

LONDON.—POLITICS OF EUROPE.
CONDITIONS OF THE PEACE.

THOSE who pretend that the late contest with France cannot be justified upon the plea of strict necessity, seem to suppose that Governments ought not to avail themselves of favourable opportunities. Wars, in general, are more convenient than necessary—when the predicament in which a rival is placed offers a palpable advantage, it is cowardice for an individual, and treachery for a Cabinet, to neglect it.—The extinction of despotism in France, and the impression which such an event made in every State of Europe, threw the four aces and all the honours into the hands of the late Ministry; if, in playing the cards, they mistook one for another, it was not the fault of Fortune. When they armed the nation against France, the object which they avowed was, the destruction of democratical principles, and the restoration of Monarchy. The first point was gained without any struggle of their own: as soon as the impracticable equality of Rousseau, and his paradoxical opinions, came to be tried by the touchstone of experience, the feverish agitations of the deluded multitude ended in a short paroxysm. With regard to the restoration of Monarchy in France, there can be no reason to regret the disappointment of the late Ministry. To this country the old French Government was an implacable enemy.

It is well known that Louis XIV. and his two Successors used their utmost endeavours not only to lessen the power of Great-Britain, but also to subvert her liberties. In the reign of Lewis XV. the Duke of Choiseul planned the Expedition to Egypt, with a view of paving the way to our ruin in India; and the Ministers of Lewis XVI. after having encouraged the American Rebellion, entered into a clandestine Alliance with Tippoo. The Bourbons have constantly proved the most inveterate enemies of this Empire; and if our late Rulers had succeeded in enforcing the claim of the French Pretender, Great-Britain would not find him more equitable than his predecessors. The Revolution which crushed the French Despots, has saved us, or rather presented us with the means of raising the splendour and establishing the prosperity of our Country. Unfortunately, the late pilot lost the direction of the compass, and wandered about in his voyage without any hope of reaching the harbour, and seeing the end of his dangers. If, instead of casting unmerited aspersions on the character of the First Consul, our late Minister had perpended the true import of his letter, and weighed the equity of his offers, the evil consequences of the Battle of Marengo would not have occasioned so many perplexities in the affairs of Europe, and especially in our Cabinet. When the late Chancellor of the Exchequer quitted the helm, the prospect could not be more gloomy; the hostile coalition of the Northern Powers, the incertitude of our success in Egypt, and the menacing attitude of a numerous army on the coast of France, could not but present a scene of serious and uncommon difficulties to the new Administration; in the course however of a few months, we find every obstacle conquered, and the Country happily restored to the blessings of Peace.—To know the value of the conditions, it is necessary to examine how far the dignity of the Crown, the credit and interest of the Nation, have been preserved. The two first points are completely obtained, when no humiliating or improper concession is made, as, for instance, a restitution of the Ships taken at Toulon or in Holland would have been; when Allies are not deserted, and faith is religiously maintained.

Whoever peruses the Preliminary Articles will see that the justice and honour of our Sovereign shine there equally resplendent; and, as to our Allies, Ministers having prevailed on France to evacuate the dominions of the King of Naples, the Porte, and Portugal, and to agree to the absolute integrity of those Powers, we may observe, that their prudent conduct has gained an evident advantage over the Cabinet of the Thuilleries; as, by the alienation of Trinidad and Ceylon the best Allies of France are compelled to pay the pipers. It would be ridiculous to blame the First Consul on that account; he has supported his Allies as well as he could, and obtained for them honourable terms, yet, it so happens, that our Allies are better used than those of France. It has been said that we have forgot two Allies, namely, the King of Sardinia and the Stadtholder; as to the former, he cannot claim any connection with this country, especially after his spontaneous abdication, respecting the Sovereignty of Piedmont.—The Stadtholder cannot, in his actual predicament, deprived of his power, be considered as an Ally; he is a Prince who deserves the partial care and protection of Great-Britain; and we make no doubt, but in the conclusion of the Treaty, his Highness will receive an adequate establishment.

It remains for us to consider what territory the nation to gain from this Peace. The Islands of Ceylon and Trinidad set in competition with the aggrandisement of France, may appear at first an inconsiderable object; but when we add in the scales our extensive conquests in India, the integrity of our Navy, and the destruction of the French Marine, it is not easy to determine which of the two countries has obtained the preponderance. The idea that Peace will enable the French Nation to rival, and even surpass us in commerce, is the greatest chimera—It is to our insular position, to the extent of our coasts, the peculiar difficulties of the tides in our seas, that we are indebted for the superior skill and energy of our sailors, and on them is grounded all our unparalleled mercantile consequence. We cannot omit, that the national anxiety from the war was deeper among us than in France.

The French had no reason to apprehend any attack from us by land; they knew that the Nation could not be inclined to renew the disastrous scenes of Quiberon, Holland and Ferrol—while at the same time we could not but feel vulnerable in many quarters. Notwithstanding the incomparable vigilance of the present Ministers, the safety of Ireland, from the hostile preparations of France, was a subject of serious alarm. And though we are fully convinced that France never would ultimately succeed in an invasion of this Island; yet it is to be considered that the sole attempt would have been felt by the whole Nation as a deep calamity. Peace is the first desideratum in any Country, and especially a commercial Nation—that which has been concluded, when circumstances are carefully weighed, must appear a necessary measure.—The line of conduct pursued by the present Ministers in this important transaction, entitles them to the gratitude of the whole Empire. Surrounded with innumerable difficulties, they have brought about a speedy Peace, and obtained more eligible terms for this Country than their Predecessors in office in this Reign, ever could in the termination of a War.

REFLECTIONS ON PEACE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GAZETTE DE FRANCE.

WAR has just ceased between France and England: Peace has commenced for the universe. This epoch, for ever memorable, is, without contradiction, the most brilliant and the most glorious in the life of Bonaparte. It was the only event which was wanting to complete his destiny. If it were not necessary for him to be the greatest man on the earth, it was requisite to make him as great a man as he could be. Nations in general had not yet proclaimed him the pacificator of the world; he was only the first warrior in it. The seal has just been put upon his immortality.

Surprise is not the most lively sensation that has been produced by the news that was announced yesterday by the sound of cannon, and solemn proclamations. The impatience of the two nations may be said to have stolen this great secret from their Cabinets; but the emotion excited in the public mind, has not been less grateful than speedy. The rejoicing was free and expressive. Happiness prevailed every countenance, penetrated all hearts, and beamed in every forehead.

It is less difficult, without doubt, to stop the Continental, than that of a Maritime War: the vast conflagration of which is communicated to the most distant parts of the globe. It is painful to reflect that the blessing which Europe enjoys, cannot yet be shared by that portion of the two nations which is spread over the surface of the seas, in the Antilles, in Egypt, and beyond the tropics. The blood that has been spilled by error is a loss that nothing can compensate: and we do not know any shipwrecks more deplorable than those which are caused in port, after having escaped the violence of tempests. It is without doubt, by the effect of this natural feeling, that in the days of mourning and tears, we have appeared to lament more than any others, the loss of those victims which would still be alive, had they been lucky enough to escape danger only a few hours longer.

The two Governments, however, will leave no means untried to put a stop to the partial disasters which ignorance and distance must necessarily prolong among friends, who have not yet had time to know each other. This state of things inseparable from a Maritime and general war, offers besides a motive of security to those who do not attach to the Preliminaries of Peace the idea and the hopes that in the present circumstances it is just and reasonable to form such a conception. This, in fact, is not an enterprise of which the afterthought should remain in the mind of the British Government, because all its movements are complicated, its power is immense; and because the reins of the State which, spread in their hands, are divided into a thousand diverging parts, which