

entitled to the appellation of cosmopolites, it is these, who pursue their avocations in all countries indifferently and accommodate themselves at will to the manners of all classes of society, their fluency of style as writers is only surpassed by their facility of language in conversation, and their attainments in classical and polite literature only by their profound knowledge of the world, acquired by an early introduction to its bustling scenes. The activity, energy, and courage which they occasionally display in the pursuit of information are truly remarkable. I saw them, during the three days at Paris, mingled with canals and gamins behind the barriers, while the mitraille was dying in all directions, and the desperate cuirassiers were dashing their fierce horses against those seemingly feeble bulwarks. There stood they, dotting their observations in their pocket books as unconcernedly as if reporting the proceedings of a Reform meeting in Finsbury square; whilst in Spain, several of them accompanied the Carlist and Christiano guerrillas in some of their most desperate raids, exposing themselves to the danger of hostile bullets, and the inclemencies of the winter, and the fierce heat of the summer sun.

#### LOOK BEYOND THE CLOUD.

'Oh! see,' exclaims the anxious wife,  
'How threatening clouds arise.  
The black'ning spot so small in birth,  
Now spreads along the skies.'  
'Oh never let thy mind my love,  
The thought of harm forebode,  
Nor fear of ill thy soul pervade,  
But look beyond the cloud.'

Just so we hear the weak complain,  
At every kindling breath,  
That stirs the rustling leaves of fate,  
As though it spoke of death,—  
Despairing ones whose chilly souls,  
Anticipate the shroud,  
They are not brave enough to hope,  
Nor look beyond the cloud.

What signifies the tiny streams,  
That lave the mountain side,  
The time enough to banish hope,  
When sinking in the tide.  
We know misfortune's winds will blow,  
Her waves around us crowd,  
But hope will guide us to the shore,  
And point beyond the cloud.

What, though my bark be madly tossed,  
On ocean's billows high,  
Her compass gone, her rudder lost,  
And death seems hovering nigh;  
I'll hope, though death himself should frown,  
And hail his thunders loud,  
See! see! the sun is breaking now,  
It shines beyond the cloud.

And be my hopes, how'er delay'd,  
Where'er by fate I'm driven,  
I'll glory in the orb that lights  
The azure vaults of heaven.  
I'll gladly stretch my hand to seize  
The good by next bestow'd,  
Exult o'er all the ills of life,  
And look beyond the cloud.

#### NEW WORKS.

From the London Spectator.

#### LIEUT. EYRE'S ACCOUNT OF THE DISGRACES AT CABUL, AND OF HIS OWN IMPRISONMENT.

Lieutenant Eyre was on active service in Cabul at the first outbreak of the 2nd Nov., 1841, which ended in the death of Barnes and others; he continued in the cantonments, leaving a part in the different 'affairs' that took place, till the retreat was commenced on the 5th January, 1842; and he accompanied the disorganized and disastrous route of the married ladies and their husbands were delivered up to Mahomed Akbar, as the only means of preserving their lives. Wounded and incapable of service, Lieut. Eyre followed his wife, and underwent the long detour of the other prisoners, till the advance of General Pollock and their own resolution effected their escape to Cabul on the 21st September. During this time, Lieut. Eyre kept a journal of events, with remarks upon them; this diary was sent piecemeal to a military friend in India, as opportunity offered, and by him transmitted to the author's relations in England. The volume before us consists of the entire journal, from the first outbreak in Cabul till the destruction of the five thousand fighting men and the twelve thousand camp followers of which the army consisted, and a narrative of the prisoners' detention from January till June; after which time, there are only occasional fragments, and a brief letter by Mr Eyre announcing his safe arrival at Cabul.

It is not, however, for its literature or its interest as an historical narrative, that Lieut. Eyre's work derives its chief importance, but for its astounding picture of the blindness which caused and consummated the Cabul disaster. In *The Military Operations at Cabul* the reader has a general view of the blindness and false economy of Lord Auckland's government, and the disregarded pre-

monitions of the coming event by the resident authorities, together with a day by day picture of their benumbed inertia, by which it would seem the ancient proverb was fulfilling, 'quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.' The facts unfolding these things, and the commentaries upon them, are by an eye-witness professionally engaged in the events he is recording, and by an eye-witness fully aware of the responsibility attending the statements of a man of his rank and position. The author also pledges himself to the accuracy of his facts, and upholds the propriety of his comments. 'In these notes,' he says, 'I have been careful to state only what I know to be undeniable facts. I have set down nothing on mere hearsay evidence, nor anything which cannot be attested by living witnesses, or by existing documentary evidence. In treating of matters which occurred under my own personal observation, it has been difficult to avoid altogether the occasional expression of my own individual opinion; but I hope it will be found that I have made no observations bearing hard on men and measures, that are either uncalled for or will not stand the test of future investigation.' That Lieutenant Eyre must have his own views, is clear; that he may have prejudices connected with military points which may unconsciously bias his opinions, or that he may give way to personal feelings, is probable; and it is self-evident that he is passing a judgment after the event. But with every allowance for these circumstances, his story conveys so gross a charge against all concerned, and calls so loudly for keen inquiry, and if the conclusions be established for the severest censure, that we shall as little as possible trust ourselves to convey the impressions that we have derived from Lieut. Eyre's book, but allow him to express his charges in his own words.

As a preliminary, however, it may be proper to observe, that besides the national spirit of the people, and their dislike to foreign interference, one first cause of the insurrection was the reduction of the stipends of Gilguy chiefs, under circumstances that looked like breach of public faith; another, the manner in which the disaffected and rebellious were allowed to take shelter in half-insurrectionary districts, which gave an idea of British weakness; a third was a resolution, in spite of warning, to persist in considering Afghanistan a conquered country, and the Afghans a subdued and settled people; and lastly, the employment of an insufficient force by the Indian Government, which rendered it impossible to occupy the country properly, even had the authorities at Cabul been so inclined. To facilitate the full apprehension of the following extracts, we may remark, that the causes which enabled the insurrection to succeed were—1. The self-confidence and negligence of the authorities immediately preceding the outbreak and during its early stage; 2. The ill-judged position and construction of the cantonment and commissariat, with all the arrangements connected therewith; 3. The indecision, approaching to mental paralysis, of General Elphinstone; and the equal incapacity as a captain, though with more activity as a soldier, of General Shelton; 4. The consequent disorganization, depression, and eventually the panic-cowardice of the troops; the British, strange to write it, being worse than the Sepoys, whilst at last the officers themselves disobeyed, or at least made an option of obeying orders. To this specific list may be added more general causes—a difference between the Envoy and the Commander; the soldier considering retreat desirable, the Political wishing to 'hold out' as long as possible, among other reasons, as he expressed it in a public letter, that 'something might turn up in our favour,' the two months wasted in doing nothing at all, or in occasionally attempting petty operations, which, if they had been fully successful, could not have put down the insurrection or extracted the army; the immense number of camp followers, and women and children, who had been encouraged by the authorities to follow the husbands into Afghanistan,—and the evidently critical condition of the army, which prevented our native friends from showing themselves, whilst our numbers and the British name kept our enemies from quarrelling, which they did as soon as the army was destroyed. Limited as we are by space, these general causes must be taken upon our credit—of the more specific charges we will adduce some evidence.

#### NEGLIGENT SUPINENESS.

It must be remarked that, for some time previous to these overt acts of rebellion, [before the outbreak] the always strong and ill-repressed personal dislike of the Afghans towards Europeans had been manifested in a more than usually open manner in and about Cabul. Officers had been insulted and attempts made to assassinate them. Two Europeans had been murdered, as also several camp followers. But these and other signs of the approaching storm had unfortunately been passed over as mere ebullitions of private angry feeling. This incredulity and apathy is the more to be lamented, as it was pretty well known that on the occasion of the shub-khoom, or first night attack on the Thirty-fifth Native Infantry at Boothkuk, a large portion of our assailants consisted of the armed retainers of the different men of consequence in Cabul itself, large parties of whom had been seen proceeding from the city to the scene of action on the evening of the attack, and afterwards returning. Although these men had to pass

either through the heart or round the skirts of our camp at Seesh Sung, it was not deemed expedient even to question them, far less to detain them.

Widely spread and formidable as this insurrection [the actual outbreak] proved to be afterwards, it was at first a mere insignificant ebullition of discontent on the part of a few desperate and restless men, which military energy and promptitude ought to have crushed in the bud. Its commencement was an attack by certainly not three hundred men, on the dwellings of Sir Alexander Burnes and Captain Johnson, Paymaster to the Shah's force,—and so little did Sir Alexander himself apprehend serious consequences, that he not only refused on its first breaking out, to comply with the earnest entreaties of the wuzer to accompany him to the Bala Hissar, but actually forbade his guard to fire on the assailants,—attempting to check what he supposed to be a mere riot, by haranguing the attacking party from the gallery of his house.

No man, surely, in a highly responsible public situation—especially in such a one as that held by the late Sir Alexander Burnes—ought ever to indulge in a state of blind security, or to neglect salutary warnings however small. It is indisputable that such warnings had been given to him; especially by a respectable Afghan named Tej-Mahomed, on the very previous night, who went in person to Sir Alexander Burnes to put him on his guard, but retired disgusted by the incredulity with which his assertions were received.

#### IN ACTION.

The King, who was in the Bala Hissar, being somewhat startled by the increasing number of the rioters, although not at the time aware, so far as we can judge, of the assassination of Sir Alexander Burnes, despatched one of his sons with a number of his immediate Afghan retainers, and that corps of Hindoostanees commonly called Campbell's Regiment, with two guns, to restore order: no support, however, was rendered to these by our troops, whose leaders appeared so thunderstruck by the intelligence of the outbreak, as to be incapable of adopting more than the most feeble defensive measures. Even Sir William Macnaghten seemed, from a note received at this time from him by Captain Trevor, to apprehend little danger, as he therein expressed his perfect confidence as to the speedy and complete success of Campbell's Hindoostanees in putting an end to the disturbance. Such, however, was not the case; for the enemy, encouraged by our inaction, increased rapidly in spirit and numbers, and drove back the King's guard with great slaughter, the guns being with difficulty saved.

Soon after this, Brigadier Shelton's force arrived; but the day was suffered to pass without any thing being done demonstrative of British energy and power. The murder of our countrymen, and the spoliation of public and private property, was perpetrated with impunity within a mile of our cantonment, and under the very walls of the Bala Hissar.

#### THE CHOICE OF HEAD QUARTERS.

To render our position intelligible, it is necessary to describe the cantonments, or fortified lines so called. It is uncertain whether, for the faults I am about to describe, any blame justly attaches to Lieutenant Sturt, the engineer, a talented and sensible officer, but who was often obliged to yield his better judgment to the spirit of false economy which characterized our Afghan policy. The credit, however, of having selected a site for the cantonments, or controlled the execution of its works, is not a distinction now likely to be claimed by any one. But it must always remain a wonder that any government, or any officer or set of officers, who had either science or experience in the field, should, in a half conquered country fix their forces (already inadequate to the services to which they might be called) in so extraordinary and injudicious a military position. Every engineer officer who had been consulted, since the first occupation of Cabul by our troops, had pointed to the Bala Hissar as the only suitable place for a garrison which was to keep in subjection the city and the surrounding country; but above all, it was surely the only proper site for the magazine, on which the army's efficiency depended. In defiance, however, of rule and precedent, the position eventually fixed upon for our magazine and cantonment was a piece of low, swampy ground, commanded on all sides by hills or forts. It consisted of a low rampart and narrow ditch in the form of a parallelogram, thrown up along the line of the Kohistan road, 1,000 yards long and 600 broad, with round flanking bastions at each corner, every one of which was commanded by some fort or hill. To one end of this work was attached a space nearly half as large again, and surrounded by a simple wall. This was called the 'Mission Compound'; half of it was appropriated for the residence of the Envoy, the other half being crowded with buildings, erected without any attempt at regularity, for the accommodation of the officers and assistants of the mission, and the Envoy's body guard. This large space required in time of siege to be defended, and thus materially weakened the garrison,—while its very existence rendered the whole face of the cantonment, to which it was annexed, negatory for purposes of defence. Besides these disadvantages, the lines were a great deal too extended, so that the ramparts could not be properly manned without harassing the garrison. On

the eastern side, above a quarter of a mile off, flowed the Cabul river in a direction parallel with the Kohistan road. Between the river and cantonments, about 150 yards from the latter, was a wide canal General Elphinstone, on his arrival in April 1841, perceived at a glance the utter uselessness of the cantonment for purposes of protracted defence; and when a new fort was about to be built for the magazine on the south side, he liberally offered to purchase for the government, out of his own funds, a large portion of the land in the vicinity, with the view of removing some very objectionable enclosures and gardens, which offered shelter to our enemy within 200 yards of our ramparts; but neither was his offer accepted, nor were his representations on the subject attended with any good result. He lost no time however, in throwing a bridge over the river, in a direct line between the cantonments and the Seesh Sung camp, and in rendering the bridge over the river passable for guns.

But the most unaccountable oversight of all, and that which may be said to have contributed most largely to our subsequent disasters, was that of having the commissariat stores detached from cantonments, in an old fort, which, in an outbreak, would be almost indefensible. Captain Skinner, the chief commissariat officer, at the time when this arrangement was made, earnestly solicited from the authorities a place within the cantonments for his stores, but received for answer that 'no such place could be given him, as they were far too busy in erecting barracks for the men to think of Commissariat stores.' The Envoy himself pressed this point very urgently, but without avail.

#### THE LOSS OF THE COMMISSARIAT.

Ensign Warren, of the Fifth Native Infantry, at this time occupied the commissariat fort with one hundred men,—and having reported that he was very hard pressed by the enemy, and in danger of being completely cut off, the General, either furloughed or on leave at the moment of the fact that upon the important fact that upon the possession of this fort we were entirely dependent for provisions, and anxious only to save the lives of the men whom he believed to be in imminent peril, hastily gave directions that a party under the command of Captain Swayne of her Majesty's forty fourth Regiment should proceed immediately to bring off Ensign Warren and his garrison to cantonments, abandoning the fort to the enemy.

It now seemed to the officer on whom the command had devolved, impracticable to bring off Ensign Warren's party, without risking the annihilation of his own, which had already sustained so rapid and severe a loss in officers: he therefore returned forthwith to cantonments. In the course of the evening, another attempt was made by a party of the Fifth Light Cavalry; but they encountered so severe a fire from the neighbouring enclosures as obliged them to return without effecting the desired object, with the loss of 8 troopers killed, and 14 badly wounded. Captain Boyd, the Assistant Commissary General, having meanwhile been made acquainted with the general's intention to give up the fort, hastened to lay before him the disastrous consequences that would ensue from so doing. He stated that the place contained, besides large supplies of wheat and atts, all his stores of rum, medicine, clothing, &c., the value of which might be estimated at four lacs of rupees; that to abandon such valuable property would not only expose the force to the immediate want of the necessaries of life, but would infallibly inspire the enemy with tenfold courage. He added, that we had not above two days' supply of provision in cantonments, and that neither himself nor Captain Johnson of the Shah's Commissariat had any prospect of procuring them elsewhere under existing circumstances. In consequence of this strong representation on the part of Captain Boyd, the General sent immediate orders to Ensign Warren to hold out the fort to the last extremity. (Ensign Warren, it must be remembered, denied having received this note.) Early in the night a letter was received from him, to the effect that he believed the enemy were busily engaged in mining one of the towers, and that such was the alarm among the Sepoys that several of them had actually made their escape over the wall to cantonments,—that the enemy were making preparations to burn down the gate; and that, considering the temper of his men, he did not expect to be able to hold out many hours longer, unless reinforced without delay. In reply to this he was informed that he would be reinforced by 3, a m.

At about nine o'clock p.m. there was an assembly of Staff and other officers at the General's house; when the Envoy came in and expressed his serious conviction, that unless Mahomed Shereef's fort were taken that very night, we should lose the Commissariat fort, or at all events be unable to bring out of it provisions for the troops. The disaster of the morning rendered the General extremely unwilling to expose his officers and men to any similar peril; but, on the other hand, it was urged that the darkness of the night would nullify the enemy's fire, who would also most likely be taken unawares, as it was not the custom of the Afghans to maintain a very strict watch at night. A man in Captain Johnson's employ was accordingly sent out to reconnoitre the place, he returned in a few minutes with the intelligence that about twenty men were seated outside the fort near the gate, smoking and talking, and from what he overheard of their conversation, he judged the