

Europe.

LONDON, October 8.

LATER BULLETINS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

Account of the operations before Choumla to the 10th Sept.

On the 9th of September, at three o'clock in the morning, the Turks, under the command of Seraskier Hussein Pacha, attacked with considerable force the centre and right wing of our position.—Each of the two redoubts was attacked by four regiments of infantry, among which, however, there was some irregular troops. Taking advantage of the darkness of the night, the Turks three times approached our works and three times threw themselves into the trenches. They were, however, very soon repulsed with loss, and in the last attack entirely dispersed, and took flight with such precipitation, that, contrary to their usual custom, they left their killed and wounded behind. We took 600 prisoners. Our loss is very inconsiderable, being only five killed and twenty wounded. The enemy's artillery hardly fired at all during the whole engagement.

It is worthy of remark, that our troops that were in the entrenchments received the enemy with bravery and coolness. In order to fire with more effect on the Turks in the trenches, our soldiers ascended the parapet; an artilleryman was even seen to take up a grenade which had fallen in our redoubt, and threw it back, with the lighted fuse, among the Mussulmans.

Halib Pacha, at the head of 3,000 horse and 500 foot, attempted to turn our right wing; but when he had passed the village of Kaspoli, and was proceeding along the heights, on which were two of our redoubts, Lieutenant-General Rudiger, with the brigade of Hussars, and four pieces of Horse Artillery, went to meet him, attacked and repulsed him, and pursued him to the distance of a verst beyond Kaspoli, as far as the wood, into which he was able to retreat. In consequence of the difficulty of procuring provender for the horses, the general movements towards Jeni Bazar will be delayed as long as possible.

Operations before Choumla, Sept. 13.—Our troops maintain themselves in the positions which they have taken up before Choumla, notwithstanding the difficulties they have had to encounter in collecting forage. Since the last attack on our redoubts the Turks have not ventured out of their trenches. Though they keep up a daily fire upon us, have neither killed nor wounded.

Account of the Operations before Varna to Sept. 15.—The besieging corps proceeded with evident success. On the right wing of the line of attack the works are completed, and the mines which have been constructed for the destruction of the counterscarp will be immediately charged.—In the night of the 10th September the enemy chiefly bombarded the point where the battalion of sappers of the Guard were working. Yesterday we took at the point of the bayonet a redoubt which the enemy had in the middle of our works, and which interrupted our communications. The fire of our artillery, which had continued from early in the morning, was stopped at noon, and a signal being given, 300 men of the regiment Simbirsk, under the command of Capt. Sulienco attacked the enemy's redoubt without firing a shot, and took it. About 200 Turks were killed in the works, and 39 prisoners taken. We had one officer killed and two wounded, thirty privates killed and wounded. On the same day, a detachment of guards and troops of the line, under the command of Adj. Gen. Golowin, was sent to occupy the south bank of the lake Diona. After occupying the heights of the peninsula of Galata, the detachment took the road to Bourgas, without falling in with the enemy. The troops embarked to support the operations of Gen. Golowin were landed without firing a shot. By these two operations we took some of the enemy's convoys, and a considerable number of cattle. The appearance of our troops in the peninsula of Galata must have made a great impression on the garrison of Varna, whose situation is reported by the prisoners to become daily more difficult. Since the beginning of the siege, the enemy has lost 3,000 men in the fortress, without reckoning the considerable losses which he has sustained in the numerous sallies, and in the works taken by our troops.

This morning the enemy sent a detachment of 400 or 500 cavalry against Lieut. Gen. Golowin. A few cannon-shot sufficed to drive them back. On

another side, however, the enemy made a serious sally about 3 o'clock. He attacked us on the right side, protected by the points which he still occupied, and just at the spot where our fascines were, very near to the ditches of the fortress. It was probably his intention to destroy our works. The action was warm, but the enemy found it impossible to attain his object, and was not only repulsed by the 13th and 14th regiments of Chasseurs at the point of the bayonet, but compelled to abandon his positions, which were occupied by our troops. We found in them so many slain Turks, that it was necessary to remove them before our troops occupied them. In this successful action some of our brave men were killed. Maj. Gen. Perowskin was wounded by a ball.

Operations before Varna, Sept. 17.—After we had on the 13th instant driven the Turks at the point of the bayonet, and with a loss 500 killed, from the points occupied by them without the fortress, the counterscarp, situated in front of the northern bastion, nearest the sea, was blown into the air at sunrise on the 14th, and their fire effectually silenced by ours. The counterscarp was thrown by the effects of a mine into the fosse, which became in consequence so completely filled, that we were able to take possession of the entrance to the breach in the bastion, which had materially suffered from our fire.

The siege having proceeded thus far, and the corps of Adjutant General Golowin having occupied the road to Bourgas, his Majesty deemed it necessary to summon the garrison to surrender, seeing there was no hope of their receiving reinforcements, or of their longer maintaining themselves in their position. A flag of truce was accordingly sent into the fortress. The first replies led to a hope that the enemy would avoid a further effusion of blood, by consenting to a capitulation, and a temporary suspension of hostilities was the consequence. But as Admiral Greig was convinced, after a conference held on the quarter-deck of the Empress Mother, with the commandant of Varna (the Captain Pacha), that the enemy was only desirous of gaining time by evasive answers, the negotiations were broken off, and on the 15th the cannonade of the fortress was recommenced.

At the present moment the cannonade still continues uninterruptedly, and our works are pushed forward with the greatest activity. The *batterie de siege* is planted on one side in the position occupied by Adj. Gen. Golowin, and on the other upon the right flank of our works. The southern part of the city which had hitherto remained almost uninjured, is now the object of an uninterrupted fire.

BLOCKADE OF THE DARDANELLES.

From Bell's Weekly Messenger.

The Blockade of the Dardanelles has been officially noticed to the Chairman of the Committee of Lloyd's, by Lord Dunglas, in the following letter:—

Foreign Office, Oct. 1.

"Sir,—I am directed by the Earl of Aberdeen to acquaint you, for the information of the Committee of Lloyd's, that his Majesty's Government has received information that it is the intention of his Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, to establish a Blockade of the Dardanelles. This Blockade will be limited to the prevention of vessels bound to Constantinople, and laden with provisions or articles contraband of war, from entering the Straits, his Majesty having declared to his Parliament that his Imperial Majesty had consented to waive the exercise in the Mediterranean Sea of any rights appertaining to his Imperial Majesty in the character of a belligerent Power." Lord Aberdeen is desirous of making the above communication with the least possible delay, for the information of all whom it may concern. And I am further directed by his Lordship to state that in the opinion of his Majesty's Government, such commercial enterprises of his Majesty's subjects as may have been already undertaken upon the faith of his Majesty's declaration in Parliament, are not liable to be affected by this Blockade.

(Signed)

"DUNGLAS."

"To the Chairman of the Committee of Lloyd's." It will thus be seen that the Blockade is limited strictly to munitions of war, provisions, ammunition, and arms. Vessels, without such cargoes, may navigate as usual. Vessels from Constantinople without articles contraband of war, will not be subject to the blockade; nor will it affect enterprises undertaken upon the faith of his Majesty's declaration in Parliament.

The Ministers have intimated to the Turkey mer-

chants that coffee and sugar will be deemed provisions, and will of course not be allowed to pass the Russian blockading squadron at the Dardanelles.

The following is the opinion expressed by the Paris Papers upon the subject of the blockade:—

"Much is confidently said respecting the blockade of the Dardanelles by the Russian squadron, in consequence of the unexpected resistance opposed by the Turks, and because the Emperor Nicholas finds himself compelled to use every means in his power to give a more favourable turn to the war. But it is feared that England will withhold her consent to that measure, on the ground of its being contrary to the Convention of the 6th of July, and that her refusal may produce serious results between the two Powers. The opinion of the French Government, which has already acquired a kind of preponderance in the affairs of the East, by its occupation of the Morea, will be almost decisive in that contest."

From the Courier of Oct. 6.—Russian Blockade.

What is our position in consequence of the blockade of the Dardanelles, both as regards Russia and France?

First, let us recollect the expressions of the King's Speech, and of the Speech of his Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Earl of Aberdeen. His Majesty declared to his Parliament that "his Imperial Majesty had consented to waive the exercise in the Mediterranean Sea, of any rights appertaining to his Imperial Majesty in the character of a belligerent Power."

And the Earl of Aberdeen, alluding to the changes of circumstances which had taken place since the conclusion of the Treaty, Russia having declared war against Turkey, said that "in order to show that it was the intention of his Majesty's Ministers that this Treaty should be fully executed, no time was lost in procuring those explanations which were necessary for the execution of the Treaty, in the spirit in which it had been framed. His Imperial Majesty at once divested himself of the character of a belligerent in the Mediterranean. But until that was done it was impossible that the two neutrals could co-operate with the belligerent under the Treaty. It is true, that they might all have pursued the same end by different means: but co-operation in such circumstances seemed absolutely impossible."

This, surely, is an explicit and intelligible exposition of the views of his Majesty's Ministers. What follows? So long as Russia waived her belligerent rights in the Mediterranean, she was to be considered, *quoad* Greece and the Mediterranean, as clothed with the same character as her Allies—France and England. She was, to all intents and purposes, a neutral in that quarter, whatever she might be in any other—and, therefore, we were able to co-operate with her for those objects which were contemplated by the Treaty of London, and which were only to be accomplished by neutral parties. Reverse the picture—change the position of Russia in the Mediterranean—represent her as no longer abiding by her pledge of neutrality, but resuming her belligerent rights—and what is the natural consequence of this alteration in her position, so far as regards the conduct of England? Simply this—that we can no longer do that, now that she is a belligerent, which we could and did do when she was a neutral. We co-operate with her under the Treaty in her latter capacity—we may co-operate with her no longer under the Treaty, in her former capacity. We gave her notice and warning of this at the time we demanded those "explanations which were necessary for the execution of the Treaty in the spirit in which it had been framed." We did not say to her, and we had no right to say to her, if you will not divest yourself of your belligerent rights in the Mediterranean, we shall consider your refusal as a ground of war!—We merely warned her of the different effects that would follow from two different courses of action. It was a question of co-operation or non-co-operation—not of peace or war.

We believe we have put the case clearly and distinctly, and have proved that Russia, however she may have surprised us by the forfeiture of her pledge, which she had given so freely, and which entitled her to the highest praise for sincerity and generosity, has not given us such cause for offence as to render it necessary for us to go to war.

The Treaty of London therefore is not at an end. We have ceased, or rather it may be inferred that we shall cease, to co-operate with Russia, when she assumes the belligerent character in the Mediterranean. But this is all. She continues our ally, though the co-operation of our fleets may cease.