four corners of Europe. Take care—the incendiary plan may not succeed, and the torch may burn the hands which raise it. Perhaps revolutionists, less the theorist, but more zealous than yourselves, may wrest the torch from your hands, and after having brandished it, quench it in storm and blood. There are many contingencies, and no certainty. Let us beware. Our revolution had its causes of repulsion as well as of attraction. The selfishness of its conquest made it hated, our bayonets have thrown discredit on our principles. Many admire us, too, who are not ready to serve us.'

There is as much truth as force in these remonstrances and arguments of M. de Lamartine. No pen could have more eloquently depicted and exposed the errors of the French in so warmly and so idly espousing the cause of the Pacha. But it does not follow that he who points out the faults of others may not fall into equally great faults himself. Thus, although M. de Lamartine would avoid the errors of past French ministries, he would recommend the division of the east into protectorates, of which England was to take Egypt; France, Syria and Asia Minor; Russia, Constantinople; and Austria the Adriatic provinces. Such a scheme, even setting aside its impracticability, would certainly have ten times more fatal consequences than the state of things which it would remedy and replace. We shall never see France possessing, directly or indirectly, Asia Minor and Syria, and Russia possessing Constantinople and Greece, without a war. And for our own part we have no need of Egypt, or its fellahs, or its revenues. It is much better in the hands of such a sovereign as the Pacha, provided he is contented within his natural limits, and does not seek to become a second Sesostris, marching across the desert to universal conquest. Besides, the whole system of protectorates is bad; for a protected sovereign can never honestly or efficiently govern. He and his people may continue to exist, like plants beneath glass; but a vigorous and healthy existence, with development, progress, and native strength, can only be attained by nations truly independent. Although Count Mole may share M. Lamartine's opinions respecting the errors of the policy of France in the east, he certainly does not approve of that policy which M. Lamartine would substitute for it.

## Colonial.

NEW BRUNSWICK.

Fredericton Gazette, Sept. 23.

We understand that His Excellency Major General Sir John Harvey, our Lieutenant Governor, has been appointed to the command of the troops in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Dependencies, on the departure of His Excellency Lieutenant General Sir Colin Campbell, and that the head quarters of the divisions are to be transferred to New Brunswick,—an arrangement which we feel to be a subject of just congratulation to this Province on every account. The removal to Fredericton of the whole of the heads of departments may perhaps not take place before the Spring, as well on grounds connected with the personal convenience of several

of the individuals (which Sir John Harvey is well known to be at all times ready to consider, as far as it can be done consistently with the interests of the public service,) as to afford time to make the necessary preparations with regard to accommodation, &c. &c.

St. John Herald, Sept. 23.

British North American Wesleyan Magazine.—We were politely favored with the first number of the above work last week, edited by Messrs. Temple and Wood, and printed by Mr. W. L. Avery. This work is certainly creditable to all parties concerned; and must become a great auxiliary to the respectable denomination to whom it belongs.

NOVA SCOTIA.

Halifax Recorder, Sept. 19.

Rumour has been very busy since the arrival of the Britannia. It is confidently asserted, in every part of the town that 'Head Quarters are to be removed hence to Fredericton.' And upon this text many a doleful comment has been made. There is no lack of prophets who tell us, 'all the heads of the military departments—the staff—the garrison—the troops—are all to be removed—*holus bolus*, and no mistake—to New Brunswick, and therefore Halifax will be utterly ruined as sure as eggs are eggs!' 'Them's my sentiments,' says a knowing one, whose credulity and nervousness make him the oracle of the street corners, and he adds, 'now you see what Joe Howe and Reform has done!' We, however, can discover no foundation for such horrid anticipations of evil, and aspersions upon Mr. Howe and Political Reform. They have grown out of an intimation, received by the Britannia, that orders will be sent by the next packet which will invest Colonel Smelt with the rank of Major-General and the Command of the Garrison.—Government considering the duties of a Legislator or Statesman and of a Military Commander too onerous, if not incompatible with each other, for one individual to discharge effectually.

There exists no authority for asserting that our garrison is to be diminished to a very small degree, however magisterially some *augurs* may impart the information; they have no authority for their reports but invention; no reason for their imputations against 'Joe Howe' and 'Reform' but mortification, at seeing Sir Colin Campbell unexpectedly apprised by his successor that Her Majesty's advisers have no intention of annoying the people of Nova Scotia, by allowing him to preside over another Legislative Session, notwithstanding their efforts to retain him. We would ask those wise individuals whose love of old times makes them shudder at the very name of change, where were 'Joe Howe' and 'Reform' when the Dockyard establishment was removed to Bermuda? Is it likely that the commodious North and South Barracks, with the buildings annexed to them, the Lumber Yard and Ordnance, Fort George, Point Pleasant, St. George's Island, the Eastern Battery, &c. all erected at a vast expense, will be abandoned by Government to neglect and ruin? Has Great Britain sufficient means to warrant the squandering of her resources upon the erection of such barracks, when no need of them exists in New Brunswick? True, New Brunswick immediately adjoins the United States, but the frontier of the States is fully as vulnerable as that of New Brunswick, and consequently the former has no advantage over the latter as far as regards attack or resistance. Besides, France is arming recruits, providing munitions of war, and increasing her navy; England is not backward in strengthening her land and sea forces, while the martial spirit of the States is dwindling and expiring from the general indifference of the nation to every thing calculated to affect their institutions, save the election of their public functionaries.

Halifax must continue an important military station so long as the parent state maintains an army in these Colonies. No other place in North America is so advantageously situated for a point of communication between England and America, and being in the centre of the surrounding Provinces, it would be an extremely prodigal waste of treasure to provide accommodations for a garrison elsewhere similar to those which we possess; and experience has frequently shown, within the last three years, that any number of troops can be removed hence, at a moment's notice, to whatever quarter they may be required: no confirmation of this assertion beyond a reference to the whole regiments that have been conveyed voluntarily and gratuitously in the depth of winter through this province, without delay, when