

England, whether or not this invasion be the act of this secret power, over which, if the native Government have no controul, it should resume it as soon as possible; and if it have controul, it deserves to be made responsible for the mischievous operations of this concealed power. It would, however, be unjust to the Government of Spain to say, that in it alone was found that unconquerable hatred of free institutions which no doubt is the origin of this aggression. There is a decided and inveterate love of arbitrary rule and unlimited sway in the Spanish nation and Spanish people; and they do doubt, feel annoyed by the contiguity and neighbourhood of liberal institutions. (Hear, hear.) There is between the two nations an antipathy and an opposition of feelings, which it does not require the authority or the suggestions of the Government to excite and stimulate and bring into action. There exists a mutual dislike and a mutual antipathy—one hugging, as it were, the malcontents of the other. This dislike might have originated in individual hostility, arising from the opposing interests of two neighbouring people. I am inclined to think that such was the origin of this dislike, which afterwards spread itself, and gained strength; in its progress matured and combined and confirmed; and finally brought into action by those angry and hostile feelings, disseminated among the whole community. I am very willing to believe that this dislike is stronger in the Spanish nation generally, and Spanish people, than in the Spanish Government. But if, though partaking of those hostile feelings of the Spanish nation, the Spanish Government, nevertheless, never intended to give body to the feeling; if their orders, as they say, were disobeyed by their own subjects; if they sincerely disliked and disapproved this aggression on the Ally of Great Britain—if there were repeated violations of their most solemn engagements, and their promises were broken from time to time, all against their will, let us now hear some signs of repentance—(Hear, hear)—let us hear their expressions of regret, and let us witness their sorrow for what was involuntarily done. There was an opportunity afforded them to prove the sincerity of their professions. Let this proceeding on our part also be a measure of defence to the kingdom of Portugal, and not a declaration of war with Spain. (Hear, hear.) But now let us come to the facts. It is generally known that there were great and frequent desertions from the Portuguese army into the territories of Spain, and also from the Spanish nation into Portugal. The Portuguese Authorities, well enough inclined of themselves, and farther encouraged by our advice, refused all assistance from those from Spain, who offered it; and whenever the Portuguese Government had any opportunity of exercising a discretion, they discouraged these desertions from the Spanish soldiers; and they did so by giving up individuals, whenever they could do so with safety to those individuals. Gentlemen were aware that there existed between the two nations of Spain and Portugal, stipulations by which they were mutually bound to make exchanges of deserters from their respective armies. All those who deserted from Spain, were to be given up by Portugal, guaranteeing for them, at the same time, certain conditions against the infliction of punishment. Portugal, in the giving up of the deserters from Spain, by our advice, perhaps—but whether by advice, or from their own unsolicited wish—I will not say, waived all conditions and stipulations. They desired their own territories to be spared, and they had signified to the Spanish Government their entire satisfaction in complying with the existing stipulations;

instead, therefore, of harbouring the Spanish deserters—instead of furnishing them with arms and ammunition, and clothing, they had them sent back into the interior of Spain. But on the other hand, the solemn engagements entered into not only with Portugal, but with France and England also, in this respect have been repeatedly and shamefully violated. These promises and engagements were not made and broken once, but several times. The deserters from Portugal and from the Portuguese army were encouraged and furnished with ammunition, they were clothed and trained, and kept together in depots, fit and prepared to act aggressively. These were facts which were not to be contradicted, nor even doubted. It was, therefore, now open for the Spanish Government—it rested imperatively on the Government of Spain, to show that this aggression was not intentional on the part of that Government. (Hear, hear.) It rested with them to prove that the fault was not with them, but that so far from intending any aggression, they were ready to make reparation for the offence. But these promises and assurances were made not only to Portugal, but also to France and to England; and here I should do an injustice to the Government of France if I did not broadly state and declare that the most urgent applications were made by France, as well as by this country, to the Government of Spain; but these applications proved equally fruitless. At the first irruption from Spain into Portugal, the Ambassador from France, at the Court of Madrid, remonstrated with the Government of Spain, and said that she was not to look to France for support, but was to take the consequences of that conduct upon herself. I am therefore bound to say that the French Government exerted itself on this occasion, in conjunction with the Government of this Country. If they have pursued any other system on another occasion—[hear, hear.] that was a question of another sort. I am bound to say that they did all that was in their power to persuade and even force the Government of Spain to the execution of its own promises, and to respect its engagements. But now I am come to consider, how will England meet the call that is now made? I hope she will meet it in such a way as to stop the consequences in that point, in which I wish she would, and not to pursue them to that dreadful extremity which I hope is not necessary. [Hear, hear.] It will be remembered, that I set out by saying that many reasons induced me to be strong in the resolution that nothing short of the national faith, and the preservation of England's honor, should make desirable any approximation to the danger of war. [Hear, hear.] But let me be understood, however, not as meaning that I entertain a dread of war in a good cause. [Hear, hear.] And in no other cause may it ever be the lot of this country to be engaged in war. I do not dread a war from any want of sufficient means and ample resources. I have other reasons, though none from fear of the resources of the country, against pushing the war in which she might be engaged, to any dangerous consequences. I have taken the liberty, on one occasion heretofore, of adverting to this subject. I then maintained that the position of this country was a position of neutrality, and that not only in respect to the contending nations, but also from principle. I said then that it was a state of neutrality alone by which we could maintain that balance of power which was necessary not only to our safety, but to the safety of all other nations in Europe. It is now three years since I proclaimed these principles; and three years experience has confirmed, and

not altered my opinion. I fear much that if the war was to go beyond the limits of Portugal and Spain, it would become a war more dangerous in its consequences. It would become a war of principle—a war of conflicting opinion—[Hear, hear.] and if we were to enter into it, our object would be rather to mitigate than to exasperate it. Yet I know that this country could not enter into such a war without proceeding farther. The number of discontented spirits in the country—the number of those who were fond of change, and who were dissatisfied with our present state—would push the war beyond these moderate limits. It is this consciousness of our situation, and that this country possesses a giant's strength—[hear, hear.]—that makes me fear for the consequences. But it was one thing to possess the giant's power, and it was another thing to know how to use it. It was our business not to seek for opportunities of making a display of our strength; but by a prudent, yet firm exertion of it, to show that we knew how to restrain it, and convert it to the preservation of others as well as ourselves. Let us not let lose the furies of war without at least having the lash in our own hands, whereby we may urge or control—

"Luctantes ventos tempestates que honores Imperio premit, ac vinclis et carcere frangat. Ni faciat, maria ac terras eolumque profundum Quipperant rapidi secum, verant que per auras"

The consequences of letting loose the passions, which are now but too badly wound up, I could not contemplate without horror—[Hear, hear.]—nor could I lie easy on my couch if I unnecessarily let loose the furies of war. This and not any fear about the sufficiency of our resources was the reason why I so much dreaded a recurrence to war. This is the reason for which I would forbear, and for which I would put up with any thing short of a breach of national faith, or an insult to the national honor, rather than let loose all the impetuous passions now in this country, and recurring to all the evils of war, without knowing where to end the devastation. This is that love of peace by which the British Government acknowledged openly that it was influenced—this is the boundary which the laws of nations required to be drawn. I will not forward this principle, however, without adding, "Let us, at all events, defend Portugal. We go there not to retaliate the aggression, but to preserve her. We will plant our standard there; and where the standard of England is planted, there foreign dominion shall not dare to come." The Right Hon. Gentleman sat down amid loud and continued cheers; but rose again, and said, "The Address which I have to move is merely an echo of the Message sent down by His Majesty, pledging the concurrence of this House in such measures as His Majesty may think necessary to adopt for the defence of our ancient Ally the Kingdom of Portugal."

ASSIZE OF BREAD.

At a Court of General Session of the Peace holden in and for the County of York on the second Tuesday, being the 13th day of June 1826.

IT IS ORDERED, that from and after Saturday next, the ASSIZE of BREAD in the Town of Fredericton, be as follows:—

The Sixpenny Wheaten Loaf to weigh 2lb. 8oz.

And other Loaves in proportion.

H. G. CLOPPER, Clerk.

CAUTION.

The Officers of the 81st Regiment hereby Caution any Person from giving credit to their Messman, upon account of the Regiment, as they will not be answerable for any debts contracted by him. Fredericton, Jan. 15. 1827.

REMOVAL.

THE Subscriber having erected a New Store (upon the old place where he was burnt out,) offers for sale a variety of

Dry Goods and Groceries, very cheap for cash.

MARK NEEDHAM.

Fredericton 14th Nov. 1826.

STEWART & AITKEN CABINET MAKERS, AND UPHOLSTERERS.

RESPECTFULLY inform the Gentlemen and other Inhabitants of Fredericton and its vicinity, that they have commenced business at that Shop next to the Store of Messrs. J. & G. E. Ketchum, where every article in their line, will be manufactured, in the neatest and most Fashionable manner, on the shortest notice, and most reasonable terms.

Fredericton, 9th May 1826.

Administration Notices.

ALL persons having any legal demands against the estate of Daniel Tague, late of the Parish of Burton, deceased, are hereby requested to render the same duly attested, within three months from the date hereof; and all those indebted to said estate are desired to make immediate payment.

EDWARD TAGUE, Sole Adm'r.
Burton, 21, Dec. 1826. 6 w.p.

ALL Persons having any legal demands against the Estate of RICHARD PRICE, Esquire, late of the Parish of Ludlow, County of Northumberland, deceased, are hereby requested to render their accounts duly attested, within Twelve months from the date hereof, and all those indebted to said Estate are desired to make immediate payment to

ABIGAIL PRICE, Adm'r.

ELIJAH FOWLER, Adm'r.

Ludlow, 2d June, 1826. 12 mo.p.

All persons having any just demands against the estate, of the Revd. F. Dibblee, late of Woodstock, deceased, are requested to present the same to either of the subscribers, within six months from this date and those indebted to the said estate are desired to make immediate payment to.

JOHN DIBBLEE, } Executors.
WM. S. I. DIBBLEE, }
July 4th 1826.

ALL persons having any just demand against the Estate of Thomas T. Easterbrooks, late of Ludlow, in the County of Northumberland, deceased, are requested to present them duly attested, within 9 months from this date, and all those indebted to said estate, are desired to make immediate payment to

Jane Easterbrooks, Adm'r.

Joseph Washburn, Adm'r.

Ludlow, 11th April, 1826.

ALL persons, having any demands against the Estate of Samuel Shaw, late of Wakefield, deceased, are requested to render the same attested, within three months from the date hereof and all those indebted to said estate are desired to make immediate payment to

JOHN F. SHAW, sole ad'm'r.

Wakefield 21st Nov. 1826. [p. 2m.]