

and, in general, to suspend, hinder, or raise the price of labour, shall be punished by imprisonment of from one month to three years; and ringleaders shall be condemned to imprisonment of from two to five years.

But whilst the civil administration was thus endeavouring to introduce order in the interior, the French army was accomplishing a mission far more dangerous, and which could alone insure the tranquility of the colony. We cannot here enter into a minute detail of the rapid military operations of 1843, multiplied over the whole surface of the country, from the frontiers of Tunis to those of Morocco; but, perhaps, our readers will be glad to be presented with a succinct view of what has been done.

The state of the country between the Mina, the Chelif, and the sea, was far from satisfactory in the month of April 1843. Insurrection raged still up to the very gates of Cherchell, and the whole of the Dahara, with the exception of the great tribe of Beni-Zerwals, which had fallen for the most part into the hands of General Gentil, on the 22nd March had risen to join Abd-el-Kader. All the inhabitants of the banks of the Chelif and of the the Khalifah of Sebeon, created a lively feeling in his favour among mountainous chain of the Warensenis submitted to his authority. These successes of the Emir shook the whole west of the province of Tittery and the east of Mascara; his letters, scattered with profusion from the frontiers of Morocco to the very heart of the professed allies of France in all parts, and reanimated the spirits of his numerous partisans. Himself at the head of a brilliant squadron of regular cavalry, amounting to 800 men, recruited and mounted among the tribes which had recently flocked again to his banner, and with at least 2,000 regular infantry, as well in the *Esmaila* (camp) as in the mountains of Dahara and Warensenis, he had regained confidence in his fortune, and established his ascendancy over the mind of the people.

Amid such difficulties the campaign of the spring of 1843 opened. It was determined by a vigorous warfare, supported by firm military establishments in the very centre of the insurgent country, to overthrow in a few weeks the pretensions of the brave and unfortunate Abd-el-Kader, to strengthen once more French superiority over all the people between the sea and the desert, and to drive back the Emir and his Khalifas beyond the Tell.

To accomplish those objects, it was resolved, in the first place, to make permanent establishments at Orleanville on the Chelif, at Tenes, on the shore between Mostaghanem and Cherchell, and at Tiarret, on the confines of the desert. Provisional posts, moreover, were planned at Teniet-el-Had, Wed-Rouina, Boghar, and the Khamis of the Beni-Ouragh, in order that the various columns of the army might have supplies at hand. The soldiers were then to overrun the mountains of the Dahara and Warensenis; and two light columns moving from Boghar and Tiarret were to traverse the desert in pursuit of the *Esmaila* of the Emir, and all the populations that were driven before the central columns. The divisions of Algiers and Oran were entrusted with the performance of these duties.

It will have been seen from this sketch of the campaign, that the French are at present compelled to put forth an overwhelming force to defeat the efforts of an enemy in actual numbers far inferior, but nevertheless difficult to overcome, not so much from their bravery, which, in truth, is of little or no avail against European discipline, as from their lightness, knowledge of the country, and above all, the sympathy of the seemingly tranquilised tribes. It is impossible to believe that these outbreaks would so frequently occur if those who are complacently styled allies did not give aid to the Emir.

The "Gouverneur-general," with nine battalions from Milanah and Mostaghanem, undertook in the first place to lay the foundations of Orleanville and Tenes, and to bring into subjection the whole Dahara from the mouth of the Chelif to Cherchell.

General Changarnier, whose portrait we gave, was entrusted with the task of penetrating at the same time into the eastern chain of the Warensenis, establishing the ports of Teniet-el-Had and Wed-Rouina, and, to use the French technical phrase, of "harassing and ruining" the haughty mountaineers of those countries, should they refuse to submit.

His Royal Highness Monseigneur le Duc d'Anmale was expected simultaneously to pursue and overtake the *Esmaila* of the Emir in the desert. The column of Mostaghanem was to cover the tribes of the Lower Mina and the Lower Chelif, attacking the refractory Flittas, whilst Colonel Gery was charged with the protection of Mascara.

General Bedeau meanwhile received orders to support the last mentioned column, if necessary, and to enter the country of the Djelfra, still devoted to the Emir, where his resources were said to be abundant.

These movements accomplished, the Governor-general was to attack, in concert with Lamoriciere and the column of Mostaghanem, the western side of the Warensenis chain; Changarnier was to devastate the eastern extremity; and the light columns of Medeah and Teniet-el-Had were to march along the south, in order the more effectually to fatigue and distress the enemy.

(To be continued.)

HON. JOSEPH HOWE'S LETTER TO F. HINCKS, ESQ.

MY DEAR SIR,—I regret to find that my name has become mixed up with your Newspaper discussion in Canada, and that some chance observation of mine called forth in the heat of debate, has been quoted by your enemies as conveying a condemnation of the course pursued by yourself and friends in retiring from the Executive Council. As I do not see many Canada papers, and none very regularly, and as I am not even aware of what the Reporters here have made me say, I am at a loss to know how any opinions of mine can be made to bear the interpretation put upon them. I think it fair, however, to set the matter right, by a frank denial that I ever pronounced any con-

demnation of the course pursued by the retiring ministers in Canada and an explanation of my opinions on the important principles which appear to be involved in the pending controversy.

The conflicting statements put forth by the Governor General and his ex-Councillors, rendered it difficult, for some time, to judge what the real points at issue were, the facts of the case, upon which alone an opinion could be formed, not being admitted on both sides. It was in reference to this contrariety of statement that I said, in answer to some speaker who sought to show that the Canadian and Nova Scotian cases were strictly analogous, that the matter had been so "bungled" in Canada, that it was difficult to say whether such an inference could be fairly drawn. This is all that was said, or intended; and the observation was only meant to apply to the then involved state of the controversy, and used without any desire to charge blame upon either of the parties, whose opposing statements rendered it difficult at the moment to form a correct decision, and most desirable to keep the simple fact, upon which the retirements here were based, free from any theoretical dispute about general principles, which it did not necessarily involve. I trust that this explanation will be deemed satisfactory, and the propriety of the course pursued, under the circumstances in which we were placed at once perceived.

The real points at issue in Canada appears to be now more distinctly developed; and, assuming that all parties mean what they say, and nothing more, and are disposed to profit by the past, and bury the feelings it may have aroused, I can see no reason why Mr. Lafontaine and his friends should not be recalled to office to-morrow.

You deny that you demanded any "stipulations" as to the mode in which patronage should be dispensed in future: on this point then, there need be no further controversy.

You claim the right to be consulted before appointments are offered or made. This appears to be reasonable. In three years and a half that I sat in Lord Falkland's Council, I never knew an instance in which this wise rule was violated. I can imagine some extreme case in which a Governor would act without advice, but only when his ministers had lost his confidence; and then the more correct constitutional mode would be, not to wound and mortify, but to dismiss them.

You claim that no appointment should be made prejudicial to your influence. Whatever may be said of this in the abstract, in practice it must be conceded to every ministry. Members of Council are, or ought to be, selected because they have influence—they can only be useful and efficient while they retain it. To break it down, by showing that to support them, is not the road to preferment, is anti-British, and absurd—to hold out a bounty to encourage opposition to men who honestly support a Governor, is an administrative anomaly which these Colonies will never tolerate—to which men of spirit will never submit. To do Lord Falkland justice, he never favoured such a practice while his Cabinet was united: he endeavoured to strengthen the legitimate influence of his advisers, by patronizing those who supported them. His errors were of a late date, and of a different kind.

The true principles upon which patronage should be dispensed I take to be these:—The Sovereign is bound to bestow all offices for the general good, without reference to party; but as no single mind can decide in all cases what is for the general good, and as a majority of the people's Representatives are assumed to reflect the wishes, and best understand the true interests of the people, the Crown selects advisers from that majority, and takes their advice in the distribution of patronage. So long as these men really reflect the national sentiment and feeling, it would be most unwise to patronize those who oppose them, and give offices to those who have mistaken the real interests of the country, or failed to carry with them the sympathies and confidence of the people. To give force and efficacy to the national will—harmony and vigour to the national councils, public confidence should govern political appointments; and, in order that there may be the necessary firmness and stability in the Government, those who conduct it should have their hands strengthened by the Sovereign or the Governor they serve, down to the moment when they are to be dismissed, for some good reason, justifying a re-construction or an appeal to the constituency, or in obedience to the declared wishes of Parliament. If, then, you did any thing to forfeit the Governor General's confidence, it appears to me that he should have dismissed you, and appealed to the country; but while you were his ministers, it was at variance with constitutional principles to deny to you the legitimate influence arising from the dispensation of patronage—that is, provided it was done, which, by his friends appears to be stoutly denied.

The minority, under such a system, have no reason to complain: they are not oppressed—they share all the common blessings secured by good government and equal laws, but they do not, for the time, share in the public honours and rewards which are the prizes reserved for those who have the ability to guide the national intellect, or the tact and good fortune to command the confidence of the majority.

If it be said that Colonial patronage is not to be dispensed by the Governors, so as to satisfy the Parliamentary majority in Canada, but the Parliamentary majority in England, then you had better have a respectable despotism at once, without all the troublesome and expensive machinery of Representative government; but I cannot believe that Sir Charles means this, or that such a policy would be approved at home.

The question of how far the Prerogative is to be restrained, in matters purely local, appears to be much canvassed in Canada. The view taken here, previous to 1840, was, that all those petty functionaries spread over the different counties, should be appointed avowedly by the Council. This was, in theory, objected to by Lord Sydenham, who urged that every officer should be appointed by the Governor in the name of the Queen—the point was yielded, but he frankly admitted that, in practice these

appointments must be made by the Council, who would alone possess the necessary local information. Our experience proves that, on this point, there need be no controversy. I can call to mind no instance, in three years, in which these appointments were not made with the approval of the Council, or in which Lord Falkland found it necessary to interpose the Prerogative in opposition to their wishes.

You will perceive, then, that on several of the topics raised in Canada, we have had hitherto no dispute. Appointments, and offers of appointments, were always communicated to us, before they were made public, except in one instance, in which the secret was divulged by a member of the Council, the indiscretion being promptly disavowed by the Lieutenant Governor. It is apparent that Responsible Government has been down to a certain period worked out simply and practically here without any material difficulty arising to throw discredit on the system. Why you, having a clear Parliamentary majority, should have any in Canada, I cannot comprehend. If Sir Charles seeks to deny to you what Lord Falkland always freely accorded to us, he is wrong—if you, having all this in practice, desire to press the theory to an inconveniently strict definition, you may be acting unwisely, but of this the people of Canada are the legitimate judges. If you ask for nothing more than appears to me to be fairly included in the system, and have a majority to support you, you ought to be the Ministers. If Sir Charles is determined to give less, and can get a majority, he may obtain a temporary triumph, but the people will ultimately have Responsible Government in all its integrity, notwithstanding.

As regards the reservation of the bill for suppressing Orange Lodges, it appears to me that circumstances may arise, after a government measure has been introduced, to render its postponement desirable. In that case the preferable mode would be, for one branch or the other to defer it to the next Session, and this could be done by the Government majority in any stage of its progress.

You will probably desire to know what we in Nova Scotia have been quarrelling about. The case is very simple. The Liberal party, or a large section of it, in consideration of the dismissal of four or five of the more obstructive members of the old Council, and the recognition of the new principles, assented, in 1840, to a coalition, being content with a very inadequate representation at the Council Board, having a frank acknowledgment of their claims to a further increase as vacancies occurred. The Liberal Majority in the last House sustained the Government in good faith for three Sessions, not demanding that official or honorary vacancies should be made for their leaders, but never anticipating that their fair claims would be overlooked, or that a more equal adjustment, as to numbers, in Council, would be denied.

In 1843, personal feelings, and a strong difference of opinion on the subject of Education, (the Attorney General supporting the denominational system of Colleges, or one for each sect, and the liberals, sick of that system, going for one for the whole people) rendered a reconstruction of the Council desirable. Lord Falkland resorted to a dissolution. The Liberals, somewhat reduced in numbers, still formed a majority in the new House. Had the Governor not interposed, they offered to and could have formed a strong government, leaving out one or two of the old council. He seemed desirous to retain all the old members, and although the Liberals had but three seats out of eight, they yielded to his wishes, and consented to meet the new House with the Council as it stood. At this moment Lord Falkland having obtained their adhesions, without breathing a syllable of such an intention, appointed Mr. Almon, passing over all the Liberals in both branches, and giving as his reasons, that he made the selection because of Mr. A.'s "affinity" to the Attorney General, and to show that that gentleman possessed his confidence, and, by inevitable inference, that we did not. As the new appointment increased the representation of the old Compact party in the proportion of 6 to 3, and as the reasons given for it were not only an outrage upon constitutional principles, but an insult to the minority, we remonstrated and retired. Then commenced a series of the most ludicrous events, all of which we of course are bound to charge upon Lord Falkland's advisers.

Scarcely had we withdrawn when a letter was sent after us, and published in the Newspapers, charging us with attempting, by retiring, and getting out of the Governor's way, to wrest the prerogative from him. This necessarily involved us in a newspaper controversy with the Governor before the House met. Though six weeks elapsed before it assembled, the vacancies were not filled, and the Governor came down with a grave denunciation of party Government. Considering party Government a necessary incident of a British Representative system, the Liberals moved an amendment, waiving the question, but assuring the Governor that whenever he was surrounded by a Council truly reflecting the opinions of the country, it should have their confidence. After a fortnight's debate, during which the members were subjected to a system of undignified personal solicitations and influence, unparalleled in this Province, the Address was carried by a majority of one, two or three recreant liberals and all the "loose fish" voting with the Government. You will perceive that the opposition, with all the influence of Government and the Governor against them, had twenty-five votes—the Administration, with three or four seats in Council, and two important offices to bestow, only being able to muster twenty-six. A more palpable and glaring defeat was never suffered, and resignation was the only honorable alternative.

You will see, then that Lord Falkland's first mistake, was dissolving a friendly House in which he had a clear majority—his second was asking the party, who formed one half of the new House, to consent to a coalition, with a representation of two to one against them, and in the face of an appointment, justified by reasons which were highly offensive—his third blunder was, charging gentlemen who would not lend themselves to such an ab-