

FREDERICTON. TO THE PUBLIC.

The Editor of the Royal Gazette of New-Brunswick has the honor to present to the public the first number of the New Series.

The Editor himself is new; the proficiency in the art of Communicative Intelligence made by numerous surrounding Journalists called for improvement; the recent establishment of a University at Fredericton, with other auspicious signs, indicate an advance in the literary character of the Province:—these are the causes and reasons of the change—*"melior hinc nascitur ordo."*

The alteration amounts almost to a revolution. The Editor has removed to a new Office; other Types are provided; the Paper is of a better description; and the Gazette itself assumes a superior Form—expanding from the cramped and awkward Quarto to the majestic dimensions of the Royal Folio.

Every exertion will be made to procure a new supply of valuable and interesting Matter. The best Papers of England, British America, and the United States will be obtained by the earliest and safest conveyance; Agencies will be established in various districts of the Province; Communications from intelligent and respectable sources will be received with due attention:—by such means the Editor trusts that he shall be enabled to render his Paper much more worthy of the patronage which it enjoys.

A new and more commodious Arrangement of articles may be observed. The body of the Paper is regularly divided according to the quarters of the globe, and subdivided according to the countries and places, to which the several paragraphs may have relation. Europe takes the lead, and of it England—unquestionably the leading country; Asia comes next, in which India claims our first regard; Africa succeeds in our map, with Egypt apparently rising once more into political importance; America, where every eye will primarily look to the UNITED STATES, conducts us home:—for the Colonies of North America we consider and shall treat as ENGLAND on this side the Sea; to them in general we shall consequently pay almost as much regard as to the Province in which our particular lot is cast.

Our Domestic Intelligence will comprise, in addition to the Official Announcements of which we have the honor to be the accredited heralds, authentic information respecting PUBLIC MEASURES, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, and the progress of education in KING'S COLLEGE and the subordinate SCHOOLS of the Province. We shall also usually introduce observations, in the shape of what are called "LEADING ARTICLES," in which we shall endeavour to give a right direction to the minds of our readers in all matters of great importance; more especially those which relate to RELIGION, MORALS, and the PROSPERITY OF BRITISH AMERICA—the three principal objects of our incessant solicitude.

A great defect is observable in most public journals. They appeal sometimes to certain political opinions; at other times to the natural feelings, and not unfrequently (alas) even to the corrupt affections of our nature; but seldom are they found to refer to any fixed standard of duty. It will be our aim to avoid this defect. A newspaper is essentially a record of passing events; and we shall endeavour, while the events are passing, and thus awaken a lively and eager attention, to make such reflections on them as may lead our readers to refer to the rule of eternal rectitude. But that our purpose may be clearly understood, we will now state the principles on which such reflections will be founded.

1.—Our first principle then is a *Supreme Regard to the mind and will of God*, as revealed in the Sacred Volume, and more particularly in the records of Christianity. This revelation alone can we admit as incontrovertible authority in religious and moral questions. This shall be our *primum mobile*; this our *ratio*. We dare not countenance anything which may oppose it; we feel ourselves bound by the most solemn considerations to support and recommend it by all fit and practicable means.

2.—We consider Christianity as a System adapted by Infinite Wisdom to the various forms of civil Society; but we hold that every man who calls himself a Christian is under a strict obligation to act as such in whatever station he may find himself placed. Hence we maintain the propriety of Kings protecting and encouraging the Christian religion, of a National Church, and of Legislative provision for its support. We are however the cordial friends of unlimited toleration, and would treat the various denominations of the religious world with true Christian charity and brotherly love.

3.—Civil Government we consider as actually Conventional; the more congruous indeed with the ordinance of God, and with the essential nature of human Society, the more it retains of the paternal character, in which it had its first and happiest existence; but now, after the many changes which States and Empires have undergone, necessarily dependent for its form and organization on the consent of the potential majority in every place. We are therefore no enemies to any well-regulated monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. But we esteem the happily blended Constitution of England, (in which her Colonies participate) as a peculiar privilege, and would strenuously uphold and defend it—and our own connection with it—against all assailants, foreign or domestic.

4.—Our final maxim is, "*While we have time, let us do good unto all men.*" We heartily desire that the benefits derivable from a pure religion, equal laws, and a well-balanced government, may be enjoyed by all ranks and orders of men, at home and abroad, in the East and in the West; and we embrace with enlarged affection the numerous measures for these benevolent objects which are the glory of our Country and our age.

The Editor will say no more by way of bespeaking a favourable attention to the New Series of the Royal Gazette, except to give the public one assurance. His principles include a sacred and reverential regard to TRUTH. He may mistake; he may be ignorant; but he will not attempt to persuade others of any thing which he does not himself believe.

FOR SALE.

THE House in which the undersigned now resides; it is an excellent stand for mercantile business; or from the number of apartments it contains, is well adapted for a boarding House. For further particulars apply to
GEORGE K. LUGRIN.
August 11, 1829. tf.

Eligible Situation to Let, for one or more Years.

TWO Offices and a commodious Cellar in the Brick Building formerly occupied by the Hon. Thomas Baillie. The apartments may be adapted for a convenient Store. For further particulars, application to be made to
E. W. MILLER.
Fredericton, December 5, 1829. ft.

STRAYED,

IN the month of July last, an OX, he is five years old, wide horned and short ears, having been froze when a calf; is speckled white and pale red, with a star in his forehead. Any person who will give information, or deliver him to the Subscriber shall be handsomely rewarded.
CHRISTOPHER BROWN.
Fredericton, 27th December, 1829. plw. 6w.

THE POWER AND STABILITY OF FEDERATIVE GOVERNMENTS.

A PRIZE ESSAY, READ IN THE THEATRE, OXFORD, JULY 1, 1829.

Assembling after long intervals, they pay a very partial regard to the common weal, but for the most part pursue their private interests; every one supposing that the commonwealth will not be hurt by his neglect, and that others will take care to provide for themselves:—thus, the same feeling prevailing through each member of the body, the community at large imperceptibly perishes.
Thucydides l. 141.

ARGUMENT.

The infinite variety in the local and otherwise peculiar circumstances of different nations urged as a principal reason for the wide discrepancies which exist between governments bearing a common appellation. Hence the difficulty of pronouncing any general conclusion upon their power and stability.

The nature of confederation commented upon; and its place among constitutions of government.

The argument against its capacity for power.

An objection, which might be raised from the fact of the existence of great power in the United Provinces, answered by an enquiry into the sources of that power, shewing how it was affected by the peculiarity of their constitution.

The stability of federative governments considered, and shewn to be incompatible with power.

Examination of the principal features of the Helvetic confederacy.

Sum of the Argument.

Brief review of the political circumstances of the United States.

Political Science, however founded upon the experience of ages, and illustrated by the highest efforts of human wisdom, is nevertheless of a doubtful and ill ascertained character. This defect is inherent in its nature, and inseparable from its subject-matter, arising as well from the unceasing fluctuation in the habits and circumstances, in the moral and social relations of mankind, as from the complex operation of external causes. There exists indeed but little community of opinion or uniformity of practice beyond the circumscribed limits of those maxims in politics, which are deducible by direct inference from moral truths; for the great mass of those rules and principles, which have a more immediate influence upon practice, and give to a government its tone and peculiar organization, are of a description purely local; deriving their force from local circumstances and local interests, and therefore, however just, are only applicable in their full extent to the particular case. Hence it is, that constitutions, nominally and externally the same, have little or no interior resemblance, and in many instances only so far correspond as to justify us in referring them to one common standard.

Closely allied to the difficulties of the science are those impediments to fair and candid investigation which exist with different degrees of strength in the mind of the enquirer. The voice of truth may indeed be heard, but is far too feeble to be obeyed, unless where reason has been enabled to establish around her a calm and perfect silence by stilling the angry and unruly feelings of the human breast. The caution against any attempt to form a comprehensive theory, so just in reference to all subjects which furnish but precarious grounds for reasoning, applies with peculiar force to political discussion, which involves too many questions of interest and prejudice, not to provoke at every step a ready appeal from the judgment to the passions.

The boundaries, then, of this subject are vague and undefined, but comprise in their extent a wide field beaten and explored, and familiar to our knowledge. There are principles of increase and decay, weakness and energy, common to all governments whatever. Others again, which develop themselves more fully and powerfully in constitutions of a peculiar kind. The danger, for instance, of an undue assumption of power by the executive exists more or less in all governments; while in republics more particularly we should look for an excess of faction and party spirit.

In like manner, in all federative constitutions there are many points of common origin, upon the investigation of which we may arrive at a common conclusion, to be subsequently modified by an enquiry into the peculiar circumstances of each separate example.

The system of federation may be partially regarded as a choice of evils, a species of compromise between subjection and independence originating in the inherent weakness of each member of the confederacy. Advantages indeed it proposes and secures, to which a number of small and unconnected states could individually form no reasonable pretension, but which involve in their very attainment a sacrifice of free agency on the part of the respective members. So far it bears a close resemblance to the social compact, by which every man surrenders a portion of his natural rights in exchange for an assurance of a more full and secure enjoyment of those he reserves. But at this point the parallel must cease. In the great system of society the objects of mutual cooperation are infinite in number and extent; and we admire the peculiar beauty of an order of things, which places its ultimate end in the advancement of human happiness, and furnishes us with a means of attaining it at once the only one we can imagine, and in all its parts the most admirably complete. In a federal union, on the contrary, the immediate objects of cooperation are necessarily fewer; the means too for securing them are not only precarious and incomplete, but inferior in many principal points to others, which have been devised for compassing the same end; which are open to observation, and matter of actual experience.

But the excellencies and deficiencies of federal constitutions must be examined, not so much by a comparison with those incident to other forms of government, as by a separate and independent process of investigation. Since it would seem a fair assumption in the outset of our enquiry, that, supposing it possible to consolidate any system of confederated states into one single and thoroughly compacted body, without depriving them of any advantages, natural or acquired, which they had previously enjoyed, the chances of pros-

perity, of power and stability, would be indefinitely increased. In a word, any government, single and indivisible, is surely preferable to one, whose tendency, unless counteracted by the operation of more prevailing causes, is disunion and decay. Nor is it any answer to adduce examples of confederated states, which have attained a higher degree of glory and prosperity than nations possessing a consolidated government; since this would be omitting to notice many important elements of consideration in the manners and habits, temper and situation, of the people thus forced into comparison, all and each of which are to the full as important as their form of government. That there are real advantages belonging more peculiarly to federative constitutions, when organized upon just principles, is not wished to be denied; but there are also counterbalancing obstacles to the extension and durability of national power, which may be said to form part of the essence of federation. Again, the advantages of any state or number of states may be great and unquestionable, and yet the government may be such as to check their growth and increase, and disappoint the fair promise of national prosperity. It will be seen that a federal government necessarily partakes more or less of this character; that it has, in short, a direct tendency to defeat in the end the very object it was devised to promote.

The question of government is a question of the application of means to an end, that end being, in general terms, the happiness and prosperity of the people; and this idea of government supposes a power vested in the hands of a few or more individuals for the benefit of the community. Now it is clear that delegated power ought in all cases to be equal to its object; since it is doubtless unreasonable to make men responsible for the discharge of a sacred trust, while you deny them all adequate means for its fulfilment and execution. It follows that a government, fettered and shackled in its operations by an ill-timed and improper jealousy, cannot be expected to provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the independent character of the commonwealth. How indeed can its administration be anything else than a succession of impotent and temporizing expedients? How can it undertake with confidence, or execute with promptitude and success, any liberal or enlarged plans for the public good?

The public good cannot from its very nature admit of precise and accurate definition. Nor is it possible to assign to it at any given moment fixed and certain limits which it may not be expedient and even necessary to transgress at some future period in order to its preservation. Those therefore who are entrusted with power for the protection and advancement of national interests, must have full and unlimited scope for the exercise of their functions. This power in a free government (and it is such only we are considering) is lodged in the legislature, composed either entirely, or in part, of the representatives of the people; and he, who would give a constitution to his country, prescribing bounds to the legislative authority, would, in his anxiety to avoid an imaginary danger, lay the foundation of practical and extensive injury. The true check and safeguard against the usurpation of the few lies not in controlling the operations of the legislature, but in making it responsible to public opinion, and in giving the nation frequent opportunities of marking that opinion, of testifying their approbation or disavowal, their rejection or

possibility of avoiding in a federal constitution, the defect which necessarily attaches to a limitation of the legislative authority, is placed in a clear point of view by the practice of the United States, which have an unquestionable title to be regarded as the best model of that form of Government, whether in ancient or modern times. With a view to balance the powers of the central and state governments, and to prevent the former from overstepping its proper limits, a power has been there conceded to the judiciary, which has in no other instance, we believe, been vested in that department. Thus if the American legislature should in the passing of any law have transgressed its legitimate bounds, the citizen, who is prosecuted for the violation of that law, may defend himself on the plea of its being at variance with the principles or practice of the constitution; and, notwithstanding the Act may have passed both Houses of the legislature, and have been ratified by the chief Magistrate in accordance with all the usual forms, should the supreme court of judicature find that it contravened the constitution, it would be pronounced null and of no authority. In this manner state laws, even upon matters over which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction, have actually been abrogated.

It does not appear necessary to consider herein what manner the due exercise of the several branches of legislative authority conduces to the vigour and stability of government; but we may safely conclude upon the evidence of reason and confirmation of history, that a supremacy of authority, undivided and uncontrolled in the exercise of its delegated powers, must be lodged in some quarter, and that that quarter can be no other than the legislature.

In the application of this principle to the question of the power of a federative constitution, the enquiry naturally presents itself in two distinct points of view. 1. Can a power of this nature, fully competent to its object, exist at all in a confederacy? 2. Is it in the nature of things to expect that confederate state will be inclined to concede even that full degree of power to the federal head, which is compatible with the principles of their constitution?

Now to both these questions the answer is in the negative. To suppose indeed the existence of such a power in a confederacy involves a contradiction of terms. A supremacy of general authority admits of no participation or interference, and is therefore incompatible with the rights of sovereign and independent states. On the other hand, if we suppose all idea of local administration to be abandoned, and every power, executive, legislative, and judicial, lodged in the component parts of the federal head, the confederacy would no longer exist in any shape but in that of a mere territorial division. We may add, that however slight might be the influence of these divisions on the national administration, in the event of

so entire a consolidation of the states, yet would they be quite sufficient to foster old prejudices, to give frequent occasion for umbrage and jealousy, and thus keep alive the embers of dissension and disunion in the very heart of the community.

The denial of the latter of the above questions is grounded upon the acknowledged principles of human nature. The grand and primary object of an association of states united under one government consists in the improved relations of security, of dignity, and independence, in which they will thereby stand to foreign nations. In the same proportion, therefore, as these interests come less home to the breasts of the greater portion of the community than such as are domestic and of daily recurrence, will the desire of giving efficiency and vigour to the power employed upon them be weak and transient. In the same proportion will the citizens of each separate state repose their confidence in the members, and interest themselves in the measures, of their own government, while they are either inattentive to the concerns of the federal administration, or regard its conduct with jealousy and suspicion.

If again by a confederacy is meant an assemblage of independent states into one great state for national purposes, it follows that all the powers, not ceded by them severally, and delegated in express terms to the federal head, must continue to reside in their own respective administrations. These therefore being, in a peculiar manner, the guardians of local interests, and protectors against the encroachments of the federal head, will always possess a higher relative degree of influence over the people of their respective states: "a circumstance," says a celebrated republican, "which teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions, and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization to give them all the force consistent and compatible with the principles of liberty."

This division of authority involves, among many other sources of inconvenience and danger, the very difficult and delicate question of a concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, where funds are to be provided as well for the maintenance and purposes of the federal administration, as for those of the state governments, there must not only exist a necessity for an extreme care and prudence in regulating the collection of imposts, and defining the precise province of each jurisdiction, but also for a degree of moderation and mutual forbearance in enforcing these regulations, which is seldom to be met with amid the eager passions and jarring interests of numerous societies.

On referring to the history of confederate states, as well ancient as modern, we shall find ample cause for assenting to the proposition, which asserts the power of such governments to be in exact proportion to the weakness or efficiency of the federal head. The denial of supreme authority to this body has in most cases been attended with fatal results, inasmuch as it comprises, among various other sources of evil, one great radical and vital error, in the principle which assigns to the national council under a federative constitution the power of legislating for its members in their collective capacities of states, but denies them all power over the individuals composing those states. Now supposing a demand to be made by this body upon the members of their confederacy for supplies of men, a demand coupled with no constitutional authority for the actual levying of those supplies, the requisition will have practically the force of a mere recommendation, and not of law. The states, on their part, will observe or disregard it at their option, in compliance with the dictates of local interests, or of any faction which may chance to prevail, and accordingly as they shall deem themselves capable or not of prescribing their own terms. For this state of anarchy and disobedience the sole remedy is force; the sole result of such a species of coercion is commonly the aggrandisement of the more powerful states at the expense of their refractory associates.

These remarks are confirmed by observing, that whosoever a confederacy has been partially free from this error, the result has been favourable to its political existence. Thus the common council of the Lycian confederacy, which is instanced by Montesquieu as the best model of that form of government with which he was acquainted, was entrusted with a very delicate species of interference in the appointment of the officers and magistrates of the various cities composing the confederacy. This concession of authority justifies us in concluding, that a union of a very intimate nature subsisted between these cities; one indeed approaching as nearly as possible to a consolidated government.

Again, in the Achaean league, which was shared with the Lycian the applause of political writers, the federal head possessed very ample powers; while so closely drawn were the bonds of union, that all the cities had the same laws and usages, the same weights and measures, and the same money. Thus, when Lacedaemon was brought into the league by Philipomen, the change was attended by an abolition of the laws and institutions of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achaeans. The natural result of this wise organization was the attainment of great power and consideration; however little calculated to withstand the force of internal jealousies, fostered and promoted by the ambition and ascendancy of Rome.

* Mr. Hamilton, one of the most distinguished advocates of the present constitution of the United States.

† We say "partially," because there has never been an instance (the United States, as we shall see hereafter, possessing a constitution of a mixed character) of the investment of sovereign power in the federal head; and for the plain reason, that such a government would not be a confederacy, but a consolidation of states.

‡ Esprit des Loix, ix. 3.
§ See the character given of the Lycians, and the account of their constitution. Strabo, l. xiv.
[To be Continued.]

NOTICE.

THOSE Persons who are indebted to the late Proprietor of the Royal Gazette, are requested to call forthwith, and settle their accounts, as no time will be lost in bringing about this object, and all persons having demands against him will please send in their account.
28th September, 1829.

SHERIFF'S SALES, COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER.

To be sold by Public Auction at the Court-House, in Bathurst, in the County of Gloucester, on Tuesday the 24th day of November, between the hours of 12 and 5 o'clock, in the afternoon of the same day;

ALL the right, title, property, claim, and demand of William Wright, of, in, and to one acre of Land, with the Buildings thereon, situate on the north west side of the harbour of St. Peters. Also, of, in, and to a lot of land lying a little below Bass River, containing 120 acres, more or less, all in the Parish of Bathurst, in the County of Gloucester. The same having been seized and taken by me under an Execution issued out of the Supreme Court, at the suit of John B. H. Starr.

WM. CARMAN, Sheriff of Gloucester.
Sheriff's Office, Bathurst, May 12, 1829.

The sale of the above mentioned property is postponed until Wednesday the 13th of January next, between the hours and at the place aforesaid.
Nov. 25, 1829.

On the 13th day of November next, between the hours of 12 and 5, at the Court House in Bathurst, in the County of Gloucester, will be sold at Public Sale;

ALL the right and title of George Glendening, to a certain lot of Land on the Nepisiquit River, in the Parish of Bathurst, taken from the said George Glendening, at the suit of Charles Mills.

WM. CARMAN, Sheriff of Gloucester.
Bathurst, 25th April, 1829.

The sale of the above mentioned land is postponed until Wednesday the 13th of January next, between the hours and at the place aforesaid.
Nov. 25, 1829.

To be sold by Public Auction, on Monday the 15th day of March next, at the Court-House in Bathurst, between the hours of 12 and 5 o'clock, in the afternoon of the same day;

THAT valuable stand for business in the harbour of Shippan, Parish of Saumarez, consisting of a lot of land, containing 100 acres, more or less, with a good House, store and barn, taken from Peter Degraaf, by a writ of Testatum Fi Fa, at the suit of Duncan & Lock.

WM. CARMAN, Sheriff.
Sheriff's Office, Bathurst, 1st September, 1829.

New Goods.

THE Subscribers Fall Goods comprises a general and extensive assortment of English and American Dry and Fancy Goods, Hardware, cutlery, gun, stationery, groceries, provisions and liquors, selected by himself, he has spared no pains to obtain articles of the best quality which he is now offering for sale at the very lowest rates.

F. E. BECKWITH.

10th December, 1829.

ON CONSIGNMENT.

40 Drums Turkey FIGS;
10 Barrels Muscovado SUGAR;
6 Puncheons Demerara RUM;
60 Dozen Port WINE.

ALSO ON HAND.
60 Chests & Boxes Hyson, Souchong and Congo TEAS.

F. E. BECKWITH.

10th December, 1829. 6w.

Wine and Porter Store.

THE SUBSCRIBER OFFERS FOR SALE.

50 DOZEN of particular fine Madeira WINE, Vintage 1825.
12 Ditto superior ditto, ditto.
12 Ditto old P. Madeira;
A few dozen old Port;
40 Ditto Hibbert's best London Porters;
5000 Best Havana SEAGRASS.
The whole of which will be sold cheap for Cash.
WILLIAM MILLER.
Fredericton, Dec. 22, 1829. 1m

NEW GOODS.

BY the Isabella from Greenock, and Pyrenes from London, the subscribers have received, in addition to their recent importation; White and Grey Shirting Cottons; Plaids; Camblet; Carpeting; Checks; and Homespuns; Seraw Augers; black, blue, whitened-brown, and all coloured Threads; Pot, Foolcap, Post and fine Quilt Writing Paper; Goose Quills; Silk Braces; Worsted, and Cotton do.; India, Book-Muslin; Gros De Naples; black Silk; and Kid Stocks; Gentlemen's Beaver, Black, Kid, and Buck Gloves; Fashionable Silk Pocket Handkerchiefs; 16 and 44 Black Crape; Sewing Silk; Ribbons, &c. &c., all of which will be sold very cheap for prompt payment.

FISHER, WALKER, & Co.
Fredericton, 20th October, 1829. tf

FALL GOODS.

The Subscribers have received per Ships Forth and Augusta, from Liverpool, a part of their Fall Supply of British Merchandise, consisting of
BLACK, blue, and Olive Superfine Cloths; and Cassimeres; Gentlemen's Superfine, and Plaided Hats; Ladies Black, and Drab, Beaver Bonnets, red and white Flannels; green Baze; drab Flushing, and Kersey; rose and point Blankets; Patent Cordage 1 1/4 to 4 1/2 inch; Bed Cords, and white Rope, Table Knives, and Forks; Desert do.; a few dozen Superior Silver Steel Pen Knives; Common do., and double-bladed Pocket-Knives; Razors in Cases assorted; Flat, Round, and Square Iron; best (L) Blistered Steel; 4d, 6d, 12d, and 20d fine rose Nails; Spades and Shovels; Mould and Drip Candles; Soap, &c. &c.; which, together with their Stock on hand, will be sold at the lowest possible advance, for cash, or other approved Payments.

FISHER, WALKER, & Co.
Fredericton, October 6, 1829.

For LONDON DERRY.

THE Substantial copper fastened Brig Leston, built by John Connell master, will sail instant, and accommodate a few cabin and steerage Passengers, for which she has superior accommodations. Apply to the Master on board, or here to

ARCHIBALD GAULT.

December 8th, 1829. p4w
It is expected that the above vessel will again sail from Londonderry for St. John, about 1st April next, persons in this country wishing to engage passages for their Friends may do so by an early application as above.

TO LET, for One or more Years.
THAT dwelling House in Queen-street, CAMBROW, owned and formerly occupied by SAMUEL CAMERON. It has good accommodations above and below, with a convenient Stable and Garden attached thereto. For further particulars apply at the Royal Gazette Office.

Fredericton, 28th Nov. 1829.

ASSIZE OF BREAD.

At a Special Session of the Peace, holden at Fredericton, in and for the County of York, on Saturday the 20th day of June, 1829.

ORDERED, that from and after the 25th instant, the price of the [One Pound Loaf of] WHEAT BREAD, be Three-pence, and other Loaves in proportion.
H. G. CLOPPER.

THE ROYAL GAZETTE.

TERMS—16s. per Annum, exclusive of Postage. Advertisements not exceeding Twelve Lines will be inserted for Four Shillings and Sixpence the first, and one Shilling and Sixpence for each succeeding Insertion. Advertisements must be accompanied with Cash, and the insertions will be regulated according to the amount received. Blanks, Handbills, &c. &c. can be struck off at the shortest notice.