FROM A LONDON PAPER OF OCTOBER 19.

To the Right Hon. HENRY ADDINGTON, &c. &c.

SIR,

ON a former occasion I cursorily noticed a very conspicuous and most extraordinary paragraph of the Government Pamphlet, which attempts to fix the charge of folly and drivelling upon any man who could at any time have entertained the smallest degree of confidence in the durability of the late Peace. The frivolous insolence of that observation, coming, which I assert it did, from Ministers themselves, would require no further incentive to general indignation than its own laboured publicity; but it has produced an effect very different, I presume, from that which your friends intended, or the Treasury Advocate had in contemplation when he made it. A man, when he is told that he has committed himself, or finds that he has fallen into a palpable error, very naturally recurs to the circumstances which led him astray, and to the actuating cause of his having diverged from his regular and steady line. When, therefore, the majority of the People of Great-Britain, who certainly were by every art of persuasion, and every trick of office, which they were far from suspecting at the time, duped into the idea of the Peace being so carried as to admit no doubt of its permanency, are told that they are ideots and drivellers for giving any credit to the assurances of Government, and should bury their folly and credulity in some by-place or corner, it is not very extraordinary that they should feel inclined to ask by what means they were first led to adopt an opinion now so scouted and so abundant in disgrace. The result of their inquiry must establish the point upon which the Learned Editor and myself are at issue; whether the believers in the durability of the Peace were besotted by the dulness of their own perceptions, or by the communicating influence of you, Sir, and your Administration,—whether, in short, Nature has played them a slippery trick, or that they have been made fools of by Mr. ADDINGTON.

The merits of the Treaty of *Amiens*, taken abstractedly, are foreign to the present question. I never could consider it as a Peace of glory, or a subject of National gratulation, still it sheathed the sword of desolation and blood, and was so far welcome to every friend of humanity. The terms were universally admitted to be excessive, and my Lord GRENVILLE truly described the relative state of the Contracting Parties, when he made the *uti possidetis* the basis of the Negociation on the part of the French, whilst the British were obliged to submit to the *status quo ante bellum*. Peace, such as it was, met the wishes of some part of the Community, though, upon the whole, it was received with a chilling indifference, and considered, as your new adherent Mr. SHERIDAN charitably painted it, such as we might be glad of, but could not possibly be proud of. You, Sir, beheld the public opinion through the medium of your own feelings, and that they played the parasite may be easily traced in the terms which you applied to the Negociation, and its ultimate result, during the discussion of the Definitive Treaty—this is farther confirmed by the publication of a similar opinion in the Pamphlet of your defender, who informs us that "the Ministers *were confident* of having deserved well; they had (says he) obtained a Peace for the Country beyond the hopes of the wisest and most sanguine of their well-wishers." You, Sir, at the period to which I have just alluded, declared in the House, that you felt convinced the People hail'd your Peace as a blessing—but did you stop here; no Sir, "it was a blessing (you continued) *which would be long preserved by a system of firmness and conciliation!* And yet now we are officially ridiculed and contemned—we are pointed at by every Clerk in the Treasury for ever having entertained an idea of its durability. Government, (says our Editor) surely did not encourage too sanguine a hope of the duration of Peace, when they described it to be *an experiment*. When, Sir, was it ever described to be an experiment, until its failure was evident to all?—Did it not first run a gauntlet of titles, and was not it principally considered as unlikely to be infracted, because by giving up every thing, there remained nothing to dispute about? If, however, you now chuse to call it an experiment, let me ask what was the experiment to establish? Was it a question of figures, or a puzzle at physiognomy? Was it a sum in arithmetic, or whether the countenance of BONAPARTE bespoke sincerity? If the former, the calculation resolves itself into this simple query—How much a man may make of the remainder when he has given up every thing? If the latter, a disciple of LAVATER would have made an infinitely better Negociator than my Lord CORNWALLIS. Would the people of this Country, do you imagine, Sir, have been so tamely acquiescent in the new-fangled doctrine which you broached during the discussion of the Preliminary Treaty? Would they have borne to be told that the retention of our Colonies, or the preservation of our Conquests was an ineffectual mode to counterbalance the aggrandizement of France, and that the cessation of both was the only possible pledge of security?—
...y have suffered a Minister to act upon this prin-
...irly told them that these sacrifices were made
... experiment? You are well aware that in
...ation to which this ill-governed Country
...asures of your Administration, that she
... her feet the man who had dared
... your assurance, Sir, and the as-
... of the sincere disposition to
...vered in BONAPARTE—your
...n of the durability of the Peace
...*ed by a system of Firmness and*
...ated an overwhelming clamour
... Treaty.—Would you, Sir, have
... way with a dash of your pen, Con-
... earned at the expence of the best
... millions of British Money had
...vation, and from which millions
... to be drawn, and you then de-
...ore than experiment? I
...mporary edifice for
...uishing it;
... met

with one mad enough to try the same experiment upon his own dwelling, in which were his wife, his children, his friends, domestics, and treasures—or attempt, at the risk of his whole possessions, to establish a point doubtful in its effect, and fatal in its failure. Such a Philosopher must fall under the censure of being Nature's Fool, without requiring the assistance of Mr. ADDINGTON's Ratiocinations. No, Sir, if Peace was an experiment, it was an experiment on the side of BONAPARTE, who has succeeded in every part of it.—He has gained by it the experience of our Imbecility—he has gained all the Conquests and Colonies made in the course of a long and successful War; he has gained time to make new Continental acquisitions; and he has gained the advantage (the greatest of all, as it respects the Continent of Europe) of placing Great-Britain in the light of an Aggressor—convicting her of a Breach of Faith, and degrading her in the eye of surrounding Nations.—I much fear that the frame and nature of our Constitution will not stand the expence of many more such experiments. Your Friend, Sir, who professes to maintain a Paradox, (a profession that was certainly unnecessary to any person who has read his Pamphlet) laments that we had not more conquests, more acquisitions, not to balance our losses, but that we *might have given them up!* This savours more of system, Sir, than any thing, which with the strictest attention, I have been able to discover in your Administration; for the principle which leads you to think the Country better without her Colonies, may be traced in your conduct towards the Volunteers; you, no doubt, consider them a more effective force without arms in their hands, and therefore refuse to supply them with such useless weapons of defence. The Enemy is at our very gates, and our Volunteers are unarmed!—"True," you say, "but they are "Volunteers still, and the Country is to be saved by the "brave Volunteers; we have publicly thanked them for "their future services, and if we think it expedient, we "may give them musquets—*in time*." This, I suspect, will be something like your *early* naval preparations (tho' it cannot be said of either, *Decies repetita placebit*); and a Volunteer without arms is no bad accompanyment to a Ship without Sailors!

But, Sir, how can you imagine the Country will submit to be laughed at by your hirelings, for having credited your assertions, and relied on your promises? Is the high authority of Government to become the stage of a mountebank? Is the tone, the character of Diplomacy to be employed for the purpose of chicanery and deception? Why, Sir, if you really felt the Peace, a Peace of Experiment, as you would have us believe, did you not wait the gradual developement of its operation? Did you observe that BONAPARTE sat down fatigued and harrassed, like a man after battle, throw aside his armour, lay by his sword in the scabbard, and turn his thoughts merely to the acts of peace and to his domestic duties? Did he not, on the contrary, stalk forth, and lay his devastating hand upon the Italian Republic? Did he not pursue his system of aggrandizement pending our negociations with him? And yet when the Definitive Treaty was signed, was there a moment lost in dismantling our Navy, or disbanding our Army? Did we not outstrip the usual routine of business to put ourselves in a state to cry out to France, "There see our disposition—see what we have done!" without once looking to BONAPARTE, or thinking to regulate our motions by his—still you assured us of the First Consul's sincerity, and the angry tumult of your soul would have crushed the daring Libellist who could even suspect the gentle, tractable, and humbled-minded Despot of France. Were the People to suppose that men entrusted with their Rights, their Properties, their Lives and Liberties, were so utterly destitute of Fore-sight, Prudence, and Precaution, as to rely upon a literal Profession, which is all you, Sir, could have trusted to, from the Enemy?—could they imagine that with the best means of information of what was actually going forward, the word of Government was not to be relied on?—No, Sir, the Country has been in the habit of eighteen years Confidence in the Character and Talents of Administration. They have only now learnt, and that to the cost of the little popularity as a well-meaning man, which your Friends conceive you once possessed, that they have been deceived, and that they are laughed at for their credulity. They have parted with their Conquests and their Colonies, and now are told they were given up as an experiment, to purchase a phantom. They are, in short, termed Drivellers and Fools by those Ministers whose acts have deceived them—and termed so, because they believed what His Majesty's Confidential Servant told them, and trusted in assurances which his every public act confirmed. Whether a people so treated are fools by nature, or by Mr. ADDINGTON's persuasion, I leave others to decide. If they suffer themselves to be so cajoled again, they must be found guilty of the *Charge* of Folly, from whatever cause it may arise. I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your's, &c. FITZ-ALBION.

SPAIN AND OUR MINISTERS.

IT is observed by MARTINUS SCRIBLERUS, in his directions for panegyrizing patrons, that every Minister of State, or other great man, has united in him every virtue of the head and heart, as inherent qualities, whether they have been exerted or not, and therefore that a dependant or expectant, in addressing the said great man, has nothing more to do than to enumerate every valuable qualification, and attribute them to the idol before whom he bows. This is a very easy and compendious mode of praise; it saves every kind of discrimination, and may be employed by any person that happens to recollect the names of the cardinal virtues. A late writer, who has taken for his theme the merits of the present Administration, and the demerits of their Predecessors, but especially the sublime elevation of soul which distinguishes Mr. ADDINGTON from the paltry meanness of Mr. PITT—after representing the Country as sinking to ruin under the feeble hands of the former Minister, until the potent arm of the present snatched it from destruction, sums up his account of the perfections of the existing Cabinet in a few words—"Faithful in intention, they are wise in counsel, able and vigorous in conduct, and fortunate in result."—Before they came into office every thing was adverse, since that blessed epoch every thing has prospered. They had indeed a supernatural operation, the very schemes which their Predecessors had contrived, and the very expeditions which their Predecessors had devised and prepared were successful, not from being well planned or provided, but from the marvellous influence of the new Counsellors, who had nothing to do with either the designs or the dispositions. The achievements of our arms in Egypt, according to the Ministerial Panegyrist, are assignable to the present Ministry; though at the time the exploits were performed, and for a month after, no man of our army or fleet in Egypt knew, or could know, that such a change had taken place; and if, as their votary declares, they arrived at Peace "by the gate of victory and success," it was a gate in the opening of which they had no hand. But without enquiring whether the Peace of *Amiens* was glorious "beyond the hopes of the wisest and the most sanguine of their well-wishers;" following the policy of Ministers during the cessation of arms; or even for the present reviewing their general measures since the recommencement of hostilities, we shall confine our enquiries, concerning their alledged wisdom and vigour, to one subject—the measures which they have adopted respecting Spain.

No Briton, in the smallest degree acquainted with what is passing in the World, can be ignorant of the principle, and system of means, which with all his violence and caprice, BONAPARTE has regularly and uniformly employed for carrying into effect his atrocious purposes. His process was indeed extremely simple—from the plunder of one Country he reserved a considerable part for enabling him to plunder another. The spoils of Belgium and Holland, that had been procured by other depredators, empowered him in his first grand robbing adventure, to pillage Italy—the pillage of Italy constitued the ways and means for the robbery of Malta and Egypt. The proceeds of these spoliations afforded him hopes of extending his robberies to Syria and Constantinople, but finding his career stopped in that quarter, he returned to France and collected what remnants he could from former scenes of pillage, and meanwhile considered where he might discover new sources. From Spain large sums had been extracted, but still, while she was allowed the importation of her Western treasures, she had an ample funding store, and there was no doubt but that fund, when arrived in Spain, would be completely at the disposal of BONAPARTE—that the riches of Mexico and Peru, if suffered without molestation to cross the ocean, would be drafted into the Consular Exchequer, and become sinews of War against England. Could there be any one so stupid or besotted as to doubt that BONAPARTE would extort that wealth as soon as it should be within his reach? Could it be questioned whether the strong robber wanting money would seize the effects of the weak proprietor when under his power? The policy of Britain in that case was obvious, required by prudence and sanctioned by justice.—The physical resources of Spain, when arrived in *old Spain*, were unquestionably to be physical resources of *France*. Prudence and self-defence demanded that Britain, who ruled the channel of conveyance, should arrest, in its passage, wealth that was destined to enrich and strengthen her inveterate enemy. The policy of this procedure was as undeniable as that, if you are ingaged in a war, it is your business as much as possible, to diminish the means of the foe for resistance and annoyance. Justice also would have ratified a seizure which was not intended to injure the proprietor, but to secure his riches from the hands of a robber. How came Ministers to neglect precautions so evidently necessary, and to employ temporizing half measures when the occasion called for decisive counsels, and immediate efforts? They have suffered Five Millions sterling already to come within the Consular grasp, which they might have with ease kept from the Plunderer. Is this one of the exploits on which they and their flatterers rest the fame of their wisdom and vigour?

Let us recal to our recollection the Counsels of another Minister of a very different kind of wisdom and vigour, in circumstances which, as far as concern England, were nearly similar, though not so urgent. During the War with France, a great portion of which was conducted under the auspices of the first WILLIAM PITT, Spain manifested a disposition to employ her wealth and power in assisting France against Britain. The sagacity of PITT instantaneously penetrated into the design; and he immediately proposed measures the most decisive and effectual. He saw that the physical resources of Spain were, as at present, though from a different cause, destined to Minister to the hostility of France towards this Country. "Let us," he said, "strike the first blow: we are paramount at sea. Let us send a fleet immediately to intercept her galleons, and prevent her treasures from being employed against ourselves. Lose no time—the wealth of Spain is destined to minister to our foes. It is just in England to prevent the attempt, and her interest, by immediate action, to prevent it effectually." On these strong grounds he moved in Council, that a squadron should be sent immediately to the coast of Spain, and that she should no longer be permitted to observe an insidious neutrality. A proposition which combined profound wisdom with sublime energy, was not relished by colleagues who had neither ability to comprehend his policy, nor magnanimous boldness to adopt his lofty tone. Seconded by Earl TEMPLE only, he was out voted in the Cabinet, and would no longer remain in a situation that would make him responsible for measures which he was not allowed to guide. He accordingly resigned. The successors of Mr. PITT, decent common-place men, suffered the Spanish treasures to reach Europe, and assist France. The British Ministers were soon driven to the hostility which Mr. PITT had proposed to begin, and rendered a late homage to his wisdom by ultimately following his belligerent plans, and employing those Commanders whom he had selected; and these men of ordinary talents, succeeding a man of extraordinary genius, through his means and preparations were successful in the contest.

Whatever party differences there might be at that time concerning the conduct of Mr. PITT, only one opinion remains now, that it possessed that union of genius and energy which has ever been the best defender of Britain's