

## Incidents of the War.

## OFFICIAL DESPATCHES.

War Department, July 2.

Lord Panmure has this day received a despatch and its enclosure, of which the following are copies, addressed to his lordship by the late Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, G.C.B.:

Before Sebastopol, June 19.

My Lord,—I informed your lordship, on the 16th, that new batteries had been completed, and that in consequence the allies would be enabled to resume the offensive against Sebastopol with the utmost vigour. Accordingly, on the 17th, at daylight, a very heavy fire was opened from all the batteries from the English and French trenches, and maintained throughout the day, and the effect produced appeared so satisfactory that it was determined that the French should attack the Malakoff works the next morning, and that the English should assail the Redan as soon after as I might consider it desirable. It was at first proposed that the artillery fire should be resumed on the morning of the 18th, and should be kept up for about two hours, for the purpose of destroying any works the enemy might have thrown up in the night, and of opening passages through the abatis that covered the Redan; but on the evening of the 17th it was intimated to me by General Pelissier that he had determined, upon further consideration, that the attack by his troops should take place at three the following morning. The French, therefore, commenced their operations as day broke, and as their several columns came within range of the enemy's fire they encountered the most serious opposition, both from musketry and the guns in the works, which had been silenced the previous evening; and observing this, I was induced at once to order our columns to move out of the trenches upon the Redan. It had been arranged that detachments from the Light, Second and Fourth Divisions, which I placed for the occasion under Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, should be formed into three columns; that the right one should attack the left face of the Redan between the flanking batteries; that the centre should advance upon the salient angle formed by the right face and flank of the work; the first and last preceding the centre column. The flank columns at once obeyed the signal to advance, preceded by covering parties of the Rifle Brigade, and by sailors carrying ladders and soldiers carrying woolbags; but they had no sooner shown themselves beyond the trenches than they were assailed by a most murderous fire of grape and musketry. Those in advance were either killed or wounded, and the remainder found it impossible to proceed. I never before witnessed such a continued and heavy fire of grape combined with musketry from the enemy's works, which appeared to be fully manned; and the long list of killed and wounded in the Light and Fourth Divisions, and the seamen of the Naval Brigade, under Captain Peel, who was unfortunately wounded, though not severely, will show that a very large proportion of those that went forward fell. Major-General Sir John Campbell, who led the left attack, and Colonel Shadforth, of the 57th, who commanded the storming party, under his direction, were both killed, as was also Colonel Yea, of the Royal Fusiliers, who led the right column. I cannot say too much in praise of these officers. Major-General Sir J. Campbell had commanded the Fourth Division from the period of the battle of Inkermann till the arrival very recently of Lieutenant-General Bentinck. He had devoted himself to his duty without any intermission, and had acquired the confidence and respect of all. I most deeply lament his loss.

Colonel Shadforth had maintained that efficiency of his regiment by constant attention to all the details of his command; and Colonel Yea was not only distinguished for his gallantry, but had exercised his control of the Royal Fusiliers in such a manner as to win the affection of the soldiers under his orders, and to secure to them every comfort and accommodation which his personal exertions could procure for them. I shall not be able to send your lordship correct lists of the killed and wounded by this opportunity, but I will forward them by telegraph as soon as they are made out. I have not any definite information upon the movements of the French columns, and the atmosphere became so obscured by the smoke from the guns and musketry, that it was not by personal observation to ascertain their progress, though I was particularly well situated for the purpose; but I understand that their left column, under General Dautemarre, passed the advanced works of the enemy, and threatened the gorge or the Malakoff Tower; and that the two other columns, under Generals Mayran and Brunet, who both, I regret to say, were killed, met with obstacles equal to those we encountered, and was obliged in consequence to abandon the attack. The superiority of our fire on the day we opened, led both General Pelissier and myself, and the officers of the Artillery and Engineers of the two services, and the armies in general, to conclude that the Russian artillery fire was in a great measure subdued, and that the operation projected could be undertaken with every prospect of success. The result has shown that the resources of the enemy

were not exhausted, and that they had still the power, either from their ships or from their batteries, to bring an overwhelming fire upon their assailants. Whilst the direct attack upon the Redan was proceeding Lieutenant-General Sir R. England was directed to send one of the brigades of the Third Division, under the command of Major-General Barnard, down the Woronzow Ravine, with a view to give support to the attacking columns on his right; and the other brigade, under Major-General Eyre, still further to the left, to threaten the works at the head of the Dockyard Creek. I have not yet received their reports, and shall not be able to send them to your lordship to-day; but General Eyre was very seriously engaged, and he himself wounded, though I am happy to say not severely, and he possessed himself of a churchyard, which the enemy had hitherto carefully watched, and some houses within the place; but as the town front was not attacked it became necessary to withdraw his brigade at night. I shall make a special report upon this by the next mail, and I shall avail myself of the same opportunity to name to you the officers who have been particularly mentioned to me. I am concerned to have to inform you that Lieutenant-Colonel Tylden, of the Royal Engineers, whose services I have had the greatest pleasure in bringing so frequently to your lordships notice, is very severely wounded. The account I received of him this morning is, upon the whole, satisfactory, and I entertain strong hopes that his valuable life will be preserved. I feel greatly indebted to Sir G. Brown for the manner in which he conducted the duties I entrusted to him; and my warmest acknowledgments are due to Major-General Harry Jones, not only for his valuable assistance on the present occasion, but for the able, zealous, and energetic manner in which he has conducted the siege operations since he assumed the command of the Royal Engineers. He received a wound from a grape-shot in the forehead yesterday, which I trust will not prove serious. I brought up the First Division from the vicinity of Balaklava as a reserve, and I shall retain them on these heights. The Sardinian troops, under Omar Pacha, crossed the Tchernaya on the 17th instant, and occupy positions in front of Chorgouna. They have not come in contact with any large body of the enemy.

I have &amp;c.

RAGLAN.

The Lord Panmure, &amp;c.

## GENERAL PELISSIER'S REPORT.

Head Quarters, before Sebastopol, June 22

Monsieur le Marechal,—After the capture of the exterior works of the 7th of June, I rapidly made arrangements for constituting them the basis of our attack upon the enclosed space of Karabelnaia. We armed them with powerful artillery; the Russian communications and places d'armes were adapted for our use; the ground and the dispositions for the combat were studied in detail; and the allied armies divided their task. The English were to force the Great Redan; and we on our part were to carry the Malakoff batteries, the Careening Redan, and the entrenchment that cover this extremity of the suburbs. It is superfluous, Monsieur le Marechal, to enhance in the eyes of your Excellency the consequences which the successful issue of such an operation would have led to. Since our last success the attitude of the enemy and the enthusiasm of our troops promised victory. There was no motive for procrastination.

By agreement with Lord Raglan, on the 17th, we overwhelmed the place, and especially the works we had resolved to carry, with a crush-fire. The enemy soon ceased to reply from the Malakoff and the Great Redan. It is probable he wished to spare his batteries and reserve his fire, and that he did not suffer so much as we supposed from the effects of our artillery.

Be that as it may, the superiority of our cannon confirmed us in the project of attacking on the 18th June; and during the preceding night we made all the arrangements necessary for effecting our general movement by break of day.

Three divisions were to take part in the combat—the divisions of Mayran and Brunet, of the second corps; the division of D'Auteemarre of the first. The division of the Imperial Guard formed the reserve.

The division of Mayran had the right of the attacks, and was to carry the entrenchments that extend from the battery of the point to the Careening Redan.

Brunet's division was to turn the Malakoff on the right.

D'Auteemarre's division was to manoeuvre on the left in order to carry this important work.

General Mayran's mission was difficult. His first brigade, commanded by Colonel Saurin, of the 3d Regt. of Zouaves, was to issue from the Careening Bay ravine, at the spot where the aqueduct is, to proceed along the left slope of the ravine by defiling as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's line, and to turn by the gorge the battery of the point.

The second brigade, under the orders of General de Failly, was to endeavour to act on the right of the Careening Redan. It was supplied with all the means for scaling.

The special reserve of this division consisted of two battalions of the 1st regiment of the Voltigeurs of the Guard. All these troops were stationed at an early hour at their posts.

Brunet's Division had one of its brigades in front and to the right of the Brancion Redoubt (Green Mamelon) the other was in the parallel to the rear and the right of this redoubt.

An analogous disposition had been made for D'Auteemarre's division; the brigade of Noel in front and to the left of the Brancion Redoubt; the brigade of Breton in the parallel behind.

Two batteries of artillery, capable of being worked *a la bricole*, were placed behind the Brancion Redoubt, so as to be brought to bear on the enemy's positions if we succeeded in taking them.

The division of the Imperial Guard, forming a general reserve for the three attacks, was concentrated behind the Victoria Redoubt.

I had chosen for my post the Lancaster Battery, and it was from thence I was to give the signal, by means of star rockets, for the general movement. Notwithstanding great difficulties in the ground. Notwithstanding the obstacles accumulated by the enemy, and although the Russians, decidedly informed of our projects, were on their guard and ready to repel the assault, I may be permitted to believe that if the attack could have been general and instantaneous along the whole extent of the line, if they had been suddenness and unity of action in the efforts of our brave troops, the object would have been attained. Unfortunately such was not the case, and an inconceivable fatality caused our failure.

I was still more than 1000 metres from the spot where I was to give the signal when a brisk fusillade, mingled with grape shot, told me that the action had been seriously commenced towards the right. In fact, shortly before three o'clock, General Mayran thought he saw my signal in a bomb with its flaming fuse that had been fired off from the Brancion redoubt. He was informed, but to no purpose, of his mistake.

This brave and unfortunate general gave the order to commence the attack. The columns of Saurin and de Failly dashed forward at once. The first rush was magnificent; but hardly had these heads of columns advanced when they were assailed by a shower of balls and grape. This overwhelming grape came not merely from the works we wanted to carry, but from the enemy's steamers also, which arrived with full steam on, and manoeuvred with equal good fortune and skill. We however must have inflicted some damage on them. This prodigious fire arrested the efforts of our troops. It became impossible for our troops to march forwards, but not one made a single step in retreat. It was then that General Mayran, twice hit already, was struck down by grape shot, and compelled to give up the command of his division.

All this was the work of a moment, and General Mayran had been already carried off the field of battle, when I gave the signal from the spot I had reached of the Lancaster battery. The other troops then engaged in order to support the premature movement of the division on the right. This valiant division, disunited for an instant by the loss of its general, rallied promptly to the voice of General de Failly. The troops engaged, supported by the 2nd battalion of the 95th regiment of the line, and one battalion of the Voltigeurs of the Guard, under the orders of the brave Colonel Boudville, kept firm near a ridge, where the general placed them, and maintained their ground with interdictory. In the meantime, being informed of their situation, which might become critical, I gave orders to General Regnault de St. Jean d'Augely to send four battalions of the Voltigeurs of the Guard taken from the general reserve, to the succour of this division. Generals Mellet and Ubrich marched with this fine troop, rallied what was scattered in the Careening Ravine, and came up with their solid support to General de Failly, by occupying the bottom of the ravine.

General Mellinet repaired in person to General de Failly's right with a battalion of grenadiers, which had been attached the evening before to the guard of the ravine and was very useful to him by securing his right.

The central attack had no better success.—General Brunet had not yet been able to complete all his arrangements when the cluster of rockets that were to serve as the signal burst in the air. For twenty or five-and-twenty minutes all the right had already been prematurely engaged. Nevertheless his troops marched with resolution, but their valour failed under the steady fire of the Russians, and against unforeseen obstacles. At the outset General Brunet was mortally wounded by a musket shot in the centre of his chest. The flag of the 91st was broken by a ball, but it is needless to add that these glorious fragments were brought back by this brave regiment.

General Lafont de Villiers took the command of the division, and confined that of the troops engaged to Colonel Lorencez. These kept steady while the rest of the division occupied the trenches, to be prepared against the eventualities of the contest.

On the left, General d'Auteemarre had not been able to engage before Brunet's division; besides, he could not account for the hurried fire of musketry he heard in the direction of the Careening Bay. But at the signal appointed for the assault, he let loose with impetuosity the 5th Foot Chasseurs and the 1st battalion of the 19th Regiment of the line, who, by keep-

ing along the crest of Karabelnaia ravine, reached the entrenchment that connects the Malakoff Tower, scaled this entrenchment, and thus entered the enciente itself. Already the sappers of the engineers were planting the ladders for the remainder of the 19th and 28th Regiments, whose general, d'Auteemarre, was hurrying on the movement behind his valiant head of the column. One instant we could believe in success. Our eagles had been planted on the Russian works. Unfortunately this hope was speedily dissipated. Our allies had encountered such obstacles in their attack of the great Redan, and they had met such a fire of grape that, in spite of their well known tenacity, they had been already compelled to make a movement of retreat. Such was the spirit of our troops that, despite this circumstance they would have pushed on and continued to charge home the enemy; but the want of simultaneous action in the attack of our divisions left the Russians free to overwhelm us with the reserve, and the artillery of the great Redan; and the enemy lost not a moment to direct against our brave Foot Chasseurs all the other reserves of Karabelnaia.

Before such imposing forces, the Commandant Garnier, of the 5th battalion, already wounded five times with gunshot, endeavoured, but in vain to hold the ground that had been won. Obligated to retire before numbers, he recrossed the entrenchment. Gen. Niel rallied his brigade, reinforced by the 39th of the line; they wished to attempt a fresh offensive movement in order to ensure the success of this new effort, and on word being sent by Gen. d'Auteemarre that his reserve was reduced to the 72nd of the line, I sent him the regiment of Zouaves of the Guard; but on the arrival of those veterans of our African wars, the movement no longer having the unity so desirable for a coup of this vigour, with one single division either on the right or left, and cut up by artillery of the Redan, against which our allies were suspending their attack, I did not fail soon to perceive that every favourable chance was exhausted. A fresh effort would merely have occasioned a useless effusion of blood. It was half-past eight. I gave orders in all directions to return to the trenches. This operation was effected with dignity, much order and coolness, and without pursuit of the enemy on any one point. A part of the Russian trenches still continued even to be held by our men, who got away in succession, nor did the enemy venture to profit by his advantages and attack them.

Our loss has been great; we took care from the very commencement of the action to remove most of the men hit by the enemy. But a certain number of these glorious dead remained stretched upon the glacis or in the moats of the place. The last honours were paid them on the following day.

Besides General Brunet and General Mayran (the latter succumbed last night), we have to regret an officer beloved and appreciated by the whole army, the young and brave de Laboussiniere, a lieutenant-colonel of the artillery, killed while ascending the slope of a trench crowded with troops, and while repairing with one of his batteries to the Brancion redoubt.—It is a heavy loss; there was much promise about him. A great many brave superior officers were struck down while setting the noblest example. Staff officers, regimental officers fulfilled their duties worthily, and the soldiers were admirable everywhere.

We had 87 officers killed and 17 taken prisoners, 1544 non-commissioned officers and privates killed or missing, 96 officers and 1644 men conveyed to the ambulances on the evening of the 18th.

Many wounds considered very severe are far from being so dangerous as was at first believed. The bearers of these honourable scars will shortly reappear beneath their colours.

These losses have neither quenched the ardour nor abated the confidence of these valiant divisions. All they ask is to make the enemy pay dearly for that day. The hope and desire of conquest are in the hearts of all, and all recon that in the next struggle fortune will not disappoint valour.

PELISSIER.

## REPULSE OF THE ALLIES, IN THE ATTACK ON THE MALAKOFF AND REDAN FORTS.

The following is a graphic description of the disastrous attack by the allies on the 18th of June;—

Camp before Sebastopol, June 18.

Ten days or more before this reaches you the electric telegraph will have given you the news that Sebastopol has been again bombarded and stormed—unsuccessfully. Soften down the humiliating fact as that obedient messenger may, I have to report the naked truth, and apprise you that we have received an unredeemed and undeniable check, which not inadequately balances accounts between the enemy and ourselves for at least one of our three general actions fought and won since we set foot in the Crimea. If to smooth away the unpleasant results of a defeat by concealing the losses on our side and underrating brave deeds performed and substantial benefits gained by the enemy, were in any way compatible with the duty of one on whom some, at least, of the home public are dependent for their knowledge of what occurs here, I might attempt to give a softening